Horse, DMB,
"...experiences come whole, pervaded by unifying qualities that demarcate them
within the flux of our lives. If we want to find meaning, or the basis for meaning, we
must therefore start with the qualitative unity that Dewey describes. The demarcating
pervasive quality is, at first, unanalyzed, but it is the basis for subsequent analysis,
thought, and development. Thought starts from this experienced whole, and only then does
it introduce distinctions that carry it forward as inquiry."
I'd say this means romantic quality is prior to classical quality. I know some
would put Dynamic Quality in place of romantic quality, but I don't think
that's proper. DQ cannot be defined, and this seems to define too much.
"It is not wrong to say that we experience objects, properties, and relations, but
it is wrong to say that these are primary in experience. What are primary are pervasive
qualities of situations, within which we subsequently discriminate objects, properties,
and relations."
Same as previous, illustrations for the same point.
"Dewey took great pains to remind us that the primary locus of human experience is not
atomistic sense impressions, but rather what he called a "situation," by which he meant,
not just our physical setting, but the whole complex of physical, biological, social, and cultural
conditions that constitute any given experience—experience taken in its fullest, deepest, richest,
broadest sense."
This seems profound enough to refer to Dynamic Quality, and it is indeed true,
that reducing the human experience to interplay of classical and romantic
quality is a too narrow way of thinking, if the MOQ is used as a context.
"Mind, on this view, is neither a willful creator of experience, nor is it a mere
window to objective mind-independent reality. Mind is a functional aspect of experience
that emerges when it becomes possible for us to share meanings, to inquire into the
meaning of a situation, and to initiate action that transforms, or remakes, that
situation."
Seems to call for abandoning SOM. I've had a lot of problems trying to define
SOM, or the subject-object-problem, in a way that I understand. I've eventually
come to define SOM as the doctrine that everything is either deterministic or
random. There is a third option, which the MOQ certainly seems to choose. That
is called relativism in Buddhism (Marsha knows about this - we had a debate on
what's the right word for that) and self-determinism in the CTMU.
"The pervasive quality of a situation is not limited merely to sensible perception or motor
interactions. Thinking is action, and so "acts of thought" also constitute situations
that must have pervasive qualities. Even our best scientific thinking stems from the grasp of
qualities."
Thinking is action. This is pretty interesting. It is clearly formulated in MCT
that the act of thinking is a specific form of romantic quality, but canonic
MOQ is, I recall, more ambiguous about that issue. I think the MCT stance is
compatible with canonic MOQ, but Pirsig doesn't emphasize _exactly_ that point
very much, only something quite similar but more vague.
"The crux of Dewey's entire argument is that what we call thinking, or reasoning, or
logical inference could not even exist without the felt qualities of situations: "The
underlying unity of qualitativeness regulates pertinence or relevancy and force of every
distinction and relation; it guides selection and rejection and the manner of utilization of
all explicit terms."
Go tell that to Rescher, the author of Rationality (1988). He says rationality is
equivalent to virtuousness. :D No wonder they haven't solved the problem of induction
yet... then Rescher introduces this funny concept of "evaluative reasoning",
which appears to be the same thing as Dynamic Quality. But Rescher seems to skip the
point that it can't be defined, which doesn't make him much of a philosopher.
"The underlying unity of qualitativeness" seems to be intended to be equivalent
to Quality.
Actually this was a fun game. I'm sorry for being a butt hole at first.
-Tuukka
26.3.2012 0:33, Horse wrote:
Tuuka
Read this to play :)
Horse
On 25/03/2012 06:19, Dan Glover wrote:
Hello everyone
On Sat, Mar 24, 2012 at 10:37 PM, david
buchanan<[email protected]> wrote:
This might be fun but it's also a kind of experiment. I was reading
a paper and saw many parallels to Pirsig, which wasn't very
surprising because it's titled "Dewey's Zen". But I wonder if others
read it the same way I do. In certain passages it seems like one
could plug Pirsig's terms into the sentences and they'd still mean
the same thing - almost exactly. Telling you more than that - like
which terms I had in mind - it would ruin the experiment. How about
if I just post a bit of it and let everyone take a shot at it? Maybe
it would be fun to put in Pirsig's terms wherever you think they
would fit. Take your pick or play with them all, but please be
explicit enough to let me know if you're seeing the same thing that
I'm seeing.
Hi David
Been editing one of my books most of the evening... I love the
writing... the editing, not so much... but since I cannot afford to
pay someone to do it, it falls to me. Anyway, I thought I'd throw out
a few ideas to chew on...
...experiences come whole, pervaded by unifying qualities that
demarcate them within the flux of our lives. If we want to find
meaning, or the basis for meaning, we must therefore start with the
qualitative unity that Dewey describes. The demarcating pervasive
quality is, at first, unanalyzed, but it is the basis for subsequent
analysis, thought, and development. Thought starts from this
experienced whole, and only then does it introduce distinctions that
carry it forward as inquiry.
Dan:
The author seems to be saying the same thing that RMP says when he
talks about Quality coming first, and how ideas arise from 'it'. The
qualifiers the author uses seem contradictory on the surface though it
is possible I'm not seeing things properly.
It is not wrong to say that we experience objects,
properties, and relations, but it is wrong to say that these are
primary in experience. What are primary are pervasive qualities of
situations, within which we subsequently discriminate objects,
properties, and relations.
Dan:
See... the author subtly shifts here into saying these qualities are
pervasive and the demarcation only happens later.
Dewey took great pains to remind us that the primary locus of
human experience is not atomistic sense impressions, but rather what
he called a "situation," by which he meant, not just our physical
setting, but the whole complex of physical, biological, social, and
cultural conditions that constitute any given experience—experience
taken in its fullest, deepest, richest, broadest sense.
Dan:
A minor quibble here... in the MOQ, experience is synonymous with
Dynamic Quality. Static quality comes later... inorganic, biological,
social, intellectual.
Mind, on this view, is neither a willful creator of experience, nor
is it a mere window to objective mind-independent reality. Mind is a
functional aspect of experience that emerges when it becomes
possible for us to share meanings, to inquire into the meaning of a
situation, and to initiate action that transforms, or remakes, that
situation.
Dan:
To respond to Dynamic Quality, in other words...
The pervasive quality of a situation is not limited merely to
sensible perception or motor interactions. Thinking is action, and
so "acts of thought" also constitute situations that must have
pervasive qualities. Even our best scientific thinking stems from
the grasp of qualities.
Dan:
"Acts of thought" are ideas? Is that what I'm understanding here? And
yes, the MOQ would seem to agree that ideas are as 'real' as inorganic
and biological patterns... they exist on different evolutionary
levels, however.
And perhaps my favorite....
The crux of Dewey's entire argument is that what we call
thinking, or reasoning, or logical inference could not even exist
without the felt qualities of situations: "The underlying unity of
qualitativeness regulates pertinence or relevancy and force of every
distinction and relation; it guides selection and rejection and the
manner of utilization of all explicit terms."
Dan:
I should think that in the MOQ, culture is the regulating force of
distinctions and relations... remember how Phaedrus read about the sun
flashing green before he actually looked up and 'saw' it?
Thank you,
Dan
http://www.danglover.com
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