Hi DMB, On Thu, Feb 25, 2010 at 2:48 PM, david buchanan <[email protected]>wrote:
> > Steve said to dmb: > ...I think the pragmatic method *does* help us settle disputes about what > is true (that's why I am a pragmatist), but it does so not by characterizing > what it means for something to be true (a theory of truth) but rather by > doing something more basic... > > > dmb replies: > > It seems to me that you replied without really thinking much about the > points you're responding to. I mean, your claim that pragmatism doesn't > characterize what it means for something to be true was boldly asserted in > the face of James doing exactly that. Steve: The point was not at all lost on me that I was disagreeing with James. I thought I was clear as I could be that I disagree with James. I think James was wrong to assert a theory of truth in the name of pragmatism. I asserted that whatever fruits pragmatism offers in settling disputes about what is true result from the pragmatic method of considering the meaning beliefs in terms of the consequences of holding versus not holding them. Pragmatism as a theory of truth does not settle any disputes about what is true but rather muddles the issue so should be rejected on pragmatic grounds. DMB: > Again, James says, "This is the practical difference it makes to us to have > true ideas; that therefore is the meaning of truth, for it is all that truth > can be known as". And your objection to this, that it doesn't "solve the > problem of settling once and for all what actually *is* true" hardly makes > sense because the pragmatic theory of truth never claims to settle anything > once and for all. That might be what an absolutist or objectivist means by > truth but that is very clearly NOT was James or any other pragmatist would > claim. As James says, "the truth of an idea is not a stagnant property > inherent in it". > Steve: I am asking James pragmatism's usual question: what is the cash-value in experiential terms of believing versus disbelieving this proposed theory of truth? Pragmatism is supposed to put theory in the service of practice. What other function would anyone ever want from a theory of truth besides helping us settle disputes about what beliefs are true and what beliefs are false? I have no problem at all with saying "TRUE IDEAS ARE THOSE THAT WE CAN ASSIMILATE, VALIDATE, CORROBORATE, AND VERIFY. FALSE IDEAS ARE THOSE THAT WE CANNOT." No one disagrees with that. My point is that saying say gets us no further in settling disputes that we were before anyone ever had the bright idea that we needed something more that the traditional "agreement with reality" and that we should have a *theory* of truth. If saying so gives us nothing that we did not already have, then this "theory" is a difference that makes no difference. Unfortunately, James didn't stop at merely offering a theory with no pragmatic value, he went on to give us less than we had before by muddying up truth by claiming that ideas are MADE true by being verified as true. After this bit, one's person's true proposition is another's false proposition depending on their individual experience. At that point we have lost all hope of settling and disputes about what is true, which is the only reason that I can think of that James would want to have a theory of truth at all. He would have done better to leave truth alone and stick to talking about how we justify our beliefs. > Steve said: > > If he accepts that truth is agreement with reality, then a belief either > agrees with reality or not. It isn't MADE to agree with reality by verifying > it. Before verifying it, it either agreed or disagreed with reality. It is > through experience that we come to know which one is in fact the case--to > know whether or not a belief is justified--but we are not forced by the > pragmatic method to see agreement or truth as the same thing as the process > of justification. > > > dmb says: > > I'm heading out for a meeting and maybe I'll come back to your reply later > but I gotta say one more thing that might help. It seems pretty clear from > your comments here that you are thinking of truth in terms of objective > truth and rejecting James claims based on that. But, of course, the > pragmatist has already rejected that whole notion and this pragmatic theory > of truth is supposed to replace that. See, the reality that our ideas are > suppose to agree with is not a pre-existing reality but rather experience > itself. That's why ideas are MADE true by experience. To a pragmatist that's > what agreement with reality means. Steve: I think James would have agreed with what I said previously--that truth consists in a relationship between a sentence, the person saying it, and the context in which they say it. If so, trying to separate subjective versus objective components of truth would be impossible. DMB: > Further, this cannot be construed as relativism because experience is not > whatever we want it to be, experience is the reality that constrains our > beliefs. > Steve: Unless you can find a way out of the "true for me, false for you" non-sense this view of truth couldn't be any more relativistic. "True for me, false for you" is pretty much the paradigm for relativism. Best, Steve Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
