On Fri, Junel 3, 2009 at 11:49 AM, John Carl wrote:
[Ham]:
Evolution is the process of change in a system, generally in the direction
of greater complexity. The assumption that evolution has an esthetic or
moral component is a speculative theory fostered largely by Pirsig. I see
no support for the notion that goodness or betterness is more complex
than evil or worseness.
[John]:
You see no support for the notion that it's more complicated for a
chemistry professor to eat, defecate, shelter himself and stay amused
than it is to dissolve into a puddle of organic compounds?
Which of these professorial functions represent "goodness or betterness"?
And why would murdering a student, stealing from the college treasury, or
falsifying test results be any less complex than the "complicated" functions
you've cited? Morality has nothing to do with complexity. The fact that
organisms evolve to more complex species, or adults become more
sophisticated than babies, and their survival is more complicated as a
result doesn't represent a moral principle unless you associate complexity
with goodness. Life forms are genetically programmed to survive, and
adaptation to the environment is a biological principle of nature.
Organisms that are equipped to deal with their environment survive and
flourish, while those that are not die out. It's the law of "survival of
the fittest". Whether it is more "moral" that the unfit perish than that
the fit survive is a subjective judgment call.
[Ham]:
However, I will say that metaphysical propositions can be validated
on their own merits, which typically are cogency or consistency with
the theory as a whole, logical construction of the major postulates,
and accommodation to (non-violation of) empirical principles. The
value of a metaphysical proposition is a subjective determination,
inasmuch as metaphysics transcends experiential evidence.
[John]:
Doesn't "metaphysical propositions can be validated on their own
merits" mean "objectively"?
If an idea or principle "'works" predictably, it has pragmatic or
utilitarian (universal) value and we call it a "law" or "truth". But this
value is still realized subjectively. In the case of metaphysical theory,
principles are not objectively testable. They can only be stated as
propositions. Thus, the value of a given metaphysical proposition is
subjective.
In which case, "The value of a metaphysical proposition is a
subjective determination" is a contradiction.
No. "Value is subjective" only appears to be a contradiction for
individuals, like you, who impute value to an insentient universe. Value or
Quality is intrinsic to sensibility or perception. All moral precepts are
esthetic or conceptual attributes that exist only for the subject. If there
were no sensible subjects, they would not exist. Which is why the
individual self is the cognizant locus of existence.
Which means, objectively speaking, your metaphysical proposition is
non-cogent, inconsistent and illogical and has no merit. I place little
value
upon it, subjectively speaking.
In case you didn't understand me, I'll repeat: Metaphysics is NOT objective.
Its value (for the individual subject) depends on its cogency and logic with
respect to experiential reality. That you place little value on
Essentialism clearly demonstrates my point.
--Ham
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