[Krimel]: > I don't see how calling it "Subjective Sensibility" solves anything. > It sounds like a proper noun to me. Categorically speaking that's > a thing. You can't use the name game to make it go away. > So categorically speaking I'll stick with process which is a set of > relationships.
[Ham] Yes, Sensibility is a noun, just as Quality is a noun. If you must speak "categorically", Subjective Sensibility is a category. But it is not a "set of relationships." It is the unit of awareness that identifies the individual Knower. [Krimel] Right this is the point where we either misunderstand each other or flat out disagree. The Self is not a thing. It is not Quality either. The Self is a process or to be strictly grammatical it is a verb. It does not fall into the category of things that are discrete. It is not a "unit." I might be persuaded that it is not a set of relationships but it certainly is what emerges from a set of relationships. [Ham] What do you call the part of self that is not a body? If each of us produces a body, then this "non-body part" is accountable. This is what I call the Self. It is the "awareness" contingent of being-aware. [Krimel] I guess I would call the part of the self that is non-body, the environment. The Mind part of the Mind/Body that arises from the interaction of body and environment. [Ham] Sensation IS value sensibility, which is the core self. That's what I've been saying. Do you think emotions such as revulsion and fear are physiological? Consider the epistemology: You are unconscious, and the endorphines in your nerve synapses are behaving physiologically as if reacting to revulsion or fear. But where is the revulsion or fear? It it is not sensible (i.e., made aware) it cannot be revulsion or fear. Insensible emotion is an oxymoron. Unrealized value is a myth. A world that is not experienced does not exist. [Krimel] Ok first if "Sensation IS value sensibility" then why not drop the pretentiousness and use the English term? Damasio makes a distinction between the physiology of emotion of the feeling of emotion and I was put off by that until he explained with a concrete example. A man had a stroke that damaged an area of the brain that included the emotional pathways between the limbic system and the cortex. The man now displays many of the outward signs of emotional communication: smiling, frowning etc. but he does not experience the emotion. In other word the physiology of emotion is present but not the experience of emotion. As a result he cannot make complicated decisions and is unable to work. Experience is a complex process that involves all kinds of feedback loops between the body and the environment and within the body to a variety of sensory and motor systems. If you want the really simple stripped down version: the system that is "me" is basically an array of inputs (sensation) and a series of outputs (motor functions). Outputs, many of which are purely based on emotion are in their simplest form either about speeding up or slowing down. Of course this is an oversimplification but it is from such simple processes that enormous complexity begin. It emerges from them. [Ham] Watcher, Knower, Subject, Observer all refer to the Self. By whatever label you choose, this is the individual's cognitive awareness. It is neither a "thing" nor a "function". Intellection is a function because it differentiates sensible value into the discrete components of experiential existence. That's where "process" enters into our worldview. [Krimel] The Self has lots and lots of processes. Only some of them become part of conscious awareness. Intellectual functions are the distinctly human parts of conscious awareness. They involve the slurring of time and expanded access to memory but they are generally filtered through the linguistic centers which are highly specialized. [Krimel]: > Our conceptual patterns are our construction but they are > rooted in our senses. The senses are our interface with the > physical world. We transduce physical energy into patterns > of electro-chemical interactions. We encode the physical. > Our concepts and understanding are always dependent on > sensory confirmation. As I have said illusions are not false, > they are just particular ways of organizing sense data. > We are capable of having multiple views and understandings > of our selves. It is our capacity to shift point of view that > makes us unique. And we can see it developing in our young. [Ham] As incredulous as it seems, you have just restated my position in your own words. I find nothing in your statement that I disagree with. But I would emphasize that "having multiple views and understandings of our selves" in no way means having someone else's conscious awareness. Every self is a unique and individual point of view. [Krimel] Of course we cannot have each other's conscious awareness. We share experiences by encoding our personal experience into language and decoding the experiences of others from language. Language works because there is overlap. It exploits the commonality between your experience and mine. > [Krimel] > If you insist on using your terms, then Self does not invent > values, but values invent the Self. [Ham] As I define the Self as value-sensibility, I can understand how values might be conceived to "actualize" selfness. However, it's inconsistent with the epistemology of Essentialism. Not that you particularly care, but I consider Sensibility primary to value realization. [Krimel] You are right I have nothing vested in preserving Essentialism. In fact I think the sooner you move past it the better. But to do that you have to realize that your investment in it is emotional not intellectual. [Ham] Value doesn't "realize"; it simply represents what is beyond sensibility. I like to think of it as desire's "referent". Socrates described desire as what man wants and does not possess: "...what he neither has nor himself is--that which he lacks--this is what he wants and desires." If Socrates was right, then the object of desire, the thing wanted, is the desire's value. In the differentiated world of existence, we yearn for value and experience it in passing things and events. But pure (metaphysical) Sensibility needs no object; Value is already and immutably its undivided Essence. That's why in my ontogeny Sensibility is negated from Essence to create the entity Being-Aware. Since the individuated self is incapable of sensing Essence directly, it experiences the Source as the value of otherness. [Krimel] I have nothing to say about this other than it is an example of how you are making up a lot of terms and arguments to support your desire to make your 'philosophy' work. Unfortunately it is stated in terms that make evaluation problematic. Just one example: Sensation is the encoding of physical energy in neural impulses. It cannot occur is there is nothing out there to encode or if there is no physical organs to do the encoding. Sensation is not a metaphysical concept it is a process. [Ham] I think this discussion has been both productive and amiable. Are you as pleased that we are fundamentally in accord as I am? Or is it more fun to quibble over terminology and accuse me of conjuring up "fantasies"? [Krimel] I think the degree of accord is pretty small, but yeah at least it is detectable. I still find your understanding flawed and your terminology obscure. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
