[John]
I guess I understand what you mean then by "biologically bound" as
the sensory inputs in our meat machine - the toys of empiricism, in
other words.
[Arlo]
Right. I am talking about the sensory input that ends up in your
neural mass. This is unique to your particular biological
boundedness, which I'd say includes your particular ear drum, for
example (in sensing audio waves), as well as the unique perspective
(not intellectual, but the angle of view, the pressure of contact,
etc.). As far as this input-to-brain goes, what ends up in your
neural mass is distinct to your biological boundedness.
[John]
I believe the social patterns and definitions so overwhelm the self,
that they are the main culprits in its creation
[Arlo]
I think I agree, inasmuch as the self only appears as a social world
is appropriated by the biological organism. So, in this sense, yes,
the "self" is a social construction. But the blocks it builds with
includes the blocks of its own unique biological trajectory. No two
people in the same culture share the same biological trajectory, so
while both develop "selves", the characteristics and patterns that
emerge as a result of this social-encoding are skewed to the unique
experiences of the biological "individual". (But they are not, I
emphasize, ever independent of their social origins. "Our
intellectual description of nature is always culturally derived." (Pirsig)).
What's funny is that immediately after saying that quote, Pirsig goes
on to say, "The intellectual level of patterns, in the historic
process of freeing itself from its parent social level, namely the
church, has tended to invent a myth of independence from the social
level for its own benefit. Science and reason, this myth goes, come
only from the objective world, never from the social world. The world
of objects imposes itself upon the mind with no social mediation
whatsoever." (Pirsig) This is PRECISELY the myth the Glorious
Individualists grasp onto, and it is PRECISELY the SOM view Pirsig is
criticizing.
[John]
... if I hypothesize a brain in a jar, with no sensory inputs except
the programmatic abstractions of a virtual world, would that brain
contain a "self" with no biological bounding at all? If you think
yes, then perhaps we agree.
[Arlo]
Yes, of course. Although even here there is a unique boundedness to
whatever stimuli is sent (by wires?) into that particular neural
mass. Hypothetically, in such an absolutely controlled state, it
should be possible to imagine two brains with absolutely identical
selves. Or near-identical, as one would have to likely factor in the
unique neural chemistry of each brain as well, to get that level of
precision (in our hypothetical construct here).
[John]
Individuals are creations of communities. The better the community
is at creating true individuals, then the better the community is.
Collectives don't create individuals. Collectives create clones.
[Arlo]
Well, I see this more a using these words in a particular
political-historical context. And that's fine, the word "collective"
carries a certain political connotation to you, and so "community"
works better. No harm. But I don't see "collective" in that manner. A
community IS a collective, in my book.
[John]
wait and see is a GOOD motto Arlo.
[Arlo]
Hehe. True that, amigo.
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