Krimel said:
 Please, if you will, find that quote in "Some Problems..." It isn't in my 
copy. In fact, search for it on the net and you will find all of the references 
trace back to Pirsig not James.

dmb says:
James's can be tricky, especially the stuff published after his death. But one 
scholar's footnote says that quote can be found on page 365 of the 1911 
version, which must be the original version, I figure, because James died just 
one year before that.

Krimel:
What I don't get is the difference between perceptual and pre-conceptual. Nor 
do I see how you can deny that sensation and feelings (both fundamentally 
biological processes) precede perception.



dmb says:
Pre-conceputal experience is broader than perception. It includes perception, 
feelings, sensations but it's even broader than that. Part of the problem with 
traditional empiricism (SOM) is that it was also known as sensory empiricism, 
which is to say that empirical experience is whatever can be known through the 
five senses. Radical empiricism goes beyond that limit. They say the empiricist 
weren't being empirical enough and that it had been so limited for metaphysical 
reasons, not empirical reasons. There are some very interesting implications to 
way James focuses on the body in his psychology but I think you tend to misread 
that part. I think you tend to focus on perception, sensation and feeling 
because then James is talking about biological processes. And he is but I'm 
suggesting you need to think about it in another way. I think you tend to 
reduce his claims down to biological processes in a sort of atomistic way. 
Nobody is denying that we have bodies or that these proce
 sses occur, you see, but that's just not the point of what he's saying. 

Remember that passage where he explains that pure experience is rarely pure in 
the literal sense? Only infants, mystics and dudes suffering from head-trauma 
can know that and for the rest of us pure experience is always mixed with 
concepts. In that passage he also says that pure experience is something we can 
act upon. It is not only a pre-conceptual form of awareness but a mode of 
consciousness in which we can operate successfully. This would be a kind of 
un-selfconscious, spontaneous action. On top of the easily measured physical 
processes there would also be things like instinct, intuition and grooviness.

Think about the difference between pre-conceptual and conceptual in terms of 
knowing HOW and knowing THAT.  I like to use typing as an example because 
everyone does it. If you're anything like me, somehow you don't "know" where 
the keys are in the sense that you could pass a pop-quiz or give a speech on 
it. And yet your fingers know what to do. How long would it take if you had to 
think about every key-stroke? You'd never get much faster than you were the 
first time. And yet, hopefully, the content of the sentences and paragraphs IS 
something you know in that conceptual sense. You know THAT the MOQ is Robert 
Pirsig's idea. You know HOW to type. 

This is where the embodied nature of experience has interesting implications, 
by the way. If all conceptual knowledge is derived from immediate experience 
and immediate experience is an embodied affair involving perceptions sensations 
instincts intuitions and feelings, then what does that say about the prospects 
of trying to create artificial intelligence, which is by definition NOT so 
embodied? That's what Dreyfus the Heideggerian tried to tell those guys back at 
MIT. He makes a pretty big deal out of this difference too, between knowing-how 
and knowing-that. Those two ways of knowing show up in many languages, 
including German. I imagine this point was fairly obvious to Heidegger's 
domestic audience. I've heard that the old Scottish distinction between wit and 
ken gets at this difference too. Skill is its own kind of knowledge. It takes 
experience and can't be gained by way of conceptual knowledge. Know-how is not 
something you can pick up from a book, not even when it come
 s to being a skilled thinker. 


As far as denying that perception comes after sensation and feeling, I honestly 
don't know what you're talking about. The thought never crossed my mind and I 
have no idea what it's supposed mean. This happens a lot, almost every time in 
fact. How about, from now on, anytime you ask about a claim, denial, statement 
or whatever, you also include the actual claims, denial, or statement in 
question. It seems like you're just making stuff up out of thin air, but if not 
I'd certainly like to know where you think you see this stuff. This time, like 
most times, I literally don't know what you are talking about and I don't 
recognize it as anything I said or would say. 





                                          
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