I still do not agree that there is something like a heinous quadrilemma. I took the liberty to re-read the whole thread.I still conclude the lack of evidence for the claims. There is an strange emptyness in your proposals.A void without a name.
Taking some liberty is allowed i suppose,so i took this from the web . http://wiki.moq.fi/index.php?title=Zen_and_the_Art_of_Insanity&action=history ------------------------------------------------------------------- there are a number of issue's coming forward now; dynamic quality is a product originating tuukka, as is static quality,and Pirsig or Whitehead or William james never mentioned something alike. But it is not because i use this as an example,that it should or would render the whole analysis meaningless, it is not. Should i read something new here? "Tuukka's work misses a starting point"( the commenter in the artikle) but this is not the only facet that needs some attention. I also took the liberty to click the "view history" button on the right/above of the page. I honestly think that the review however should be reviewed by the listers here. Not to make Tuuk ridicules,but to understand. Adrie 2016-11-09 12:44 GMT+01:00 Tuukka Virtaperko <[email protected]>: > dmb, Dan, Adrie, David, all, > > > > >> dmb had said: >>> >>> One say that "Pure experience" or Quality "logically precedes this >>> distinction" just as one can say sleeping logically precedes waking. >>> In both cases, logic doesn't exist in that first stage but logic >>> does obtain when we start thinking about it or talking about it. The >>> logic can also be expressed as a little argument: Since concepts >>> are derived from experience, the experiential material from which >>> they are derived must come before the concepts. >>> >>> Tuukka repled to dmb: >> >> Unlike Quality, "sleeping" is not an undefined concept. But you seem >> to imply that logic doesn't exist when people sleep. Firstly, not >> true. Some people have seen correct formal statements in their dreams. >> My high school maths teacher told me Ramanujan did this. Secondly, not >> relevant. Waking does not logically follow sleeping, it follows >> sleeping temporally. >> >> As for you little argument, well, I don't see the point. I'm fine with >> the idea that concepts are derived from experience and that the >> experiential material from which they are derived must come before the >> concepts. But I'm saying the concepts are not deduced from the >> experiential material. They also do not logically follow from it. >> Deduction and logic is what you do when you already have a bunch of >> concepts. >> >> >> >> dmb says: >> >> You've missed the point entirely so I'll try a more direct approach. >> >> >> You're saying that concepts can't logically follow from pure experience >> because there is no logic in pure experience. The "logic" characterizes es >> the RELATION BETWEEN experience and concepts but you have been mistakenly >> using "logic" as if it were supposed to characterize pure experience. >> > > > Tuukka: > Logic doesn't characterize pure experience. Neither does it characterize > the relation between experience and concepts. Logic characterizes the > relation between defined concepts and other defined concepts. > > > dmb: The same confusion occurred in your response to the sleeping-waking >> analogy, wherein you tried to characterize sleep as containing logic. >> Again, the logic describes the RELATION BETWEEN sleep and waking, i.e. you >> can't wake up unless you're sleeping. >> > > > Tuukka: > According to Pirsig, Quality is an undefined concept. There is no > metaphysical restriction against defining "sleeping". Hence, even if > sleeping were thought to be a logical necessity of waking up it wouldn't > follow that Quality would be a logical necessity of, well, anything. > > > dmb: >> Understanding an idea BEFORE criticizing it is also a logical necessity, >> by the way. >> > > > Tuukka: > Now I understand why you don't criticize the Metaphysics of Quality. > > > > On 08-Nov-16 10:50, Dan Glover wrote: > >> Tuk, all, >> >> I haven't time to go through this document in its entirety. David >> Buchanan answered some of the earlier questions so I have deleted >> them. >> >> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 12:20 AM, Tuukka Virtaperko >> <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >Dan, Horse, Adrie, all, >>> > >>> > >>> >"Donny: Put this tool in your philosophical toolbox: whenever you have a >>> >dichotomistic distinction (everything is either A or B), iterate it, >>> that >>> >is, apply it to itself, and see where it falls. [107] RMP: This has been >>> >done. The MOQ is an idea." >>> > >>> >If I read this correctly, Donny suggests dialetheism to Pirsig and >>> Pirsig >>> >doesn't get it. >>> >> Dan: >> I am guessing you read it incorrectly. Donny suggested dichotomistic >> distinction, not dialetheism. These terms are diametrically opposed. >> >> dichotomize >> >> verb (used with object), dichotomized, dichotomizing. >> 1. >> to divide or separate into two parts, kinds, etc. >> verb (used without object), dichotomized, dichotomizing. >> 2. >> to become divided into two parts; form a dichotomy. >> [http://www.dictionary.com/browse/dichotomistic] >> >> >> Dialetheism >> >> First published Fri Dec 4, 1998; substantive revision Thu Mar 28, 2013 >> >> A dialetheia is a sentence, A, such that both it and its negation, ¬A, >> are true (we shall talk of sentences throughout this entry; but one >> could run the definition in terms of propositions, statements, or >> whatever one takes as one's favourite truth-bearer: this would make >> little difference in the context). Assuming the fairly uncontroversial >> view that falsity just is the truth of negation, it can equally be >> claimed that a dialetheia is a sentence which is both true and false. >> [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dialetheism/] >> >> Dan comments: >> Note that Donny says: everything is either A or B. Not both. >> > > > Tuukka: > > What Donny actually says is: > > "whenever you have adichotomistic distinction (everything is either A or > B), iterate it, thatis, apply it to itself, and see where it falls." > > Applying a dichotomistic distinction to itself could to lead us to: > > (either ((everything is either A or B) or (not (everything is either A or > B)))) > > This seems to suggest dialetheism is an option. > > The problem with your interpretation is that you don't apply the > dichotomistic distinction to itself. > > > >> > >>> >"So, Mind/Body distinction (MBd) is clearly a thought or system of >>> thought. >>> >It is not spatially extended; MBd has no body. It's an element of Mind. >>> But >>> >what about SOM (knower/known)? It's obviously not a knowing >>> consciousness; >>> >it's something (namely an idea) we know/are aware of. SOM is an object, >>> a >>> >/Gegenstand/ (literally 'stands over against' consciousness). So, I >>> hope now >>> >that it's clear that SOM and MBd are different. Pirsig missed that >>> little >>> >point. >>> >[108] RMP: No, both the SOM and MBd are sets of ideas, and there is no >>> >reason to make a big distinction between them on this basis. >>> >I think the confusion here is between the 'object' of a sentence >>> >(Gegenstand) and a physical object. When you call ideas 'objects' you >>> >destroy the normal meaning of those terms and introduce confusion." >>> > >>> >Then why call bodies objects in the first place? >>> >> Dan: >> Pirsig is replying to a post that introduces 'body.' >> > > > Tuukka: > A native English speaker would be accustomed to thinking of material > things as "objects". In Finnish we have a different word for that, so my > normal meaning of "object" ("objekti" in Finnish) is something like "the > object of a sentence" or "JavaScript-object" or "mathematical object". This > probably explains why Pirsig's use of the word "object" is so > counterintuitive for me. > > > > >> > >>> >"Donny: 'Subject' means 'knowing subject', and 'object' means 'known >>> >object.' >>> >[111] RMP: Object: n. >>> >Something perceptible by one or more of the senses, especially by >>> vision or >>> >touch; a material thing. >>> > 1. A focus of attention, feeling, thought or action. >>> > 2. The purpose, aim, goal of a specific action or effort. >>> > 3. Abbr. obj. Grammar. a. A noun or substantive that receives or is >>> >affected by the action of a verb within a sentence. b. A noun or >>> substantive >>> >following and governed by a preposition. >>> > 4. Philosophy. Something intelligible or perceptible by the mind. >>> > (American Heritage Dictionary) >>> >The 'objects' in the MOQ refer to Definition #1. Objects are biological >>> >patterns and inorganic patterns, not thoughts or social patterns. The >>> >'objects' Donny refers to seem to be in Definition #5. It seems to me >>> that >>> >in Definition #5 subjects can also be objects. Thus any distinction >>> between >>> >them is meaningless." >>> > >>> >If ideas can't be objects does that mean they can't even be the focus of >>> >attention, feeling, thought or action? >>> > >>> >Why is there no Definition #5? >>> >> Dan: >> My apologies. This error was corrected in later versions of LC: >> >> Object: n. >> >> 1. Something perceptible by one or more of the senses, especially by >> vision or touch; a material thing. >> >> 2. A focus of attention, feeling, thought, or action. >> >> 3. The purpose, aim, or goal of a specific action or effort. >> >> 4. Abbr. obj. Grammar. a. A noun or substantive that receives or is >> affected by the action of a verb within a sentence. b. A noun or >> substantive following and governed by a preposition. >> >> 5. Philosophy. Something intelligible or perceptible by the mind. >> >> (American Heritage Dictionary) >> >> The “objects” in the MOQ refer to Definition #1. Objects are >> biological patterns and inorganic patterns, not thoughts or social >> patterns. The “objects” Donny refers to seem to be in Definition #5. >> It seems to me that in Definition #5 subjects can also be objects. >> Thus any distinction between them is meaningless. >> > > > Tuukka: > > Okay, good to have that sorted out. Anyway: > > * LC RMP annotation 3: "Life is matter that has been configured by DNA. > The distinction is very sharp." > * LC RMP annotation 4: "In the MOQ all organisms are objective. They exist > in the material world. All societies are subjective. They exist in the > mental world. Again, the distinction is very sharp. For example, the > 'President of the U.S.' is a social pattern. No objective scientific > instrument can distinguish a President of the U.S. from anyone else." > > Funny that the distinction between objects and subjects should be "very > sharp" when it comes to the difference between biological and social > things, but meaningless when it comes to the difference between ideas and > physical objects. > > > >> >> > >>> >"Donny: In plainer words, can you have knowledge of (the world of) >>> >experience prior to experience? Hume says no, Kant says yes, Hegel >>> gives a >>> >strenuous no and Pirsig says yes. [112] RMP: Pirsig says no." >>> > >>> >Then what kind of an experience is the experience of making a logical >>> >deduction? >>> >> Dan: >> That has nothing to do with the annotation. >> > > > Tuukka: > Logical deduction supposedly allows us to infer relevant predictions of > experience. If logical deduction itself is experience, the MOQ explains why > mathematical formalisms sometimes lead to hypotheses of empirical science > that turn out true. If logical deduction isn't experience, the MOQ doesn't > explain that. This is why I asked what kind of an experience is logical > deduction. > > > >> > >>> >At this point in LC there's a Pirsig quote in which he compares critics >>> to >>> >sharks smelling blood. I think some people here see me as a similar >>> shark. >>> >But what is despicable about such a shark are the lack of effort and the >>> >profuse amount of rhetoric. I'm a MOQ scholastic, not a shark. >>> >> Dan: >> Prove it. >> > > > Tuukka: > According to Antti Kukkonen (MA, M.Soc.Sci) my research and development of > the MOQ, published in my work "Zen and the Art of Insanity" (2013), is an > important contribution to process philosophy. > > > >> "Bodvar: (...) how can SOM avoid being trashed if it competes with the >>> Quality of being reality? >>> [135] RMP: As far as I know the MOQ does not trash the SOM. It contains >>> the >>> SOM within a larger system. The only thing it trashes is the SOM >>> assertion >>> that values are unreal." >>> >>> I agree. >>> >>> "Magnus: Truth comes with a context, the context in which it is true. >>> Mostly >>> for Struan: the MOQ does not provide absolute answers to ethical >>> dilemmas. >>> It /does/ however provide a framework with which to contextualize >>> dilemmas. >>> [143] >>> RMP: This is how I have always seen it. Just as two opposing sides can >>> cite >>> the Constitution as support for their case in the Supreme Court, so can >>> two >>> opposing sides cite the MOQ. 'The Devil can quote scripture to his own >>> choosing,' but there is no reason to throw out the Bible, the U.S. >>> Constitution or the MOQ as long as they can provide a larger context for >>> understanding." >>> >>> Yeah, but the mind-matter problem isn't solved before it is explained >>> how to >>> correctly select idealism or materialism as the context in a given >>> situation. >>> >> Dan: >> Not sure what you are objecting to here. >> > > > Tuukka: > Idealism states that "mind precedes matter" but materialism states that > "matter precedes mind". Pirsig's MOQ states both are true. But they > contradict each other. So, how do we know when should we believe in > materialism and when should we believe in idealism? The only answer that > can be logically inferred from Pirsig's writings is that when we believe in > bad ideas that are true we may believe in idealism, and when we believe in > good ideas we may believe in materialism. I think that's a weird answer. > > > >> "Why the ambiguity on four or more levels? [151] >>> RMP: The answer is that Pirsig doesn't like being unnecessarily >>> arbitrary. >>> If someone likes fire levels, he can have them. It's still the MOQ, even >>> though he personally prefers four levels." >>> >>> What does it mean it's "still the MOQ"? Can it be discussed on MD? >>> >> Dan: >> Yes. >> > > > Tuukka: > Great! Then perhaps there's something else to discuss than the Heinous > Quadrilemma. > > > >> That Pirsig doesn't like being unnecessarily arbitrary increases the >>> potency >>> of the Heinous Quadrilemma. >>> >> Dan: >> How so? If your Heinous Quadrilemma is faulty, then your argument falls >> apart. >> > > > Tuukka: > Same is true for Pirsig's MOQ. > > > > >> "Q&A [4] >>> Yes, it's clear I've been of two minds on whether subjects and objects >>> should be included in the MOQ. My earlier view, when I was concentrating >>> on >>> the confusion of subject-object thinking, was to get rid of them >>> entirely to >>> help clarify things. Later I began to see it's not necessary to get rid >>> of >>> them because MOQ can encase them neatly within its structure--the upper >>> two >>> levels being subjective, and the lower two, objective. Still later I saw >>> that the subject-object distinction is very useful for sharply >>> distinguishing between biological and social levels. >>> If I had been more careful in my editing, I would have eliminated or >>> modified the earlier statements to bring them into agreement with the >>> latter >>> ones. However I missed these and it's valuable that the Lila Squad has >>> caught them. The main danger to the MOQ from subject-object thinking at >>> present seems to be when it tries in a conversational way to encase >>> values >>> and declare them to be either objects or thoughts. That was the attempt >>> of >>> the professors in Bozeman in ZMM that started this whole MOQ. >>> At present, I don't see that the terms 'subject' and 'object' need to be >>> dropped, as long as we remember they are just levels of value, not >>> expressions of independent scientific reality." >>> >>> Horse said I'm incapable of backtracking but dmb obviously isn't, since >>> he >>> reverted to Pirsig's earlier stance when I demolished Pirsig's MOQ >>> logically. But I don't think we need to revert if we make some other >>> kind of >>> changes. A logically demolished MOQ wouldn't be very attractive anyway. >>> >> Dan: >> Come on, dude. You did not demolish the MOQ. This is silly. >> > > > Tuukka: > Indeed I didn't, as Pirsig doesn't claim the final word on what is the > MOQ. Instead, he writes things like: "If I understand the MOQ correctly... " > > > >> "Q&A [4] >>> RMP: Yes, the relationship of the MOQ to philosophic idealism is an >>> important one that is not adequately spelled out in LILA. In a >>> materialist >>> system mind has no reality because it is not material. In an idealist >>> system >>> matter has no reality because it is just an idea. The acceptance of one >>> meant the rejection of the other. In the MOQ, both mind and matter are >>> levels of value. Materialist explanations and idealist explanations can >>> coexist because they are descriptions of coexisting levels of a larger >>> reality. >>> The MOQ does not deny the traditional scientific view of reality as >>> composed >>> of material substance and independent of us. It says it is an extremely >>> high >>> quality idea. We should follow it whenever it is practical to do so. But >>> the >>> MOQ, like philosophic idealism, says this scientific view of reality is >>> still an idea. If it were not an idea, then that 'independent scientific >>> material reality' would not be able to change as new scientific >>> discoveries >>> come in." >>> >>> Even if the MOQ attempt to contain idealism wouldn't cause the Heinous >>> Quadrilemma there would be a problem with this. This is just a taxonomic >>> declaration. There is no idealistic system. There's just a conceptual box >>> that's labeled "idealism". The box is nearly empty. It does contain the >>> MOQ >>> but the MOQ is also contained in the box labeled "materialism". So, why >>> put >>> the MOQ alone into this other box, too? >>> >> Dan: >> No idea what you are saying here. >> >> > > Tuukka: > LILA actually contains an elaborate variant of emergent materialism: > Pirsig's theory of static value patterns. When one compares that to what > Pirsig writes of idealism it's like comparing a mountain to a grain of sand. > > > On 08-Nov-16 0:26, Adrie Kintziger wrote: > >> Maybe this can be of help to further avoid the munchausen trilemma. >> >> I arrived at my in a dynamical way(smiley) >> >> https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/imagine/201003/einstein >> -creative-thinking-music-and-the-intuitive-art-scientific-imagination >> > > > Tuukka: > The Münchhausen trilemma is a pretty fundamental objection towards the > possibility of any kind of knowledge. I don't find it particular to the MOQ > or the Heinous Quadrilemma. > > > > On 08-Nov-16 11:36, Adrie Kintziger wrote: > >> Sorry for the intrusion,but only a fast respons... >> >> what kept my eye,earlier this week when i was reading russel's paradox >> on the web,was the striking similarity between the paradox and what tuuk >> is >> saying here >> >> snip >> "Even if the MOQ attempt to contain idealism wouldn't cause the Heinous >> Quadrilemma there would be a problem with this. This is just a taxonomic >> declaration. There is no idealistic system. There's just a conceptual >> box >> that's labeled "idealism". The box is nearly empty. It does contain the >> MOQ >> but the MOQ is also contained in the box labeled "materialism". So, why >> put >> the MOQ alone into this other box, too? >> Dan: >> No idea what you are saying here" >> --------------------------------------------------- >> The russel paradox is on the web.but its is math,and mixing math with >> words >> ends up in woods. Always. >> > > > Tuukka: > > Rusell's paradox points out an inconsistency in naive set theory: there > can't be a set of all sets. But Russell's paradox doesn't apply to the MOQ > because the MOQ contains itself at a stage that precedes logic. The MOQ > does also contain itself as an intellectual idea, but this is more of a > projection of the MOQ into Pirsig's theory of static value patterns than > the real MOQ. > > Furthermore, there are potentially consistent variants of set theory that > permit the set of all sets. The most notable of them is probably New > Foundations by Quine. I'd like to understand more about them. They might > render Russell's paradox even more inapplicable to the MOQ. In order to > employ them one would apparently have to denote Quality by a variable, but > this could be possible in some many-valued logic. However, that would be a > lot of work and it wouldn't seem to defuse the Heinous Quadrilemma. I am > also somehow opposed to the idea of denoting Quality by a variable although > I'm not sure why. > > In any case, this consistency issue highlights a curious fact. In LILA > Pirsig writes: > > "The tests of truth are logical consistency, agreement with experience, > and economy of explanation. The Metaphysics of Quality satisfies these." > > It's funny that due to Gödel's incompleteness theorems, normal arithmetic > isn't known to be consistent. Only weak systems of arithmetic such as > Presburger arithmetic are provably consistent. But Presburger arithmetic > doesn't allow multiplication by variables. This basically excludes > Newtonian mechanics and quantum physics and a great deal of science. Does > Pirsig intend to restrict truth to weak systems such as Presburger > arithmetic? Probably not. What he means with "logical consistency" is > probably something like: "hasn't been proven inconsistent" (for systems) > and: "proven as a theorem of a system that hasn't been proven inconsistent" > (for theorems). > > As for your opinion that mixing math with words always ends up in woods - > not for Einstein. I cite the article you linked in your previous post: > > "Einstein only employed words or other symbols (presumably mathematical) > -- in what he explicitly called a secondary translation step -- after he > was able to solve his problems through the formal manipulation of > internally imagined images, feelings, and architectures. 'I very rarely > think in words at all. A thought comes, and I may try to express it in > words afterwards,' he wrote (Wertheimer, 1959, 213; Pais, 1982)." > > > > > On 07-Nov-16 10:02, David Harding wrote: > >> Tuk wrote: >> Pay attention! My starting points are what Pirsig wrote. See the first >> post titled "The Heinous Quadrilemma". Also see the cited earlier >> message at the end of that post. >> >> djh responds: >> Yes I am listening. You've concluded that the MOQ is low quality due to >> the >> Quadrilemma. The Quadrilema in your mind is a foregone conclusion and so >> you've already moved on from it. So you're starting for a point that the >> MOQ is low quality. If that is your starting point then why should we >> bother to discuss the MOQ with you? >> > > > Tuukka: > Because someone could write an academic article about the Quadrilemma and > send it to a philosophical journal. If the article were to pass peer-review > it would be published. I thought you'd have a motive to be prepared for > this. I could help you. > > > Regards, > Tuk > > > --- > This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software. > https://www.avast.com/antivirus > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html > -- parser Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
