Hello everyone On Mon, May 6, 2013 at 11:28 AM, david buchanan <[email protected]>wrote:
> > D. Harding said to All: > Why does Dan not see what I'm saying? ...We have had an ongoing discussion > about the MOQ for a long time now and our differences *appear* to have come > down to what 'experience' is. Dan insists that 'experience' is DQ and > everything else after that - is not 'experience'. I have said to him > time and again that experience includes *both* DQ and sq. ...But the > trouble is - if all you're interested in talking about is DQ - then why are > you on a philosophical discussion board? Like Marsha, the place for Dan > isn't a philosophical discussion group. It's a Zen retreat…Zen Master Dan > wrote: "You say we experience static quality. NO!!!! Not in the MOQ!" > > dmb says: > I haven't really followed the Harding-Glover debates - but I don't see > how this particular point is even debatable. It must be that you have > different ideas about what the operative terms mean, exactly. > > If static quality is conceptual, to say that we don't experience static > quality is to say that we don't experience concepts. But that's absurd > because one cannot say anything without experiencing concepts, without > using words and ideas. It's a performative contradiction wherein you're > indeed doing the very thing you are denying. It would be like saying, "we > do not experience words or concepts." I seriously doubt that Dan means to > say anything so absurd. > Dan: Well, I think you may be falling into the same SOM trap as Harding and Morey here although you crawl out of this abyss quite nicely later on. IF we are using the term 'experience' in the context of the MOQ, then we (subjects) do not experience things (objects) such as concepts. We manipulate those concepts, those memories of experience, but those concepts and words are secondary to experience, they are not experience itself. For instance: "So in the MOQ experience comes first, everything else comes later. This is pure empiricism, as opposed to scientific empiricism, which, with its pre-existing subjects and objects, is not really so pure. " [Lila's Child] Dan comments: The MOQ subscribes to pure empiricism where experience is primary. In the SOM we experience both Dynamic Quality and static quality. That makes sense. However, in the MOQ we experience neither Dynamic Quality nor static quality. Experience becomes synonymous with Dynamic Quality. Is this absurd? Sure. "Since a metaphysics is essentially a kind of dialectical definition and since Quality is essentially outside definition, this means that a "Metaphysics of Quality" is essentially a contradiction in terms, a logical absurdity." [Lila] Dan comments: If we take Quality and Dynamic Quality as being synonymous then we are saying in essence that experience is outside definition. Once we have defined 'it' experience has moved on and we are left with static quality, a memory of experience, not experience itself. So to say we experience either Dynamic Quality or static quality is a misnomer in the MOQ. > dmb: > What we want to agree about is the difference between concepts (sq) and > immediate, preconceptual experience (DQ). Yes, of course, in the usual > sense of the word concepts (static pattens) are known in "experience". > That's what we are exchanging and dealing with right now, obviously. But > concepts (sq) are not the same as preconceptual experience (DQ). That's > exactly WHY it makes sense to call it "PRE-conceptual"; to distinguish it > from concepts and conceptual understanding. Dan: Again, I am not sure this is quite right and please press back if I am mistaken, but you seem to be mixing "the usual sense" and "the MOQ sense" here. By usual sense I take it you mean SOM. You go on to say that static quality is not the same as Dynamic Quality (experience) which is what I am on about too. Perhaps we are simply coming at this problem from differing perspectives. dmb: > This is not just true in Pirsig's view, but also with the other radical > empiricists like James and Dewey. > > “In beginning to understand his view, it cannot be overemphasized that > Dewey is not using the word ‘experience’ in its conventional sense," John > Stuhr explains. "For Dewey, experience is not to be understood in terms of > the experiencing subject, or as the interaction of a subject and object > that exist separate from their interaction. Instead, Dewey’s view is > radically empirical” wherein “experience is an activity in which subject > and object are unified and constituted as partial features and relations > within this ongoing, unanalyzed unity” (PCAP 437). > > This is a nice parallel to Pirsig's warnings about being careful with the > term "experience" because it's almost always conceived in terms of subjects > and objects. Dan: This is quite right. Still, if the MOQ starts with experience we need to carefully define the term in the MOQ sense and not the SOM sense. dmb > Stuhr is warning the reader that Dewey is using the term quite > differently. Where Pirsig talks about the cutting edge of undivided, > pre-intellectual experience, Dewey is talking about the "ongoing, > unanalyzed unity". This is what James calls the immediate flux of life, > pure experience, a dynamic continuity, which sounds very much like > Northrop's undifferentiated continuum. See a common concept behind all > these various terms? That's the kind of experience we're talking about, a > unconventional use of the term used to distinguish a pre-verbal immediacy > from reflective thought. > > And this is important for overcoming SOM precisely because it takes > subjects and objects as the cause of experience rather than a product of > reflection, rather than concepts which has been derived from experience. > Our radical empiricist are correcting a conceptual error, one known as > "reification" As Stuhr puts it, “the error of materialists and idealists > alike” is “the error of conferring existential status upon the products of > reflection” This is a matter of treating our “products of reflection” as if > they were ontological realities instead of parts of a man-made conceptual > scheme. > Dan: Yes! This seems quite profound, actually. By saying we experience static quality we are conferring "ontological realities" upon them. We are saying static quality patterns come first and our experience of them is secondary. > dmb: > This attack on subjects and objects is really why we want clarify the > distinction between concepts (sq) and pre-intellectual experience (DQ). The > point is to show how subjects and objects are just static concepts rather > than the basic starting points of reality, to distinguish the primary > empirical reality from the ways we conceptualize it. And BOTH of these > elements are necessary.... > > > “The Metaphysics of Quality subscribes to what is called empiricism. It > claims that all LEGITIMATE KNOWLEDGE arises from the senses or by THINKING > about what the senses provided. Most empiricists deny that validity of any > knowledge gained through imagination, authority tradition, or purely > theoretical reasoning. They regard fields such as art, morality, religion, > and metaphysics as unverifiable. The Metaphysics of Quality varies from > this by saying that the values of art and morality and even religious > mysticism are verifiable, and that in the past they have been excluded for > metaphysical reasons, not empirical reasons. They have been excluded > because of the metaphysical assumption that all THE UNIVERSE IS COMPOSED OF > SUBJECTS AND OBJECTS and anything that can’t be classified as a subject or > an object isn’t real. There is no empirical evidence for this assumption at > all. Its just an assumption” (LILA 99). > Dan: Yes again. Dynamic Quality (experience) and static quality (memory of experience) are both necessary to make sense of the world. Once experience has been defined, it is no longer experience but a concept, a memory, a static quality pattern that makes sense of that experience. The hot stove example in Lila is a great example. Thanks Dave, Dan http://www.danglover.com Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
