Hello everyone On Wed, Dec 14, 2011 at 12:20 PM, david buchanan <[email protected]> wrote: > > Matt said to Dan: > I wish to stop you (if I could) to ask that you not go bit by bit through the > post, responding as you think at the moment of reading, but read the whole > thing and respond holistically. .. I apologize for making demands, but it > appears from the beginning of your response again that we would just keep > spinning in the mud. ... > > > dmb says: > Holistically rather than bit by bit. Yep, I'm definitely sympathetic to that > complaint. (Although I'd direct this complaint at every participant.) > Sometimes, especially when talking about things like philosophy, it's really > much better to think and speak in paragraphs. Sometimes it takes a big block > of text to express an idea but I'll find people responding to a sentence > fragment instead. Sometimes a second or third paragraph is needed in order to > further qualify what was said in the first. But I often see responses (from > Steve, for example) that simply delete those qualifications and then condemn > the idea for lacking those qualifications. From this I can only conclude that > these post are going off half-cocked. It seems pretty obvious that such > responses are being hastily and absent-mindedly slapped together even before > the post has been read all the way through. This tends to produce half-baked, > knee-jerk responses that really aren't worth much even when they don't > completel > y miss the point. > > I would beg every MOQer to think in paragraphs - or at least recognize it > when the other guy is talking like that. How far can we go by simply trading > slogans and quips, after all?
Dan: I don't think Matt is talking about thinking in paragraphs (and feel free to correct me if that's untrue) but rather he wishes I would respond to the gist of his entire post rather than breaking it down into bit-size bits. Unfortunately, that's my "style." Furthermore, I think it is way too easy for some contributors (not naming names, Dave) to cover up their uncertainties with a load of bullshit by going on and on rather than taking the time to offer up a succinct response. There is no reason to expect someone to read a ten thousand word essay replete with dozens of cut-and-pastes when a hundred well-chosen words will suffice. > > > Matt said to Dan: > > ... I have absolutely no wish to pressure anyone to only speak or write when > they "have this all figured out," whatever the "this" is. That is sincere > But in the midst of conversation, isn't it imperative that we try to carve > out the consistent space we call "the philosophical position I want to > occupy"? I have been trying to understand what your position is in regard to > things like NYC and dog dishes (and now unicorns), but I don't get it. > ...One thing I would insist, though, is that you not blame this on elitism, > which is what I sense you keep edging toward with "vastly different > background" and "merely withholding the knowledge." You're emoting a sense > that I've done you an injustice, but I'm sorry... > > > dmb says: > > I think a big part of the problem here is the almost constant use of jargon > and slogans. That kind of short hand only works when everyone concerned is > already familiar with the ideas behind terms like "anti-realism" or > "Cartesian anxiety", for example. We're all here to discuss Pirsig's > philosophy and we can reasonably expect everyone to become familiar with the > jargon in his books, such as it is, but other than that I think we all need > to stick with standard english as much as possible. And if a word or slogan > is brought into the mix, the one who brings it is obliged to introduce the > terms and otherwise explain its meaning, significance, etc., ESPECIALLY if > it's not the kind of term or phrase that one can simply look up in a > dictionary or encyclopedia. Otherwise, the use of jargon is not only > unhelpful, it almost seems like a deliberate effort to exclude people from > the conversation. A good writer understands who he is talking to and acts > accordingly, no? Dan: Well, when I offered up a few of the definitions concerning "imagination" Matt seemed perturbed that I didn't isolate upon one. The English language is ambiguous in that many words have multiple meanings. When you throw about terms like "standard english" and all we have to do is stick to it, well... it makes me wonder just how familiar you are with the language and its intricacies. Honestly, I have no idea to whom I am talking when I write to this discussion group. I understand I am answering certain individuals but at the same time I also know there are many people who might read my posts both now and in the future, and I have no way of accounting for their tastes or their knowledge. I assume most people here are half-way intelligent but of course I've been proven wrong about that a number of times. > > > Matt said to Dan: > ...What I want to know is the relationship you see between "observation" and > "experience" (and really, between the "indirect" and "direct" kinds), but you > think I'm jerking your chain. I'm not jerking your chain. I'm trying to > understand you, Dan, and I'm sorry my frustration is bubbling over. ... If > I'm not mistaken, you have been pressing the claim that Dave and I construe > "object permanence" as "independent of experience." You then shake your > head, saying that doesn't make any sense from a Pirsigian standpoint. We > agree, so we've tried to explain what "object permanence" is _without_ > relying on the anti-Pirsigian claim of "independent of experience." ..., it > appears as if you'd interchanged Quality-experience with subject-observation, > thus making them synonymous in the philosophical position you are occupying > in this conversation. ...I suggested that your use of "observing" signaled a > conflation of "observation" and "experience," despite the fact that you > didn't use > it. Also, irrespective of your position, I would posit that Pirsig does not > think that Quality-experience can be interchanged with subject-observation. > > > dmb says: > > Yes, I think this is the center of the knot. "Object permanence" is a concept > based on sensible, empirical realities. But Dan keeps insisting that it > becomes imaginary any time it's not being sensed. So I tried to explain how > "permanence" is simply part of what we mean by "objects". It's just a feature > of the concept. The concept is based on experience, which means we have > empirical, sensible reasons to believe things like dog dishes are going to be > there the next time we check. To say the same from the other side of the > coin, we have no empirical, sensible reason to think that things could exist > so capriciously. Experience offers enough regularity and consistency that > concepts like object permanence work quite well. In the MOQ, "objects" are > pattens of static quality derived from experience, from DQ. They are concepts > that agree with reality, not in the sense that these concepts correctly > represent or mirror things-in-themselves, but rather they agree in the sense > that they > work AS concepts. The whole idea of objective reality as it is regardless of > whether or not anyone knows about it, or Kant's idea of things-in-themselves > being the cause of our experience, the real reality and at the same time > something we can only ever know indirectly as they are filtered through our > mental categories. That's when mere objects become elaborately expanded into > a metaphysics of substance. That's what Pirsig means to deny when he denies > realities "independent of experience". This is very different from doubting > every thing that isn't presently felt or known in experience. In the MOQ, > realities are limited to that which can be known in experience and we ought > not take too seriously any claim about realities that can't be known or > experienced. In the MOQ, experience and reality amount to same thing. In that > sense, things that are outside of experience are outside of reality. That's > how we can tell the difference between dog dishes and unicorns. Well, let me > qual > ify that. Dan: Again, I am not saying to doubt everything that isn't sensed. I think you're misunderstanding the question being considered, as I've already said a couple times. Of course an "object" is imaginary when it isn't sensed. It exists as a concept. How else can it exist? It isn't that the object "becomes" imaginary though, nor does it magically blink out of existence. There is nothing we can say of it other than what we imagine. That is the only sense of it that we have. You can cling to the notion of object permanence and claim it is common sense that objects exist apart from the experience of those objects but on the other hand there is no way for you to prove their existence when I ask: what objects? >dmb: > It's pretty silly to be debating the existence of actual horse-like animals > with a single phallic horn. Unicorns are part of a symbolic language, of > course, and their meaning AS SYMBOLS is quite rich and varied. In that sense, > they're a heck of a lot more meaningful and interesting than dog dishes. The > comparison would tend to suggest that what's real is whatever is "physically" > real. > > As James put it, inner and outer are just names for the way we sort > experience into conceptual categories. We think of dog dishes as outer and > physical while the unicorn is inner and imaginary. But James said it more > like we sort experience this way because "real" dishes and "imaginary" > unicorns enter into a different set of relations. The dog dish will make a > sound when you put it down on the floor or fill it with crunchies but the > imaginary unicorn can gallop across a drum head without making a sound. > Imaginary water may or may not put out an imaginary fire but it won't put out > a real fire. Causal relations don't necessarily obtain in the inner realm and > logic relations don't necessary obtain in the outer realm and so we tend to > sort things on the basis of experience. To draw the conclusion that reality > itself is so divided is whole other can of worms and we don't have to deny > the empirical basis of this sorting out process in order to dispense with the > larger metaphysical > claim, in order to get rid of SOM. If the infant doesn't sort these things > out and learn concepts like object permanence, life is gonna be rough. That's > why we should let our babies play with knives and fire. :-) Dan: Exactly... so to try and explain to Don that he shouldn't worry himself about his dog dish disappearing when he leaves the room on account of the concept of object permanence is a fool's choice. He should know that already. As you say... every infant needs to know it in order to properly function in the world and if they don't, us explaining it to them isn't going to help much. > > > > Dan said to Matt: > I guess one thing that bothers me just a little is that (I feel) I understand > you and dmb and where you're both coming from and yet I find I don't > altogether agree with either of you when it comes to the MOQ. I tell myself > that I must not understand you like I think I do but the further our > discussions progress the more intense the feeling grows. I want to explain > myself to both of you in a better way so that you both might see what I'm > saying but I get the impression it would take years of formal education on my > part to do that and by then I would be so thoroughly indoctrinated that I > would no longer see things the way I see them now. So maybe I am best seen as > merely an uneducated fellow who doesn't know any better. > > > dmb says: > Yea, you could devote yourself to years of academic study or the rest of us > could just explain things in plain english. One of those solutions seems far > more plausible than the other. Dan: Again, you seem to believe the English language is unambiguous and clear... it isn't. And as far as I know, I have been explaining things in "plain english" which seems to be getting me nowhere fast. You and Matt seem blocked to me and I am sure I appear the same way to you. Yet it is clear by your continued responses that you are not understanding the holistic (thank you, Matt) meanings behind my postings. On the other hand, I understand what you're saying even though I don't (entirely) agree with it. You keep saying: Oh! I have it now! But you don't have it. What you have is your idea of what I am saying and that is stopping you, blocking you if you will, from grasping the notion that I am attempting to convey... if the idea of matter comes before matter, then the concept of object permanency becomes a non sequitur. It is illogical to say objects exist apart from experience... nor can we say they don't exist apart from experience. The only thing we can say is: what objects? Is that plain enough? Dan Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
