Andre quoted Pirsig:
'Later Phaedrus felt that three-termed realities are rather unwieldly ( low 
quality) and rare in metaphysics, and tries to collapse them into one. He saw 
that if you collapsed them into the object you got a materialist metaphysics. 
If you collapsed them into the subject, you got an idealist metaphysics. But 
who had ever collapsed them into value? He tried and saw it could be done. As 
time went on, he saw that not only could it be done, but that it solved huge 
philosophic problems that had dogged metaphysics for centuries. It produced 
harmony where there had been disharmony. It had high intellectual quality.'( 
Annot.118 LC).



dmb quotes Hildebrand:

"Realists and idealists assume that subject and object are discrete and then 
debate which term deserves first rank. Dewey assumes that what is primary is 
the whole situation - 'subject' and 'object' have no a priori, atomistic 
existences but are themselves DERIVED from situations to serve certain 
purposes, usually philosophical" (Beyond Realism and Antirealism, p27).


"The first great pitfall from which such a radical standing by experience will 
save us is and artificial conception of the relation between knower and known. 
Throughout the history of philosophy the subject and object have been treated 
as absolutely discontinuous entities; thereupon the presence of the latter to 
the former, or the 'apprehension' by the former of the latter, has assumed a 
paradoxical nature which all sort of theories had to be invented to overcome" 
(James, A World of Pure Experience, p 27).


It probably goes without saying, but Dewey is rejecting SOM and conceiving the 
primary reality in terms of "the whole situation" rather than anything 
dualistic. The "whole situation" is whole precisely because it is as yet 
undifferentiated into thought and thing, knower and known, subject and object, 
etc.. Those kinds of intellectual distinctions or differentiations are derived 
from the whole situation, and this whole situation is what James calls pure 
experience or the immediate flux of life.


As James puts it, in the moment of pure experience "its phases interpenetrate 
and no points, either of distinction or of identity can be caught. Pure 
experience in this state is but another name for feeling or sensation 
[aesthetic value]. But the flux of it no sooner comes than it tends to fill 
itself with emphases, and these salient parts become identified and fixed and 
abstracted; so that experience now flows as if shot through with adjectives and 
nouns and prepositions and conjunctions [static patterns].


If SOM and the intellectual level are identical, then how would it be possible 
for all four of these philosophers to reject it for intellectual reasons? 
Doesn't prove that Bo's position is untenable? I think so. SOL is RIP and Bo is 
a no go, bro.


                                          
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