Bo, You asked to provide one example of a philosophy that refutes SOM before Pirsig. Lot's of philsopher's on this forum have spluttered and protested you on this issue before, but you are still not satisfied. I don't see how the babbling idiocy of a mere Kindergardner is going to help, but here goes anyway.
In Royce's four conceptions of Being, the first conception he calls "Realism" and asserts that "no serious thinker holds this conception". It is the view of the common man that reality is "out there" independent of us. That is SOM, just being called by a different name. You can read his entire thesis on the subject, if you care to. http://www.giffordlectures.org/Browse.asp?PubID=TPWATI&Volume=0&Issue=0&ArticleID=3 Or you can read his summary dismissal and make your own conclusion from that. "But viewed as an ultimate and complete metaphysical doctrine, and not as a convenient half-truth, Realism, as we shall find hereafter, upon a closer examination, needs indeed no external opposition. It rends its own world to pieces even as it creates it. It contradicts its own conceptions in uttering them. It asserts the mutual dependence of knowing and of Being in the very act of declaring Being independent. In brief, realism never opens its mouth without expounding an antinomy." Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
