[Arlo had said] There are many "post-" philosophies out there. "Post-technological", "post-consumerism", "post-industrial" (of course)... I've been reading some articles lately on "post-postmodernism" (which has its own Wikipedia page: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Post-postmodernism).
[Ron] Incidentally, I didn't like the wiki article much. I preferred the SEP's description of post-modern. [Arlo] Just to clarify, what I was linking wasn't about "post-modernism" but "POST-post-modernism". And, not making any claims, just pointing out the fun with this way of labeling. [Arlo previously] Overall, I think the use of "post-" to demonstrate an initial cleave with a dominant ideology is an appropriate first-step, but its a definition by negation; defining "this" as "not that". It provides a point of departure, but not a point of destination. [Dan] I was under the assumption that the prefix 'post' normally connotes 'after' just as 'pre' designates 'before.' [Arlo] Certainly it does, Dan. My only point was to say that defining something as being "after" something else doesn't really define what something "is", just what "it is no longer". I have no problem with these label, but I think a lot of authors are starting to realize we need something more descriptive than simply labeling everything "post-modern". Its the same thing with the label "post-intellectual", or maybe "post-rationalist". As you point out, there are significant differences between Kirby's ideas about post-modernism and post-postmodernism and the MOQ, and yet I'd argue that Pirsig's MOQ is certainly NOT "modernist". Does that make it post-modern? Post-postmodern? If so, what does that mean? What does it share with these other theories? Is it fair to Consider this paragraph from Alfredi Ruiz. It certainly seems like Pirsig's MOQ would be described as "post-rationalist". "According to Guidano, the most important problem which has been posed to this epistemologic approach has been the radical change which has taken place in the conception of the relation between observer and observed. In the empirist approach the observer faces a reality, objective in itself, which exists independently. The observer in this case is considered impartial and objective. The observation of the observer corresponds to reality. Now, with the changes produced in the notion of the relations between observer and observed, the observer no longer stands as neutral. On the contrary, with his observation he introduces an order in what he observes and what he observes is much more dependent on his perceptual apparatus than on the structure itself of something objective external to him. What is now happening is that we are beginning to attain greater conscience that the reality in which we live is codependent of our way of ordering and goes together with our perception. The world of regularities we live in is a world which is co-constructed by the observer." (Ruiz, Theoretical Bases of the Post-Rationalist Approach. http://www.inteco.cl/post-rac/ifundam.htm) I should note that this short article also calls for an ontological and an epistomological approach to experience, in much the same way that Paul Turner approached describing two approaches to Pirsig's MOQ. Consider too that Ruiz writes, "The first dimension is immediate experience. Like what occurs in other animals, the experience of living, of feeling alive, is something with simply occurs to us, something we can not decide. The other dimension is explanation." Sounds very Dynamic/static, doesn't it? But this seems different from the post-postmodernism Kirby describes. How would Ruiz's "post-rational" compare to Wood's "post-intellectual" (I have no idea)? Do either reflect, even partially, the MOQ's "spirirationality" (if I'm remember the term Ant's friend used)? We are awash in a sea of "post-X"s, though, that's for sure. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
