On Sep 26, 2011, at 5:37 PM, Ham Priday wrote: > Steve, dmb, and All -- > > On Mon. 9/26/11 at 8:27 AM, "Steven Peterson" <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Hi dmb, >> >> A pragmaticized version of free will is simply to say that we make >> choices, and a pragmaticized version of determinism is just "it >> depends." Then compatiblism is just the position that "choices >> depend." If you jump all over that claim with your usual claim that >> that means that we aren't really in control, you are trying to pull me >> back into an SOM appearance-reality conundrum about what >> in this picture is REALLY real--whether causality makes choice >> a mere illusion. That's a game we pragmatists aren't playing. >> >> dmb: >> The resistences felt in experience are the real thing and causality - >> not to mention substance- is a metaphysical posit that is supposed >> to explain that empirical fact. And it's not that causal explanations >> make our choices illusory. That idea works if you're talking about >> billiard balls or rocket science. The problem is using causality to >> deny human freedom, which is exactly what the causal determinist >> does. And it's no accident that both our favorite pragmatists - >> James, Dewey and Pirsig - all reject this idea because, pragmatically >> speaking, that is one of the worst ideas in the history of ideas. > > Indeterminism is just a sophisticated term for "whatever happens, happens," > which, when you think about it, is really Fatalism. Compatilibilism, on the > other hand, is the idea that without a cause-and-effect universe your freedom > to choose would be meaningless. > > I'm running a 2003 interview by Reason magazine's science editor with Daniel > Dennett on my Values Page this week. The interview was a promotion for the > atheist philosopher's book 'Freedom Evolves' which was published that year. > In it, Dennett defends his concept of Compatilibilism with these statements, > culled from the interview . . . > > "To have freedom, you need the capacity to make reliable judgments about > what's going to happen next, so you can base your action on it. Imagine that > you've got to cross a field and there's lightning about. If it's > deterministic, then there's some hope of knowing when the lightning's going > to strike. You can get information in advance, and then you can time your > run. That's much better than having to rely on a completely random process. > If it's random, you're at the mercy of it. > > "A more telling example is when people worry about genetic determinism, which > they completely don't understand. If the effect of our genes on our likely > history of disease were chaotic, let alone random, that would mean that > there'd be nothing we could do about it. Nothing. It would be like Russian > roulette. You would just sit and wait. But if there are reliable > patterns-if there's a degree of determinism-then we can take steps to protect > ourselves. > > [In answer to the interviewer's question: "Would a deterministic world mean > that, say, the assassination of John F. Kennedy was going to happen ever > since the Big Bang?] > > "Going to happen" is a very misleading phrase. Say somebody throws a > baseball at your head and you see it. That baseball was "going to" hit you > until you saw it and ducked, and then it didn't hit you, even though it was > "going to." In that sense of "going to," Kennedy's assassination was by no > means going to happen. There were no trajectories which guaranteed that it > was going to happen independently of what people might have done about it. If > he had overslept or if somebody else had done this or that, then it wouldn't > have happened the way it did. People confuse determinism with fatalism. > They're two completely different notions. > > "Fatalism is the idea that something's going to happen no matter what you do. > Determinism is the idea that what you do depends. What happens depends on > what you do, what you do depends on what you know, what you know depends on > what you're caused to know, and so forth - but still, what you do matters. > There's a big difference between that and fatalism. Fatalism is determinism > with you left out." > > Now, a question for you MoQers who reject the subjective Self: > Is Fatalism DQ's deterministic "movement to betterness" with you left out? > > I suggest you consider your answer carefully. Thanks, folks. > > In support of Individual Freedom, > Ham Greetings Ham,
What do you mean by "subjective Self?" Are you suggesting a subjective stream of consciousness as presented in the Steve Hagen quote, or an independent, autonomous Self that is a locus of control? AND Dynamic Quality isn't anything. Fatalism, on the other hand, is an intellectual static pattern of value. Or were you asking something different? Marsha ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
