Ron:
Perhaps viewing it as an increase in predictabilty to create a relative base
in
certainty might come closer to the meaning that is commonly held in the
term "belief', I think what is argued is how that certainty is arrived at. I
think
people tend to define the term as it relates to faith in our culture as
certain
kinds of socially derrived assumptions verses a personal approach to the
inquirey of experience.
How we make the arguement from the particular expereince to the universal
understanding is every bit as important as the expereince being described.
because it is likewise as important to reduce that universal back to the
related
expereince in ones own life.
The most successful methods are those which correlate with expereince more
accurately.
Ayn Rand made some observations about the most common assumptions being to
place
faith in the words of an authority figure over individual thought. That as a
result of a complex
culture the tendancy is stronger because of the requirements it demands to
function.

[Krimel]
William James draws an interesting distinction between percepts and
concepts. Percepts are the ongoing ever changing dynamic flux of immediate
experience. Precepts are synthesized from sense data. For James percepts are
both dynamic and continuous. Concepts on the other hand are static and
discrete. They are the categories into which we shelve our percepts.
Concepts he claims are wholly derived from perception. James thinks the
Greeks were seduced by the beauty and perfection of concepts. The rational
world of concepts was without flaw while the messy world of percepts is
always changing and dirty. The Greeks saw the world of percepts as shadows
derived from concepts. James argues that this is backassward. For one thing,
once you have carved the world into discrete conceptual categories, it is
darn near impossible to reconstruct the dynamic continuum experience. 

He speaks directly of Pirsig's "ghosts" when he says:

"What is it to be real? The best definition I know is that which the
pragmatist rule gives: 'anything is real of which we find ourselves obliged
to take account in any way,' Concepts are thus as real as percepts for we
cannot live a moment without taking account of them. But the 'eternal' kind
of being which they enjoy is inferior to the temporal kind because it is so
static and schematic and lacks so many characters which temporal reality
possesses." 

Nevertheless his biggest point is that our understanding of experience
neither precepts nor concepts alone is sufficient. He claims:

"No one can tell, of the things he now holds in his hands and reads, how
much comes through his eyes and fingers, and how much, from his apperceiving
intellect, unites with that and makes of it this particular 'book'? The
universal and the particular parts of the experience are literally immersed
in each other and both are indispensible. Conception is not like a painted
hook, on which no real chain can be hung, for we hang concepts upon percepts
and percepts on concepts interchangeably and indefinitely; and the relation
of the two is much more like what we find in the cylindrical 'panoramas' in
which a painted background continues a real foreground so cunningly that one
fails to detect the joint."

I think this all points to reality as illusion in the sense you and I have
discussed before. Illusion not as a mirage but as a particular way of
organizing our percepts and concepts. In the light of our percepts and
concepts what we see is not True in any absolute sense but not False either;
rather they give us belief about reality.


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