Hi dmb,
> dmb quoted the Stanford encyclopedia: > > Compatibilism offers a solution to the free will problem. This philosophical > problem concerns a disputed incompatibility between free will and > determinism. Compatibilism is the thesis that free will is compatible with > determinism. Because free will is typically taken to be a NECESSARY CONDITION > OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY, compatibilism is sometimes expressed in terms of a > compatibility between moral responsibility and determinism. > > Steve replied: > I have always granted that free will is _typically_ taken to be linked to > free will. What I have asserted is that that link is not a logical necessity. > > > dmb says: > Lots of entries mention the fact that there are exceptions but I've only run > across one source that actually says what those exceptions are; the Oxford > Companion to Philosophy. It says there are two exceptions, one being a > position that no philosopher has ever held and the other one is predicted on > the conflation of two different concepts of the will. So they only exceptions > are either wrong or non-existent. > > But I was really hoping you would simply think about the logical relation ON > YOUR OWN. You've done everything except that and it's pretty clear to me that > your position is incoherent and you don't appreciate how morally disastrous > that position is. One of the main things that Pirsig're reformulation is to > avoid the view that morals aren't really real. Steve: Pirsig's metaphysics asserts the reality of morals as a first principle rather than dependent on belief in free will to make them real. I understand that you would love for me to come to the conclusion you have ON MY OWN without any argument from you about why this link is a logical necessity, but if you want to convince me that that is the case, you will need to provide a rational argument in support of your claim rather than citing sources that merely say that most philosophers have thought so. > Steve said: > You keep highlighting the term "agent" presumably to make some point. An > agent is simply an entity that makes choices. > > > dmb says: > Yes, there is a point to repeatedly stressing the relation between freedom > and morality. It sure would be nice if you got that point. Steve: But "agent" is not the same thing as a "free agent." The fact that humans are agents--that we make choices--does not do anything to link free will and morality. Choices are necessary for morality, but whether our choices are free in some meaningful sense can be held as a separate question. > Steve continued: > ...I've always said that we make choices and have intentions, moods, desires, > preferences, etc.. What I question is whether we are free to have different > intentions than we now have through an act of will. That doesn't seem to be > the case in my subjective experience (I can't will myself to want what I > don't want) and such a capacity of "freely" willing isn't supported by > science. I also don't see how the capacity to follow DQ cashes out to such a > power. > > > dmb says: > Are we free to will our intentions? What? That is redundant, recursive > nonsense. It's like asking if we are free to have liberty to be free, if we > have a choice about our choices we choose. Steve: Is it your position that free will is a redundant term? I agree that we have will, but _free_ will makes no sense to me. dmb: > And if it's not simply weirdly put redundant nonsense, then you are > apparently asking about two different concepts of will at the same, then you > are conflating the concrete practical reality with a metaphysical will as the > cause behind the concretely lived experience. And that would be nonsense as > well. > > If you are willing to admit we make choices, then that's all we need to say > we make choices. If you saying we had no choice but to make that "choice", > then you are simply defying the meaning of the word "choice". And that's > nonsense too. Steve: I never said that, but it is a common usage of the word "choice." For example, though someone might say, "I have no choice but to...," another might say, "I see only one choice here." It is an everyday word tat gets used in lots of ways. What I mean in saying that we make choices is that we do one thing and don't do another thing in cases where alternative histories seem plausible. dmb: > This is more specifically what I mean when I say I can't make any sense of > what you're saying. Steve: Perhaps you can't make sense of it because I am pointing out that the position of free will is somewhat nonsensical or redundant when you look at it deeply. And it isn't just me who is saying so. I've quoted Harris quoting Einstein quoting Schopenhauer saying so. None of them are disposed to spout nonsense. > Steve said: > What remains to be sussed out with regard to the MOQ is how DQ cashes out to > the free control of an agent. I don't see how. But as for moral > responsibility and the MOQ, what makes us and rocks and trees and atoms moral > beings in the MOQ is not the assertion of free will but the assertion that > reality itself is a moral order. Yet it still makes little sense to talk > about responsibility until we get to beings that have social patterns because > only such beings have behavior which is modifiable through praise and blame. > It's just not worth punishing a rock since there is no hope that its behavior > could change as a benefit of punishment (rocks don't participate in social > patterns), but a scolded child may behave better next time. > > > > dmb says: > > Man, you are so not getting the point. It seems like you really don't > understand what moral responsibility is. I mean, the idea that praise and > blame are just a means of modifying behavior is not about moral > responsibility. Steve: I am not saying that they are _just_ a means of modifying behavior. I just mean that that rather than retribution is how the concept applies to the criminal justice system for those denying free will. We can have a forward looking rather than retributive justice system, and that would be an improvement rather than a major problem if everyone stopped believing in free will. As pragmatists, you and I don't take moral responsibility as the praise or blame of a fundamental essence of who a person really is deep down somewhere. Pragmatically, praise and blame are a matter of identifying good or bad actions and inferring from the actions that the people performing them are themselves good or bad which just means (since we deny any metaphysical self) that the person is likely to do other things that are good or bad or that badness or goodness are typical of the person's acts. Best, Steve Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
