"The first great pitfall from which such a radical standing by
experience will save us is an artificial conception of the relations
between knower and known. Throughout the history of philosophy
the subject and its object have been treated as absolutely discontinuous
entities; and thereupon the presence of the latter to the former,
or the 'apprehension' by the former of the latter, has assumed
a paradoxical character which all sorts of theories had to be
invented to overcome. Representative theories put a mental 'representation,'
'image,' or 'content' into the gap, as a sort of intermediary.
Common-sense theories left the gap untouched, declaring our mind
able to clear it by a self-transcending leap. Transcendentalist
theories left it impossible to traverse by finite knowers, and
brought an Absolute in to perform the saltatory act. All the while,
in the very bosom of the finite experience, every conjunction
required to make the relation intelligible is given in full." -- William James,
A World of Pure Experience.
As you can see here, James construes subject-object metaphysics as a problem
that's existed "throughout the history of philosophy." In other words, it's a
philosophical problem. It certainly CAN be described in terms familiar to fans
of philosophy, it should be described in those terms. It should be described in
terms that non-philosophers can learn by simply using a dictionary or
encyclopedia. Notice how James lists some of the various theories that have
been invented to overcome the problem created by this "artificial conception of
the relations
between knower and known"? When the subject (knower) is treated as an entity
that is absolutely discontinuous
objective entities (known) "all sorts of theories" have "to be
invented to overcome" the gap between them. Since this gap is between knower
and known, it is called an epistemic gap. These ontological assumptions create
a very paradoxical knowledge problem, a truth problem. The various theories
listed by James, please notice, are theories of Truth. (Representative theories
put a mental 'representation,'
'image,' or 'content' into the gap, as a sort of intermediary.
Common-sense theories left the gap untouched, declaring our mind
able to clear it by a self-transcending leap. Transcendentalist
theories left it impossible to traverse by finite knowers, and
brought an Absolute in to perform the saltatory act.) That's basically what all
the isms are all about; crossing that epistemic gap. I believe the
"representative theories" are a reference to old-school sensory empiricism, the
common sense theories would be called naive realism (not really a philosophical
position), and the transcendentalists were quasi-theological idealist like
Hegel or maybe even Kant, who had introduced the transcendental ego to fill the
gap.
But James and Pirsig will say that subjects and objects are not entities at
all, they are not the ontological starting points of reality or the conditions
that make experience and knowledge possible. They're just very handy ideas.
They're just thought categories into which we sort experience - and so there is
no epistemic gap.
Just as Pirsig's rejection of SOM represents a Copernican revolution, James's
rejection is described as a revolution, as a "radical reconstruction of
philosophy". And of course it's hard to appreciate their solution without first
understanding what the problem is all about.
How's that?
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