Arlo said: I don't think Pirsig ever intended demonstrating the analogous nature of symbolic systems to be an excuse to avoid precision and clarity in thought. And I think his entire thesis of Quality is built are the understanding that "some things are better than others". And, of course, analogies are 'things' as well.
dmb says: Exactly. Pirsig's central metaphor, the art of motorcycle maintenance, is "a miniature study in the art of rationality itself" and in both cases they include elements that demand great precision. In both cases, they are human inventions that will either improve your life or lead you to break down by the side of the road. In both cases, you have to care in order to rightly perform the maintenance and repairs. Arlo said: "All this is an analogy" is, as I understand it, a pressure-release valve to the constraints of S/O inquiry. It is Goedel pointing to the incompleteness of any mathematical system. Not to weaken math. Not to make all math systems equal. Not to devalue the precision that goes into crafting a mathematical model. But to never lose sight that without the undefined, inexpressible, uncapturable "that which is always outside the system" one is trapped, running in circles, trying like the Chairman to find that Truth. dmb says: Yep. Similar examples include the alternative geometries with which Poincare' grappled and Pirsig SODV paper. In both cases, the concept of a single, exclusive and objective truth is exposed as obsolete - or rather inadequate in particular situations. In what is perhaps the most pragmatic moment in Pirsig's first book, he says that geometries aren't "true" (objectively) so much as they are convenient (pragmatically true). The same basic ideas that apply to the artful mechanic and the art of rationality also applies to those who practice math and physics. The hardest of sciences have their creative artists too. Arlo said: So one the one hand, "all this is an analogy" is what keeps understanding from devolving into S/O territory. On the other, it should never be an excuse to interject relativism, or bypass clarity, precision and critical thought. After all, Goedel's Incompleteness Theorum itself is a well-crafted, carefully argued, clear and precise argument. dmb says: Right, and Pirsig's MOQ is "a well-crafted, carefully argued, clear and precise argument" too. Unlike the relativism of postmodernism, the MOQ contains a theory of truth with empirical standards and other criteria. Truth is no longer Absolute, eternal, or objective. Nor is truth just a matter of power, the will or subjective caprice. Instead, truth is something like excellence within a practice, within a discipline or tradition. The truths of science are not truer than the truths of history or philosophy and there is no overarching Truth that contains them all BUT the physicists can certainly be wrong about physics and it will be the philosophers who identify philosophical bullshit as such. This is pluralism in truth, not relativism. This means that truths are provisional. It does not mean that the truth is personal or whimsical or arbitrary. It does not mean that every assertion is just as valid as any other, that's for sure. Pragmatic truths are open to revision but, as Ja mes says, they are also tightly "wedged and controlled" by two main factors: the existing conceptual order and the empirical flux of reality. There is a nice overview of this kind of truth and its rivals in philosophy. "The Concept of Truth that Matters" by Laura E. Weed may be of interest to the relatively serious MOQers. (Harvard hosts the "William James Society" and they publish papers online for free.) http://williamjamesstudies.org/3.1/weed.html Arlo said: On a side note (and something I may bring up for discussion in its own thread at some point), I've been reading lately much of the work (that which has been translated, I don't speak Russian) of Piotr Gal'perin, a student of Vygotsky, whose research focuses on the notion that the specific quality of the concepts we teach to children directly effects their cognitive development. This is a reversal of the Piagetian concept that cognitive development is a natural/biological process of maturation and instruction should be responsive (come after) development. From the article, "The Quality of Cultural Tools and Cognitive Development: Gal'perin's Perspective and Its Implications": the specific character of culturally evolved cognitive tools [concepts, measures, schemas, etc.] acquired by the child in the course of instruction defines in large measure the specifics of the child's cognitive development. I mention this here because it not only builds from the notion that "some th ings are better than others", but argues there are significant consequences to how we choose and implement the things (concepts, analogies, etc.) that we use. dmb says: That is a fresh idea and it's one that seems true right away. I'd be interested to know more. The richness of the cognitive environment has been shown to make a huge difference, so much that some kids are already way behind on their first day of school. It's basically a function of how many words they hear. The differences are so great that in some cases the most advanced kindergarteners will have a better vocabulary than the parents of the most underdeveloped kindergarteners! But the idea that the specific character or quality of the "cognitive tools" plays a role is new, to me anyway. It's hard to imagine what that means, exactly. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
