Adrie quoted Wikipedia to dispute John's claims:
"His publication in 1885 of The Religious Aspect of Philosophy ...contained a new proof for the existence of God based upon the reality of error. All errors are judged to be erroneous in comparison to some total truth, Royce argued, and we must either hold ourselves infallible or accept that even our errors are evidence of a world of truth. Having made it clear that idealism depends upon postulates and proceeds hypothetically, Royce defends the necessity of objective reference of our ideas to a universal whole within which they belong, for without these postulates, “both practical life and the commonest results of theory, from the simplest impressions to the most valuable beliefs, would be for most if not all of us utterly impossible”. (see The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, p. 324)" dmb says: Since Royce was offering fallibilism as "a new proof for the existence of God" and "the necessity of objective reference of our ideas", his fallibilism is very, very different from the fallibilism of Pragmatists like James and Pirsig. I think it's fair to say that Pirsig is NOT offering theism or objectivity. James, Dewey, and Pirsig are quite explicit in their rejection of SOM and even James, the most religion-friendly of the three, wrote his Varieties of Religious Experience in order to DISPUTE the religious claims made by Royce. >From the Stanford Encyclopedia: "Royce and James had always disagreed deeply concerning the proper understanding of religious phenomena in human life. When James delivered the Gifford Lectures in 1901 and 1902, he directed many arguments against Royce's idealism, though he did not there target his friend by name. James's lectures, published as The Varieties of Religious Experience, were a popular and academic success . Royce believed that James, who had never been regularly affiliated with an established church or religious community, had in that work placed too much emphasis on the extraordinary religious experiences of extraordinary individuals. Royce's first education was into a strongly Protestant world view, he always retained a respect for the conventions of organized Christianity, and his writings exhibit a consistent and deep familiarity with Scripture. He sought a philosophy of religion that could help one understand and explain the phenomena of ordinary religious faith as experienced by communities of ordinary people. There was a deeper difference between them, as well, and it centered on a metaphysical point. Royce's 1883 insight concerning the Absolute was at bottom a religious insight. Contrary to the open-ended pluralism and pragmatism of James, Royce was convinced that the object and source of religious experience was an actual, infinite, and superhuman being." Since Pirsig was suspicious of James for trying to sneak religion in through the back door into philosophy, imagine what he'd think of Royce's "respect of the conventions of organized Christianity" and his stance "contrary to the open-ended pluralism and pragmatism of James". Like I keep saying, trying to make this Idealistic religious fanatic into a Pirsigian is like trying to pound a square peg into a round hole. Why, why, why does John keep preaching this nonsense against all evidence and reason? This covert theism is bullshit and cannot be sustained without a huge dose of dishonesty, or ignorance, or both. It's fine if a person insists on being an Idealist, an Absolutist, or a advocate of conventional Christianity but it makes no sense to paint Pirsig or Pragmatism in these colors. The keys concepts of these two opposed views will crash into each other like two trains heading in opposite directions. It's worse than a pointless waste of time because, frankly, it's so obviously stupid. It makes me sad and angry that John is allowed to continue raining his bullshit on Pirsig and James. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
