Hi Matt, Matt: > I'm not sure I can properly make the point I want to here, about the > "replacement method" I was off-handedly using to demote the > historical importance of the subject/object distinction. To illustrate, > perhaps instead, the belief you state above can be stated without the > use of the terms "subject" or "object." Say: "the belief that the physical > world operates independently of what observers think about that > world." Now, to the point of saying which is the operative distinction > behind the overturning of the Capricious God Worldview, the > replacement I performed doesn't speak one way or the other. And > that's why I say I can't speak any further to the historico-philosophical > question, other than saying my suspicion is that the > external-world/observer distinction is the pragmatic difference that > makes a difference, and not the subject/object (but that's partly > because I don't know how to specify what it uniquely picks out). (And > not the only distinction operative in what you specified, however; I > think I would need to specify others to generate the paradigm shift > you've picked out, and I'm not sure one of them wouldn't fit > something uniquely played by a subject/object distinction.) >
If I'd said the observer-external world distinction is valuable, would you have challenged me on it? > > What is important here, of course, is not the terms or words used, but > the -role- they play in a network of beliefs. This, I take it, is a > function > of pragmatism, something I've been taught specifically by > Brandom--that a concept is picked out by its inferential role. And this > makes historical work more difficult, especially the philosophical kind, > because it involves the ability to go back and forth between your own > vocabulary and the historical target-vocabulary while being able to > specify what differences in vocab make a real difference between > what you are able to say and do and what the historical, dead users > were able to say and do. (And, actually, on that score, I think it's easy > to see that your initial formulation of the Capricious God Worldview > would need slight modification, because it's pretty obvious that every > -animal-, including humans, practically makes an > external-world/observer distinction in how they behave. For example, > when Hagar prays to Odin to influence his ability to get the deer, he > practically understands that that's not the only thing he needs to do. > He also knows that, to influence his ability to eat venison tonight, he > will need to throw the spear into the deer. Hagar may think that the > important distinction at work in his eating venison was the human/God > distinction, but we enlightened folk know that in fact that distinction > wasn't operative at all--or at least, we have no way of knowing if it was > operative, and so by Occam's razor cut it out from our accounts of how > best to hunt deer.) > I don't think it's as obvious as you suggest that other animals and Hagar make/made external world-observer distinctions but I don't have the capacity to substantiate my Capricious Gods Worldview, although I have a few comments to make, for your consideration One is that the mythos Hagar lived in may have been one where his thoughts were not his own as our mythos would have it but were the gods telling him what to do. I'm thinking of something like Julian Jaynes's thesis as a reference. The other is that we tend to think that people inside a different mythos experience the same things as us but just think differently about them but if you follow something like Owen Barfield's idea of original participation you will find a very different way of looking at the history of human experience. I think Pirsig's understanding of the mythos shares some of the conclusions reached by these theories. > > Matt said: > As an example of the kind of lesson I've learned about metaphysics > over the past ten years, above you say that "the appearance-reality > distinction is the one to be avoided" in the context of the locution > "what appears to be subjects and objects are really patterns of value." > Divorced of any other collateral premises (e.g., about having a > method for determining when one has detected reality qua reality), > I'm now no longer inclined to think there's anything suspicious about > saying that subjects and objects are really patterns of value. This is > because conceptual redescription is the genre to which pernicious > metaphysical reductionism (e.g., Platonism) is simply one species. > "Really," above, is simply a commendation about what will work > better. > > Paul said: > If that's all people mean then I agree. But I think you see pragmatist > people.....everywhere. > > Matt: > Heh, well, let's just say that since practice comes before theory, I've > taken to thinking that the right way to go about the problem of "does > this person mean something Platonic?" is to let them create the noose > by which they are hung. (And this because, as I alluded to, I once saw > Platonists everywhere, and I've found that that's the wrong way around > in philosophical discussion. Partly because of the pragmatist point > above about concepts being their inferential role. I need to see an > awful lot of inferences being made before I'm willing to ascribe > philosophical theses to people these days. It's why my rhetorical > stance is full of suspicion and inclination.) You can't be a Platonist by > _saying_ you either _do or do not_ use the appearance/reality > distinction. You have to _behave_ like a Platonic theorist. For > example, one cannot just say that they are not a relativist to get off > the hook. But the same has to go in reverse: neither avowal nor > disavowal is enough. > > So, how does one behave like a Platonic theorist? That's the > (non)answer to your challenge below. > OK, I was thinking about the use of the distinction in philosophical discussions, like the one with Marsha about mirages as an analogy for static quality. Also, is the appearance-reality distinction strictly a Platonic thing to you? I see it more that he took the Parmenidean appearance-reality distinction and put Forms firmly into the reality category. I think you can take pretty much any Western philosopher after Parmenides and analyse them in terms of what they placed on either side of that Parmenidean distinction. Paul said: > I tend to see the appearance-reality distinction as the big problem > because when you use this to analyse anything philosophically it > inevitably leads to the same questions about "how do you detect that > which is real?" etc. I think the other distinctions mentioned can be > considered taxonomical, pragmatic distinctions in philosophical debate > but appearance-reality is ontological by definition, or at least loses all > meaning if it is defined otherwise. I see you suggest it can be divorced > from such "collateral premises" but I would need some convincing. > > Matt: > The reason I said, "I as much as you want to avoid the > appearance/reality distinction and most of the locutions that call it > into being when we are doing metaphysics" is because I agree with you > (under one qualification) that "when you use [the A/R distinction] to > analyse anything philosophically it inevitably leads to the same > questions about 'how do you detect that which is real?'" The > qualification is the excising of the unpragmatic "inevitable"--I, like you, > cannot envisage a _philosophical_ use of the appearance/reality > distinction that does not bind oneself to the terrible question of > method you articulated (and I gave as an example of a collateral > premise). But pragmatic fallibilism is in point here: I might simply lack > the imagination to give that distinction an important, interesting > philosophical use that is non-Platonic. I said I'd be willing to go as far > as saying that no distinction leads inevitably to SOM or Platonism or > any other kind of pernicious philosophical mode of thought, whatever > one thinks those are, because I don't think a distinction that works > fine in everyday practice will lead you inevitably to become a > pernicious theorist. I can envisage a world in which people use the > appearance/reality distinction to distinguish mirages and non-dairy > creamer, but where it never occurs to them to press it into service for > talking about this "thing" called "reality." (Is "reality" a "thing"? > Brandom thinks that thinking of reality that way is actually the first > step towards philosophical mayhem. Because it's only by doing that > you'd think the otherwise serviceable appearance/reality distinction > might be applied to it.) > I think I agree with Brandom here, without having read exactly what he said. It at least seems similar to what I said in an earlier post about taking a notion of Reality and trying to work out what fulfils its role. I think this is what creates the "mayhem." As I suggested above, I agree that applying the appearance-reality to something like leather-PVC is not problematic. But applying it to static quality-Dynamic Quality, for example, I think is a problem. So, given the existence of mirages and unicorns, I like you want to > carefully circumscribe my denunciation of the appearance/reality > distinction to philosophical discourse. The only reason I intimated it > _can_ be divorced from collateral premises is because I think any > belief can be so divorced. The question is whether there is anything > "philosophical" left after the divorce. I, like you, am inclined to think > not. Talking about mirages doesn't seem to be particularly > philosophical, unless you do it the way Descartes would've. But who > knows? When we subscribe to DQ, we have to live with the possibility > of being surprised. > I agree with all of that. Paul Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
