Hi Craig, On Tue, Sep 13, 2011 at 2:32 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: > [Craig, previously] >> Parfit's argument shows only that a "causally inevitable" act can be >> morally wrong, not that the actor is morally responsible for the act. > > [Steve] >> What does "morally responsible" mean to you?
Craig: > Probably the same as for you. > In the case of a person being morally responsible for an immoral act, > we look at such factors as the capacity to distinguish right from wrong, > the ability to foresee the consequences of the act, having choices, > the ability to deliberate and so on. Steve: Yes, I agree. Which essential ingredient is Parfit's account missing? I don't think he was trying to establish all the requirements of moral responsibility. He was just saying that even under determinism, we would still have enough _freedom_ for moral responsibility. We "could have acted differently if we had wanted to" even if "what we wanted to" is is understood to be causally determined. Since we act on our own intentions, we are morally responsible for what we do whether or not we have the capacity to freely choose what our desires are. That would be silly since we ARE our desires, our patterns of value with the capacity to respond to DQ. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
