On 8/23/10 1:25 AM, "John Carl" <[email protected]> wrote:
>> But SOM is also Pirsig's version of the long standing mind/body dualism >> debate wherein mental substance and physical substance are two irreducible >> forms of "stuff" which mysteriously interact but are not dependant on each >> other. Pirsig is ultimately always talking about how each of us has and >> makes sense of our individual experience. It is pure phenomenology. >> >> > > Hey! I made that point recently. didya notice Krimel? About the > congruence between dmb's interpertation of the Moq and phenomenology - the > most radical of the empiricists? > > Tha's ok. Nobody pays much attention to my words, and I don't blame them a > bit. And then another hilarious congruence. David Chalmers, who dmb rejects prior to reading, argues the phenomena is integral to the "hard problem" of conscious experience. DMB Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
