Greetings Mark, also to Tim and John who are "watching" --
This will be my first monograph specifically addressing the dynamics of Value as viewed from the Essentialist perspective.
Lest I be accused of straying too far from the MoQ, I should like to point out that the SOM perspective has been in contention on this forum for as long as I have followed it. I believe Essentialism offers a credible way to reconcile these two "modes of reality" and provide a valid metaphysical foundation for Pirsig's Quality thesis. In order to achieve this, however, it will be necessary to conceptualize the MoQ fundamentals somewhat differently than the author presented them, which calls for stricter definitions of the basic terms, including some which the author either failed or declined to explain.
I have already suggested to Mark that the meaning of "exists" is paradoxical when applied to metaphysics. Individuals and things relate to each other in existence, and are appropriately termed 'existents'. Quality (Value) is not an existent, nor is the primary source from which it is derived. How we express this distinction linguistically influences how we conceptualize Reality. In effect, there are two "realities" -- empirical and ultimate.
Rather than acknowledge an ultimate Reality, the MoQ posits a Dynamic/Static split between "pure" Quality and the Quality that is experienced empirically (as "patterns"). According to A. McWatt's Ph.D. doctorial thesis, "Pirsig thought 'Quality' was better divided metaphysically into the Dynamic and static - primarily because the aesthetic, mystic and scientific aspects of reality can be taken account of by this dichotomy and, as the Dynamic is the essential nature of the static, there remains, essentially, only one reality of Quality, not two."
The logic of the notion that "Dynamic is the essential nature of the static" escapes me. Moreover, the postulation of Quality as an entity unto itself, independent of conscious discernment or relative measurement, refutes the epistemology that "something cannot be valued without a consciousness". The need for conscious realization does not mean there is no value without a conscious agent. But it does mean, as Pirsig himself noted, that what is not valued (positively or negatively) does not exist. We know this because all the properties of 'beingness' are valuistic; that is, sensible to the individual who experiences them. Empirical reality is known only in terms of the values we are capable of experiencing and the conclusions we intellectualize from this experience.
The philosophy of Essence starts, not with quality or experience, but with the premise 'ex nihilo nihil fit' [nothing comes from nothingness], attributed to Lucretius. It posits Essence as the "absolute potentiality" of all that is or appears to be. Essence encompasses the "virtues" of Sensibility, Order, Beauty, Truth, and Goodness, as well as their antonyms, in the Oneness.of an uncreated Source. So that these values may be realized from the perspective of an "other", and since there is no other within or outside of Essence, conscious agents come into existence by negation from (rather than as an addition to) an omnipotent source. The order and dynamics of relational existence reflect the perfect balance of the Absolute Source, while its qualitative properties represent Essential Value differentiated by the negated self whose proprietary nature is value-sensibility.
The primary dichotomy of existence is not Static/Dynamic but Sensibility/Otherness; and otherness is objectivized experientially from the Value realized by the cognizant agent. The only "split" or division of the Source is its potentiality to create "otherness" negationally. That Essence-denied versus Essence-affirmed is the paradigm of creation suggests that there is a valuistic purpose for man's existence. The Essential ontology affords each individual self the freedom to create its own reality within the parameters of a predetermined relational system. Thus, the self may be understood as the uniquely sensible agent whereby Essence is completed or "perfected" by an extrinsic perspective of Value.
It is my hope that this ontology will be viewed as a metaphysical extension of Pirsig's Quality thesis, rather than an attempt by an "antagonist" to invalidate the MoQ for his own purposes. I anticipate questions and criticisms from Mark, and others who may be "standing by", which I shall try to answer to the best of my ability.
And thanks for the opportunity, Ham Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
