[Michael]
IMO you would do well to consider why you reacted that way.
[Arlo]
Right. As I had said, because I've been down the path of "activist
judges" and laments about the breech to the Constitution so many
times I border on nauseous when I hear the term. Take this on the
heels of your initial reply to my first response which basically
dissected everything into "I agree with you in all places where you
say the MOQ would find this immoral" and something akin to "You're
confused, or not seeing clearly, or missing the boat, or whatever..."
whenever I suggest the MOQ may find such and such an instance moral.
Everyone and their brother has a "boogeyman" that they feel the rest
of us should be up in arms about, and everyone and their brother
thinks those who disagree about the potential devastation of said
boogeyman is trapped in some "static" view, incapable of seeing their
profound message.
[Michael]
Law written through democratic representative process is dynamic.
Law written through judicial fiat is static.
[Arlo]
I don't even know what to say this, except it reveals such a profound
misuse of MOQ terminology, and to set up a "good/bad" dichotomy as
well. Just horrible. Better you just use the proper terms, good and
bad. Indeed, I'd say RvW was a very profound example of DQ since it
represented a response to a situation that did not rely on old
analogues, but paved new ground. You think that direction was/is
"bad". But it was hardly "static". All "law", by the way, is by
nature a "static pattern of value". You may argue, of course, that
RvW sets up a law that places of static pattern of social value OVER
a static intellectual patterns. This would get back to your dichotomy
above. Laws by democratic representation evidence intellectual
control of society, laws by fiat evidence social control of
intellect. THAT would be appropriate MOQ terminology.
[Michael]
Is this an accurate reckoning of MoQ's understanding of the
"evolution" of a human life, and more importantly how that human life
compares to other life during its "evolution"?
[Arlo]
I think its ultimately problematic to consider "pre-social" human
organisms to be nothing more than biological patterns. They are, of
course, I'm not disputing that. What I am concerned about is law that
is based on this notion alone. For example, if we abort "pre-birth"
using the argument that the zygote or whatever is nothing more than a
biological pattern, isn't this also what it is for quite a while
after its birth? How is a newborn any less "just a biological
pattern" than it was three days prior in the womb? If we draw the
line where we *legally* consider the organism a "person" only after
it becomes "social", then the moment of birth is arbitrary and must
be tossed aside in that formulation.
Indeed, many argue socialization begins in utero, and the developing
fetus begins responding to social input early on. Is THIS the target
then for moral abortions? Others have argued that socialization does
not occur until significantly later in the post-birth organism. My
point here is not WHEN socialization occurs (people have been
debating that for decades), but whether or not this is what is being
suggested as the "measuring line" between when ending the life of the
organism is moral and when it is not. If so, we need to define that
line based on that line's merits, and "birth" is not it.
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