"The Metaphysics of Quality itself is static and should be separated from the
Dynamic Quality it talks about. Like the rest of the printed philosophic
tradition it doesn't change from day to day, although the world it talks about
does."
"Quality is indivisible, undefinable and unknowable in the sense that there is
a knower and a known, but a metaphysics can be none of these things. A
metaphysics must be divisible, definable and knowable, or there isn't any
metaphysics."
Krimel said to Carrie:
...Nietzsche's chief complaint against science was that after having disposed
of the theological Absolute, science was doing nothing more than building a new
set of Absolutes in the form of the "Law of Science." Nietzsche thought this
was absurd because every Absolute formulation did little more than answer
questions asked in a purely human voice.
Carrie said to Krimel:
yes, well, he was operating from a subject object perspective, was he not?
Just because an absolute is human, is not proof that it's non-existent. In
fact, rather the opposite. The law of gravity could equally be called the
absolute of gravity. As it's the bedrock of our understanding of the way the
physical universe flies. Maybe one day there will come a unifying theory, and
then we'll have a new absolute. I'd have no problem with that. But then, I
have no problem believing in ghosts, either.
Krimel replied:
I don't know that Nietzsche was an SOMer or that it really matters. I think his
point was that theology claims to provide universal absolutes but in fact they
are just human inventions to satisfy human ends. He was equally critical of
what the sciences had become. He saw the doing exactly what you describe,
replace one set of imaginary absolutes for another. As long as we keep trying
to substitute one absolute for another we are just spinning our wheels. This is
part of my objection to some peoples notions of what the MoQ is all about.
dmb says:
No, he wasn't a SOMer and yes, it really matters. His rejection science as the
new absolute is a rejection of scientific objectivity. That's what rejecting
SOM is all about. Carrie alludes to the earliest version of this, when the road
trip has just begun and Pirsig tells his ghost story about gravity. The SOMer
doesn't know it's a ghost. He thinks Newton discovered the law of gravity but
Pirsig says that Newton invented the law gravity. That's the difference between
an absolute and a human convention, which is a mighty big difference. The law
of gravity is Newton's ghost, not a pre-existing objective reality. (Thanks,
Isaac. Your law is extremely useful.)
But didn't apples obey the law of gravity even before Newton was ever born,
somebody asked Pirsig. "No," he answered, "They just fell." The idea here, I
think, is that the law of gravity is an abstract concept that we invented as a
way to explain falling objects. It's a fabulous idea but what real is the
falling of apples and other objects. That's the concrete empirical reality from
which the law was derived. Of course "falling," "apples," and "objects" are
fabulous concepts too and our whole static reality is made of these ghosts.
He'll make this same point again later in the book but instead of ghosts this
static conceptual reality is made of analogies. Every last bit of it.
Krimel said To Carrie:
Nietzsche thought the "universe" the entire cosmic order was meaningless and
purposeless. But he thought that eventually people could come to understand
how liberating and joyous this could be.
dmb says:
Well, not exactly. The rejection of absolutes, theological or scientific,
doesn't destroy all meaning so much as it forces a "revaluation of all values".
The rejection of universal values isn't quite the same as a rejection of any
and all values, but it does mean you have to have some serious re-thinking to
do.
Standford Encyclopedia:
In one of his latest works, "Twilight of the Idols, or How One Philosophizes
with a Hammer," according to the Stanford Encyclopedia:
"Nietzsche reiterates and elaborates some of the criticisms of Socrates, Plato,
Kant and Christianity found in earlier works" and contrasts "these alleged
representatives of cultural decadence" with figures such as "Caesar, Napoleon,
Goethe, Dostoevski, Thucydides and the Sophists as healthier and stronger
types. The phrase 'to philosophize with a hammer' primarily signifies a way to
test idols by tapping on them lightly; one “sounds them out” to determine
whether they are hollow, or intact, etc., as physician would use a percussion
hammer upon the abdomen as a diagnostic instrument."
I like Stanford's description here because the common misconception of
Nietzsche as a nihilist paints him as a destroyer who's going around
indiscriminately smashing everything to pieces with his hammer. But if the
hammer is a diagnostic tool, an instrument to increase the physician's
sensitivity or perceptivity, then Nietzsche is not a destroyer of values but a
concerned expert. He's looking for what's hollow and what's not. Pirsig uses no
hammer metaphors but I think he takes up a very similar position. Instead of
tapping to find out what's hollow and what's still intact, Pirsig calls for a
fair dusting off and an impartial re-examination.
"...the Metaphysics of Quality concludes that the old Puritan & Victorian
social codes should not be followed [or attacked] blindly … They should be
dusted off and re-examined, fairly and impartially, to see what they were
trying to accomplish and actually did accomplish towards building a stronger
society. ...These moral bads and goods are not just ‘customs’. They are as real
as rocks and trees."
Krimel said to Carrie:
...In part what he [Nietzsche] was about was having people stop looking up to
authority, custom or the cosmic order to tell them how to live their lives.
Whether the universe has a purpose or not is really none of my concern. I have
purposes and projects of my own. Even if the cosmos has no purpose
what-so-ever, I do and I hope you do as well.
dmb says:
"And what is good, Phaedus, And what is not good - Need we ask anyone to tell
us these things?"
Nihilism is actually a product of the world view these guys are rejecting. Not
the view they advocate. These guys are talking about the genealogy of morals,
the evolution of values. Not absolute standards, universal morals or objective
truths but the varieties and strains and conflicting forces in a complex jungle
of developing values. Nihilism means no values at all, so that's not the right
word. That label does not comport with the content of their work. Not that they
were working together, of course, but this can be said about both of them.
Nietzsche's hammer would be quite pointless if nothing were left in tact and
everything was hollow. And there is nothing new about the view that all values
are hollow anyway. That's the problem, not the solution. Roughly speaking,
Krimel has it backwards.
"From the perspective of subject-object science, the world is a completely
purposeless, valueless place. There is no point to anything. Nothing is right
and nothing is wrong. Everything is just functions, like machinery. There is
nothing morally wrong with being lazy, nothing morally wrong with lying, with
theft, with suicide, with murder, with genocide. There is nothing morally wrong
because there are no morals, just functions."
As Carrie rightly points out, "...'meaningless and devoid of purpose' is
exactly how science looks at nature. And the laws of cause and effect having
an objective reality..." It seems to me that Krimel is pretty good as an
inadvertent spokesman for the sort of this scientific nihilism. But as a
spokesman for Nietzsche or Pirisg? Not so much.
Krimel replied to Carrie:
Those weren't his examples so I am sorry if they sounded that way. I may be
stretching Nietzsche to the breaking point here but the way I see it. In a
great many situations realism works really well. Why not adopt it as a
perspective when it is? In other situations it doesn't and I become all
idealistic. Really I think that is what Pirsig' gallery is all about. My
appreciation for any particular painting on the wall is largely a matter of how
I feel at the moment. We are capable on many moods and many perspectives. Why
should we feel the compulsion to cling to only one?
dmb says:
Interesting you should put it that way because "perspectivism" is the
epistemology position shared by Nietzsche and pragmatists like Pirsig, James,
Dewey, etc. That's what Pirsig's gallery-of-truths analogy illustrates so well.
Stanford says the third essay in his book "On the Genealogy of Morals",
"contains one of Nietzsche's clearest expressions of 'perspectivism' — the
idea that there is no absolute, 'God's eye' standpoint from which one can
survey everything that is. Dewey brilliantly mocked this "God's eye" view by
simply giving it a nickname: "immaculate perception".
But stretching Nietzsche's (or anyone's) intended meaning to the breaking point
is NOT a different perspective. Getting his idea backwards or turning it upside
down is NOT a different perspective. It's just a distortion of somebody else's
perspective. I mean, perspectivism does NOT say that nobody can be wrong about
anything. It doesn't mean that all opinions are equally valid. It just means
that there are multiple truths and that those truths can't be universally
applied, have limited applications, and can never exhaust the number true
things that could be said about whatever it is you're looking at. It certainly
doesn't mean we can toss a salad of words and call it a perspective, call it my
truth, of whatever. These guys want to loosen things up in a very dramatic way
but they are not THAT epistemologically promiscuous. They still have standards.
They not going to get in bed with just any old concept. Nietzsche really was a
certain kind of elitist, after all, and in his own way Pirsig is very
interested in what's best too. Apathetic nihilists they are not.
Krimel said to Carrie:
Pirsig highlights the affinity, I would say identity, of DQ and chaos when he
says, "To cling to Dynamic Quality alone apart from any static patterns is to
cling to chaos." A quote that lies outside the orthodox cannon of the MoQ.
Carrie replied:
.. well that is interesting. not just the quote, but there's an orthodox
cannon. Sounds religious! Is the creed and practice of the MoQist online
somewhere? Or is the knowledge bequeathed in levels, like with scientology?
(jk)
dmb says:
Well, Carrie, Krimel is probably talking about me. I've repeatedly criticized
Krimel (and Marsha) for misunderstanding and misusing the key terms of the MOQ.
As he puts it, "There are those among us who get really bitchy if they think
you aren't using the right words in the right way. Canonization is really
fascinating." But this confuses demands for obedience to a single vision
(orthodoxy) with a criticism about one's level of comprehension. It's much
more flattering to be a persecuted rebel than it is to be a guy that doesn't
get the basic ideas, so Krimel's characterization is transparently
self-serving. It is also based on a confused idea of orthodoxy, one that blurs
the distinction between a demand for conformity and the criticism of conceptual
errors. The former wants you to comply with the idea, believe in the idea or
even prohibits you from doubting the idea. The latter simply wants you to
understand the idea. Big difference, of course.
Having said that, I'm pretty sure that Krimel's equation (DQ = chaos) is a
mistake. And if he doesn't denounce it by dawn, he shall be excommunicated,
drawn and quartered, and the scattered quarters shall be left for the wolves to
eat.
But seriously, the fuller context of the quote would make it very clear that
Pirsig is not equating DQ and chaos. He making a case for the necessity of
static pattens. If I represented an orthodox interpretation of the MOQ, this
quote would be the John 3:16 of my canon. I've fired it at Marsha many, many
times.
"In the past Phaedrus' own radical bias caused him to think of Dynamic Quality
alone and neglect static patterns of quality. Until now he had always felt that
these static patterns were dead. They have no love. They offer no promise of
anything. To succumb to them is to succumb to death, since that which does not
change cannot live. But now he was beginning to see that this radical bias
weakened his own case. Life can't exist on Dynamic Quality alone. It has no
staying power. To cling to Dynamic Quality alone apart from any static patterns
is to cling to chaos."
As I read it, the idea is not to equate DQ with chaos but to say that we need
static quality. Life without static quality will degenerate into into chaos.
The DQ isn't the chaos so much as the ALONE part, you know? That's largely what
Lila is all about, the static pattens. ZAMM ends with a metaphysical system
consisting of one undefined term. Lila starts off with several apologies like
this one for his "radical bias" and otherwise makes up for his former neglect
of static quality by lavishing his attention on it. The levels, the codes, the
philosophology and a whole metaphysics.
Krimel said to Carrie:
...It is pretty clear that Pirsig doesn't understand chaos the way Nietzsche
and the chaos theorists do, he shares your confusion and you can hear it when
he says, "It doesn't make sense."
dmb says:
I'm pretty sure you're using the term in a scientific and mathematical sense,
but that's not how Pirsig or Nietzsche would use it unless they' actually
talking about physics or maybe the philosophy of science. But philosophy is not
science and these guys are philosophers, not scientists. And this is a
philosophical discussion group, not a science forum. If anyone is to be blamed
for using "chaos" in a confusing and inappropriate way, I think it's Krimel.
How does Krimel figure it's okay to describe Pirsig's undefined mystical entity
(DQ = chaos) in terms of chaos theory or coin tosses? Does that strike anyone
else as totally absurd? Like putting money in the bank of a river, the
wrongness of Krimel's misconception is funny and tragic at the same time.
Imagine cash floating toward the open sea.
Carrie said to Krimel:
...But while quality is defined as undefinable, we all do have an idea of what
it means to do good. And what it means to just randomnly do any old thing. We
have common understanding of the terms that seems to say they are opposite one
another.
Krimel replied:
...the issue of definition is important. I think widely over stated and
misunderstood. I think the problem is not confined to Quality. As I said a
while back in another thread. The dog that can be named is not the constant
dog. Definitions are never absolute. They are always fuzzy. They indicate they
do not prescribe.
dmb says:
No, that's just a weird application of your scientific nihilism and it has
nothing to do with Pirsig's refusal to define the MOQ's central term. Using
"dog" interchangeably with "Quality" or the "Tao" would be provocative and edgy
if it made any sense at all.
Let me see if I follow your reasoning here, Krimel. As I read it, you are
saying,
A) Dogs and everything else, including definitions, cannot be defined any more
than the indefinable, mystical reality can.
B) Therefore, you are not required to use words correctly or otherwise make
sense when discussing philosophy.
Is that about right?
I agree with the part where you say that definitions are not Absolute but other
than that, I disagree. I think your position is sophomoric relativism and I
think there's good evidence that Pirsig does not share your view either. Here's
some....
"The Metaphysics of Quality itself is static and should be separated from the
Dynamic Quality it talks about. Like the rest of the printed philosophic
tradition it doesn't change from day to day, although the world it talks about
does."
"Quality is indivisible, undefinable and unknowable in the sense that there is
a knower and a known, but a metaphysics can be none of these things. A
metaphysics must be divisible, definable and knowable, or there isn't any
metaphysics."
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