David, I don't know... this seems like pretty much a yawn to me. But let's go ahead and kick the tires and see if the engine cranks. You never know...
On Tue, Dec 9, 2014 at 2:59 PM, david <[email protected]> wrote: > David Morey asked the MOQers: > > > How does the MOQ describe science? Dan: I'd say science is a set of high quality intellectual patterns. DM: Does science study SQ? Dan: Now, see? This is an asshole question if there ever was one. Come on, Morey. You've been at this long enough to know better. Read the first two paragraphs of chapter 12 in Lila and get back with me on this. DM: Does science discover SQ processes that take place in the world beyond the confines of direct experience? Dan: Now this is somewhat interesting. If by using the term 'direct experience' you mean Dynamic Quality, then of course static quality is all that exists beyond 'it.' But that isn't really right. I get the sense you don't actually understand what it is you are saying, otherwise you wouldn't be saying it. DM: If not how should the self-understanding of science be corrected or redescribed in MOQ terms? Dan: If you want self-understanding, I suggest meditation. Science is more about intellectual understanding. > > > > dmb says: > > This could be a really great question, a great way to discuss the difference > between SOM and the MOQ, but there is a glitch in it that needs fixing first. > In the MOQ, there is no such thing as the world beyond the confines of > experience - or rather if there were we couldn't know anything about it. How > would it be possible for us to go beyond the world of experience? In the MOQ > (and for James), experience and reality amount to the same thing because > there is no sense in talking about what might be beyond our limits. Dan: Yes, exactly. By dropping the qualifier 'direct' the term 'experience' becomes synonymous with Dynamic Quality. Once defined, we have static quality. Science is one possible process of identifying experience. > >dmb: > I think one of the best ways to get at the question is to frame it in terms > of metaphysical realism or scientific realism - that's more or less the SOM > view of truth and reality - and then pragmatists like Pirsig and James can be > put on the other side along with certain kinds of anti-realists. Here are the > opening lines to a Stanford article called "Challenges to Metaphysical > Realism". > > > "According to metaphysical realism, the world is as it is independently > of how humans take it to be. The objects the world contains, together > with their properties and the relations they enter into, fix the > world's nature and these objects exist independently of our ability to > discover they do. Unless this is so, metaphysical realists argue, none > of our beliefs about our world could be objectively true since true > beliefs tell us how things are and beliefs are objective when true or > false independently of what anyone might think. Dan: This is some stuff David Harding ought to be hoisting onto his SOM website. This is the whole reason behind the MOQ, to combat the notion of an objective reality that exists independently of observation. What the realists consistently fail to consider is that there is no way to know one way or another if reality exists separately and apart from > >dmb: > Many philosophers believe metaphysical realism is just plain common > sense. Others believe it to be a direct implication of modern science, > which paints humans as fallible creatures adrift in an inhospitable > world not of their making. Nonetheless, metaphysical realism is > controversial. Besides the analytic question of what it means to > assert that objects exist independently of the mind, metaphysical > realism also raises epistemological problems: how can we > obtain knowledge of a mind-independent world? There are also prior > semantic problems, such as how links are set up between our beliefs > and the mind-independent states of affairs they allegedly > represent. This is the Representation Problem. Dan: Didn't Wittgenstein get into a lot of this? I'd have to go back and re-read some of his stuff but I think so. > > >dmb: > Anti-realists deny the world is mind-independent. Believing the > epistemological and semantic problems to be insoluble, they conclude > realism must be false." Dan: Right, and so realism and idealism are seen as mutually exclusive, whereas the MOQ unites them both... they are both correct in their own limited ways. Good stuff, Dave... thanks! The engine sounds great. Dan http://www.danglover.com Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
