Hello everyone On Sat, Dec 10, 2011 at 4:53 PM, Matt Kundert <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > > > Hi Dan, > > Matt said: > You have a much stronger notion of "verification" than I do. I think > we can reconstruct a notion of verification from indirect experience > that supplies a form of verification for things we aren't directly > experiencing, such that we can verify the existence of dog dishes in > other rooms in a way that we cannot do, e.g., unicorns. > > Dan said: > I'm not sure that's a fair comparison. Our discussion on verifying > New York City despite no direct experience of it seems to offer a > more favorable outcome than does talk about unicorns. > > Matt: > This is what I mean by reticence, Dan: you say it's not fair, but you > don't say why. Also, why is it not fair for me to, at the very least, > establish the baseline of the notion of verification _I'm_ using? You > haven't exactly elaborated one, so I thought I might say what I think. > Also also, why isn't it fair to talk about unicorns in the context of your > notion of verification? You are the one who earlier stipulated that > you see no difference between hypothetical forests and dog dishes a > person is not currently in the presence of. Why not bring fictional > entities into the mix?
Dan: But I did say why... I didn't recapitulate our discussion on NYC as I assumed (perhaps wrongly) that we made a little headway there, whereas by bringing unicorns into the discussion we are lowering the quality. > > Dan said: > Yet I have a difficult time understanding how it is possible for objects > to exist outside of experience if they are not independent of it. > > Matt: > This sentence does not make sense from the Pirsigian position you > claim to otherwise be occupying. If experience is everything, who's > talking about objects existing outside "everything"? Neither Dave > nor I have put forward that philosophical claim. We are attempting > to reconstruct what object-permanence means from within the > confines of the notion that "everything is experience." Dan: Now who's being reticent? You claim my sentence makes no sense from the position of the MOQ and yet you continue to insist objects have a permanence even when no one is around. If I'm not mistaken, Dave has already explained what object-permanence means... it is common sense. If experience is everything, then how can objects have a permanence existing outside our imagination? > > Matt said: > Your direction in the conversation has been to assume that SOM > assumptions are at work in common sense and that, therefore, we > should question them in order to extirpate them. My direction has > been the exact opposite: it has been to assume a successful > extirpation of SOM and that, therefore, it is our next step to give > non-SOM construals of how common sense works. > > Dan said: > But what if common sense rests on a foundation of subject/object > interpretation? If one kicks out the rungs of that ladder then there is > nothing left to build upon. I think that's what RMP is on about when > he talks (in LILA'S CHILD) about how he came to see that it isn't > necessary to do away with subject/object thinking as long as it is > understood that subjects and objects are a short hand for patterns > of value. > > Matt: > I believe that Pirsig does not see the situation as you put it. You have > conflated "SOM" with "subject/object interpretation." I would not do > this. When Pirsig says the LC bit you speak of, I believe he's > suggesting that subjects and objects can be redescribed from within > the MoQ, which is what Dave and I have been after. I do not believe > he is saying that common sense rests irrevocably on SOM. I also > see no reason, irrespective of Pirsig, to think that common sense > rests irrevocably on particular philosophical interpretation. Dan: You may be right. Here is the quote from LC I was thinking of: "...it’s clear I’ve been of two minds on whether subjects and objects should be included in the MOQ. My earlier view, when I was concentrating on the confusion of subject-object thinking, was to get rid of them entirely to help clarify things. Later I began to see it’s not necessary to get rid of them because the MOQ can encase them neatly within its structure—the upper two levels being subjective, and the lower two, objective. Still later I saw that the subject-object distinction is very useful for sharply distinguishing between biological and social levels." [Robert Pirsig, LILA'S CHILD] Dan comments: He seems to be saying that subject/object thinking is commensurate with subject/object metaphysics (SOM). Would you say he is conflating the two as well? He also seems to be saying it isn't necessary to "assume a successful extirpation of SOM" and in fact it can be neatly encased within the MOQ. > > Dan said: > You seem to be saying that by doing away with the notion of objects > existing independently of an observing subject (a successful > extirpation of SOM) we can better understand how common sense > works. But at the same time, you want to allow that objects exist > independently of observation. That (to me) seems contradictory but > I'm sure I'm not following your argument properly. > > Matt: > When you reconstruct my claim as "objects exist independently of > observation" you have conflated "observation" with "experience" in > such a way that you're inconsistent with your later claim that "It isn't > my experience. It is experience." If "observation" is distinguished > from "experience," then why would their be a problem with allowing > objects to exist independently of observation? Dan: Perhaps I wasn't as precise as I might have been... within the framework of the MOQ, I don't possess experience... experience possesses the "I" that you are labeling me. >Matt: > I've been, for quite a while, trying to figure out what you think the > relationship is between first-person experience and > Quality-experience, and additionally rock-experience. I haven't been > able to figure the consistency of your usage, and you also haven't > elaborated a theory of any kind. Dave has had this problem, too, as > we can tell from his last response and your brush-back in reply. > (This was his "oh, I think I see the problem." I had a similar light > bulb go off about your use of "imaginary" three weeks back, but I've > yet to figure out how you are consistently using that term, either.) Dan: As far as I could see, his attempt at discerning the problem was not quite correct, as I attempted to explain. You seem to be asking for answers to questions but when I attempt to offer an explanation you either ignore what I said or claim I am being inconsistent. I supposed earlier in our discussion that we are both coming from vastly different background and that is one reason for our disagreements. As the discussion progressed, it seems as if you believe I have this all figured out and I am merely withholding that knowledge. In fact, I am pretty much making this up as I go along although (of course) I am drawing on the knowledge I have gleaned over the last dozen years of participation in this discussion group and the continued study of RMP's work. >Matt: > If you want to continue this conversation, you will have to supply an > outline of how you will consistently use, for the sake of this > conversation, the following terms: "experience," "imaginary," "direct > experience," "indirect experience," "hypothetical," "presupposition," > "observation," "common sense," "philosophy," "thought-experiment," > and "independent of experience." We can start there. I'm sorry it > has come to this, but given the wheel-spinning, there's no reason to > converse if we can't consistently stay on the same page of the > conversation. Dan: You're right... you would probably be better served directing your comments to folk like dmb and Steve Peterson. They seem much better at elaborating what it is you seem to be after here. For the record though, the dictionary definitions are a good beginning point for all the words you are seeking to identify. > > Dan said: > It wasn't my intention to present problems the MOQ is designed to > avoid. I suppose I could accuse you of doing the same by presenting > the thought experiment in the first place but I don't see the value in > doing so. > > Matt: > I know you want to avoid SOM as much as I, Dan. But I deny that > my thought-experiment imports Cartesian-SOMism. It is your > responses to it that I believe re-inject it. Dan: Quite possible. I still see no difference between your thought experiment and the thought experiment concerning trees falling in forests with no one around. But perhaps I am not presupposing the experiment properly. > > Dan said: > From my point of view, both you and Dave are throwing the > discussion back into a world where objects exist when no one is > around to observe them and trees make noise when they fall in > forests even when no one is around. I think you're both missing the > more important question that this discussion is meant to raise by > insisting our common sense understanding of reality is paramount. I > understand we all operate under the common sense notion of object > permanence. On the other hand, to assume because that notion > works well in the real world it represents a fundamental part of our > reality seems at odds with the MOQ. > > Matt: > I think this again misunderstands what Dave and I thought we were > talking about. We are not insisting that "our common sense > understanding of reality is paramount." We are insisting that every > philosopher has to be able to reconstruct common sense platitudes > out of their philosophical vocabulary. We are not trying to "throwing > the discussion back into a world where objects exist when no one is > around," we are trying to work out of the MoQ's vocabulary how that > commonsensical attitude could be the case given the commonsensical > attitude's supreme, evolutionarily-tested value to how we function in > the world. To reconstruct common sense, and to insist that this a > task for every philosopher, is not to insist that it "represents a > fundamental part of our reality," if by "fundamental" you mean a > position that usurps Quality. Dan: Quality isn't common sense, though... at least not before Robert Pirsig introduced the term as synonymous with reality. In common sense terms, when we say: that object has quality, we assume quality resides in the object. RMP turned this around by saying Quality has the object... that nothing can possess Quality. This isn't common sense... in fact it goes against common sense. It seems to be one of the points of our disagreement here... you seem to believe I think that I experience the world. But if Quality and experience are seen as synonymous, then I don't experience the world; I am possessed by experience. In the same sense, you seem to believe Don's dog dish is a Quality possession of Don's experience... that his Quality is his to keep. But the Quality that possesses Don isn't his. The same way that Quality creates the "I" that you attribute to me, "it" also creates the "Don" that you know as your friend. > > Dan said before: > What throws me a bit is Matt's query concerning the difference > between knowing New York City exists without experiencing it and > knowing Don's dog dish exists without experiencing it. At first I took > the existence of Don's dog dish as hearsay evidence and therefore > not admissible in a court of law. But I'm not sure that's correct. Still, > the overwhelming weight of evidence seems in favor of the existence > of New York City as a higher quality idea than does the evidence for > the existence of Don's dog dish... unless I am Don. > > Matt said: > Exactly, unless you are Don. The notion of a thought-experiment is > that its characters are placeholders for you, the thinker. To think > through my thought-experiment properly, you need to put yourself in > Don's shoes. > > Dan then said: > Ah... but are you not presupposing I can do that? > > Matt then said (about Dan's procedure): > But what the veil pulling _doesn't_ do is actually give you new > assumptions. So when people start working on new assumptions and > you come along and keep pulling the veil, the response is likely to be, > "Yeah, yeah: got it. We know we're working on assumptions. But > what do you think about our new ones?" And if your response _then_ > is, "Hey, don't forget that your last question has assumptions!" then > you're going to cease to be taken seriously. (And you should be > thinking now of your later response to my explanation of how a > thought-experiment works: "ah...but are you not presupposing that I > can do that?" Indeed, I am. The question still remains: can you put > yourself in Don's shoes?) > > Dan finally said: > Well now... at the risk of not being taken seriously... no. How can I > do that? I am not Don. This discussion is (after all) about > presuppositions and how we use them constructively to live our lives > and give meaning to our experience. > > Matt: > How on earth is this not a Pickwickian answer? You've either 1) > construed "shoes" in the physical sense, and wondered how you > could get in Don's shoes (which is impossible either because (A) you > accept him as a figment of imagination, so how could you physically > get into imaginary shoes or (B) you don't own Don's shoes, so how > could you); or 2) you construed "shoes" as a metaphor for "point of > view" and denied that anyone can take anyone else's point of view > through the use of imagination; or 3) you understood that I was > asking whether you could use any thought-experiment whatsoever, > and said no (for some mysterious reason). Dan: When you asked if I could put myself in Don's shoes, you seemed to be asking if I could bring to bear the same perception of reality that Don brings to bear. Our life histories are completely different. Our methods of assigning values grow from those evolutionary histories and so there is no way I can effectively put myself into Don's shoes. There is nothing mysterious about it. Thought experiments are fine as long as it is understood that a set of parameters has been constructed in which to operate that experiment. Don is a fly in the ointment. He is (I assume) a living being and as such a Dynamic individual who is continuing to evolve in ways that no one can fathom but Don. Check out some of Einstein's thought experiments... they don't include unknown parameters like living beings. >Matt: > Why on earth are we talking if there is nothing we can do to bridge > points of view? Since you pragmatically cannot believe this, what > are you intending to convey? You say this is all about how we use > presuppositions to "constructively live our lives," but when Dave or I > try and construct a useful presupposition for the living of our lives > (like "object permanence"), you think we're doing something wrong. Dan: No, you are acting in a common sense way. There's nothing wrong with that. I've agreed with both of you that concepts like object permanence are high quality ideas. But that those ideas are just that... ideas. > > Dan said: > RMP's question wasn't meant to alleviate Don's worry over his dog > dish. It was meant as a historical answer from the Idealists when > asked about trees falling in forests with no one around. I assume he > was pointing out that If no one is around, all we have is imagination > to tell us what is going on in forests or in kitchens. > > Matt: > Oh, now you can use your imagination, can you? (Do you see why I > cannot construct a consistency?) Dan: Save the snide remarks for someone who cares. >Matt: > "If no one is around, all we have is imagination." Indeed, but does > that mean that New York, dog dish bowls in kitchens, and unicorns > all exist in the same way? Dan: We are operating from a shared sense called our culture. Within that culture there are high quality patterns and low quality patterns. And you know the difference. > > Dan said: > Have you ever tried to have a discussion with a drunk or an insane > person? It doesn't work. Our ability to communicate effectively rests > upon a foundation of social and intellectual patterns that break down > when we are mentally impaired. Therefore, to try and explain a > common sense notion like the concept of object permanency to a > mentally impaired person would only fall on deaf ears. > > Matt: > Can you tell me why I find this so ironic at this moment, Dan? Dan: Again, save it for someone who cares. > > Matt said: > However, maybe you misspoke, and meant that Don wouldn't have > _that specific_ worry of "if I leave the room, maybe the dog dish will > disappear!" unless he was mentally impaired, and that's what > common sense tells you. You'd probably be right then, but you'd > have also short-circuited the thought-experiment before it told you > anything interesting. The interesting part only appears when you > recognize Don's similarity to Descartes. > > Dan said: > So we have to entertain the Cartesian notion that the world of > objects is independent of we as subjects doing the observing. Why > is that interesting? It seems more like backsliding to me... > > Matt: > No, Dan, it's about understanding what a successful defusing of > Cartesianism looks like. One has to understand what it means to > give a Cartesian response before one can understand how to avoid > giving a Cartesian response. (And note that you've conflated > "observation" with "experience" again here.) Dan: Huh. I don't see that I wrote "experience" so I assume you are assuming again... > > Dan said: > Experience, or Dynamic Quality, doesn't reside in the person telling > the story. > > Matt: > Don't tell me. Tell the Dan who denies that "the world of objects is > independent of we as subjects doing the observing" and thus sounds > like he's saying we need to directly observe objects to assure their > existence. Don't we have other forms of assurance? Dan: You seem to be constructing a misunderstanding of what I'm saying and I am beginning to think it is on purpose. Oh well... Thank you, Dan Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
