Steve, Craig, Matt and All --
On Wed, June 22, 2011 7:31 PM, "Steven Peterson" <peterson.st...@gmail.com>
wrote to Matt:
Matt:
... if determinism is the thesis that we are caught up in causal
chains, then it is not destructive of moral reasoning because
moral reasoning is something that occurs partly _because_ of
causal chains. Moral reasoning _needs_ causal chains. And
if that's the case, why on earth would determinism destroy
moral reasoning?
Steve:
That's basically what Dennett said in the interview Ham and Craig
referenced, and it's a great point. Dennett reformulates free will as
the human capacity to play out scenarios in our heads before acting
them out and then asks, what good would free will be without
determinism? If we didn't think that our actions had at least somewhat
predictable effects (including effects on other people and what we
think they will do in response to what we do), what good would it be
to be able to choose among possible actions? Instead of free will
opposing determinism, free will depends on determinism.
As you point out above, the same goes for the notion of moral
responsibility. Moral responsibility cannot be threatened by
determinism when moral reasoning can only make sense in the context
of determinism.
Free will depends on determinism. A seminal point, indeed, and you've
developed it brilliantly, Steve.
I'm glad the links to this philosopher's interviews proved worthwhile. As
Reason's science correspondent Ronald Bailey noted in the preface to his
interview, "Dennett maintains that to whatever extent we were ever at the
mercy of our genes and biological evolution, we no longer are. Instead our
genes are now at the mercy of our brains." And that should effectively
resolve the age-old determinism vs. free will controversy, but for one
additional issue: agency.
Unless we grant that the Will referred to in this dialectic is that of an
independent agent, the principle of Free Will is a meaningless neurological
phenomenon. Unfortunately Dennett couched the subject of his concept in
mechanistic terms, referring to the human 'willer' as a "choice machine."
While this enabled him to contrast the free agent with a "situation-action
machine", his analogy misses the 'noumenal' aspect of Freedom. Making genes
subservient to brains is a biological proposition. Only when we understand
Will as the "intent" of a cognizant being can we realize the metaphysical
significance of free agency.
Admittedly this is a difficult concept to get across to people who reject
proprietary awareness and individual autonomy, even if the denied "subject"
is presented in terms of "spov". Yet, the fact remains that you and I are
active agents of this phenomenal reality which, without our awareness, would
have no empirical (i.e., experiential) validity. But this argument will
have to be a topic for another discussion.
In that interview Dennett also clears up confusion between fatalism
and determinism which I think have been confused in this thread.
Fatalism means that whatever we do we cannot avoid a given outcome
whereas determinism says that what we do matters. Different actions
have different consequences.
Then there is the issue of _pre_determination which I think is only a
concern if you imagine an omniscient super-being, but it still manages
to keep James and dmb awake at night.
There's no need to lose sleep over this issue, Steve, if you understand that
teleology, unlike space/time existence, is not a cause-and-effect phenomenon
but the end that is immanent in the cosmic design itself. As you know, I
happen to believe in an Absolute Source that's not a "super-being" but whose
omniscience is not limited to sequential events but transcends both
evolution and individuality. At least one person I know (a former MD
participant) attributes creation to an "idea" (I AM). Although Essence is
an idea (in my mind), it is also the Absolute Reality that accounts for all
finite difference and appearance -- including free agency.
But this topic, too, shall have to be the subject for another day ... if not
some other forum.
Essentially speaking,
Ham
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