Don't know Auxier, but that is entertaining. Thanks John. Ian
On Fri, Apr 25, 2014 at 3:39 PM, John Carl <ridgecoy...@gmail.com> wrote: > "... pragmatists in the James-Dewey temper will have to learn > *difficult*philosophy, something they have successfully avoided doing > for about three > generations, through disinclination, dullness of mind, and uninformed > superstitions about the role of reason in philosophy. The inheritors of > the James and Dewey temper, however, are such as to believed, quite > dogmatically, that all metaphysics is bad metaphysics--and here we have a > nice examples among them of the methods of tenacity, authority and the a > priori method , which is what they have done in fixing their beliefs about > the matter. Hence, they neither read nor understand Royce, nor Whitehead, > nor anyone else who is difficult to understand, and the often dislike > Peirce and do not understand him, even though they have developed a > conscience about forcing themselves to read him, once. > > Asking contemporary pragmatists to reconsider metaphysics is recieve as > though one had asked them to go to church to get a little religion, an > affront to any respectable intellectual these days, especially the > followers of Dewey and James. They would rather go to hell than learn > logic and try some metaphysics. But most of them have done some > metaphysics badly, and fail to grasp the situation until they feel Rorty's > pointy nominalistic trident poking their collective behinds." > > Time Will and Purpose, Auxier, 120 > > I bet ol' Matt Kundert would get a kick out of that. > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
