dmb, Dan, Adrie, David, all,
dmb had said:
One say that "Pure experience" or Quality "logically precedes this
distinction" just as one can say sleeping logically precedes waking.
In both cases, logic doesn't exist in that first stage but logic
does obtain when we start thinking about it or talking about it. The
logic can also be expressed as a little argument: Since concepts
are derived from experience, the experiential material from which
they are derived must come before the concepts.
Tuukka repled to dmb:
Unlike Quality, "sleeping" is not an undefined concept. But you seem
to imply that logic doesn't exist when people sleep. Firstly, not
true. Some people have seen correct formal statements in their dreams.
My high school maths teacher told me Ramanujan did this. Secondly, not
relevant. Waking does not logically follow sleeping, it follows
sleeping temporally.
As for you little argument, well, I don't see the point. I'm fine with
the idea that concepts are derived from experience and that the
experiential material from which they are derived must come before the
concepts. But I'm saying the concepts are not deduced from the
experiential material. They also do not logically follow from it.
Deduction and logic is what you do when you already have a bunch of
concepts.
dmb says:
You've missed the point entirely so I'll try a more direct approach.
You're saying that concepts can't logically follow from pure experience
because there is no logic in pure experience. The "logic" characterizes es
the RELATION BETWEEN experience and concepts but you have been mistakenly
using "logic" as if it were supposed to characterize pure experience.
Tuukka:
Logic doesn't characterize pure experience. Neither does it characterize
the relation between experience and concepts. Logic characterizes the
relation between defined concepts and other defined concepts.
dmb: The same confusion occurred in your response to the sleeping-waking
analogy, wherein you tried to characterize sleep as containing logic.
Again, the logic describes the RELATION BETWEEN sleep and waking, i.e. you
can't wake up unless you're sleeping.
Tuukka:
According to Pirsig, Quality is an undefined concept. There is no
metaphysical restriction against defining "sleeping". Hence, even if
sleeping were thought to be a logical necessity of waking up it wouldn't
follow that Quality would be a logical necessity of, well, anything.
dmb:
Understanding an idea BEFORE criticizing it is also a logical necessity,
by the way.
Tuukka:
Now I understand why you don't criticize the Metaphysics of Quality.
On 08-Nov-16 10:50, Dan Glover wrote:
Tuk, all,
I haven't time to go through this document in its entirety. David
Buchanan answered some of the earlier questions so I have deleted
them.
On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 12:20 AM, Tuukka Virtaperko
<[email protected]> wrote:
Dan, Horse, Adrie, all,
"Donny: Put this tool in your philosophical toolbox: whenever you have a
dichotomistic distinction (everything is either A or B), iterate it,
that
is, apply it to itself, and see where it falls. [107] RMP: This has been
done. The MOQ is an idea."
If I read this correctly, Donny suggests dialetheism to Pirsig and
Pirsig
doesn't get it.
Dan:
I am guessing you read it incorrectly. Donny suggested dichotomistic
distinction, not dialetheism. These terms are diametrically opposed.
dichotomize
verb (used with object), dichotomized, dichotomizing.
1.
to divide or separate into two parts, kinds, etc.
verb (used without object), dichotomized, dichotomizing.
2.
to become divided into two parts; form a dichotomy.
[http://www.dictionary.com/browse/dichotomistic]
Dialetheism
First published Fri Dec 4, 1998; substantive revision Thu Mar 28, 2013
A dialetheia is a sentence, A, such that both it and its negation, ¬A,
are true (we shall talk of sentences throughout this entry; but one
could run the definition in terms of propositions, statements, or
whatever one takes as one's favourite truth-bearer: this would make
little difference in the context). Assuming the fairly uncontroversial
view that falsity just is the truth of negation, it can equally be
claimed that a dialetheia is a sentence which is both true and false.
[http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dialetheism/]
Dan comments:
Note that Donny says: everything is either A or B. Not both.
Tuukka:
What Donny actually says is:
"whenever you have adichotomistic distinction (everything is either A or
B), iterate it, thatis, apply it to itself, and see where it falls."
Applying a dichotomistic distinction to itself could to lead us to:
(either ((everything is either A or B) or (not (everything is either A or
B))))
This seems to suggest dialetheism is an option.
The problem with your interpretation is that you don't apply the
dichotomistic distinction to itself.
"So, Mind/Body distinction (MBd) is clearly a thought or system of
thought.
It is not spatially extended; MBd has no body. It's an element of Mind.
But
what about SOM (knower/known)? It's obviously not a knowing
consciousness;
it's something (namely an idea) we know/are aware of. SOM is an object,
a
/Gegenstand/ (literally 'stands over against' consciousness). So, I
hope now
that it's clear that SOM and MBd are different. Pirsig missed that
little
point.
[108] RMP: No, both the SOM and MBd are sets of ideas, and there is no
reason to make a big distinction between them on this basis.
I think the confusion here is between the 'object' of a sentence
(Gegenstand) and a physical object. When you call ideas 'objects' you
destroy the normal meaning of those terms and introduce confusion."
Then why call bodies objects in the first place?
Dan:
Pirsig is replying to a post that introduces 'body.'
Tuukka:
A native English speaker would be accustomed to thinking of material
things as "objects". In Finnish we have a different word for that, so my
normal meaning of "object" ("objekti" in Finnish) is something like "the
object of a sentence" or "JavaScript-object" or "mathematical object". This
probably explains why Pirsig's use of the word "object" is so
counterintuitive for me.
"Donny: 'Subject' means 'knowing subject', and 'object' means 'known
object.'
[111] RMP: Object: n.
Something perceptible by one or more of the senses, especially by
vision or
touch; a material thing.
1. A focus of attention, feeling, thought or action.
2. The purpose, aim, goal of a specific action or effort.
3. Abbr. obj. Grammar. a. A noun or substantive that receives or is
affected by the action of a verb within a sentence. b. A noun or
substantive
following and governed by a preposition.
4. Philosophy. Something intelligible or perceptible by the mind.
(American Heritage Dictionary)
The 'objects' in the MOQ refer to Definition #1. Objects are biological
patterns and inorganic patterns, not thoughts or social patterns. The
'objects' Donny refers to seem to be in Definition #5. It seems to me
that
in Definition #5 subjects can also be objects. Thus any distinction
between
them is meaningless."
If ideas can't be objects does that mean they can't even be the focus of
attention, feeling, thought or action?
Why is there no Definition #5?
Dan:
My apologies. This error was corrected in later versions of LC:
Object: n.
1. Something perceptible by one or more of the senses, especially by
vision or touch; a material thing.
2. A focus of attention, feeling, thought, or action.
3. The purpose, aim, or goal of a specific action or effort.
4. Abbr. obj. Grammar. a. A noun or substantive that receives or is
affected by the action of a verb within a sentence. b. A noun or
substantive following and governed by a preposition.
5. Philosophy. Something intelligible or perceptible by the mind.
(American Heritage Dictionary)
The “objects” in the MOQ refer to Definition #1. Objects are
biological patterns and inorganic patterns, not thoughts or social
patterns. The “objects” Donny refers to seem to be in Definition #5.
It seems to me that in Definition #5 subjects can also be objects.
Thus any distinction between them is meaningless.
Tuukka:
Okay, good to have that sorted out. Anyway:
* LC RMP annotation 3: "Life is matter that has been configured by DNA.
The distinction is very sharp."
* LC RMP annotation 4: "In the MOQ all organisms are objective. They exist
in the material world. All societies are subjective. They exist in the
mental world. Again, the distinction is very sharp. For example, the
'President of the U.S.' is a social pattern. No objective scientific
instrument can distinguish a President of the U.S. from anyone else."
Funny that the distinction between objects and subjects should be "very
sharp" when it comes to the difference between biological and social
things, but meaningless when it comes to the difference between ideas and
physical objects.
"Donny: In plainer words, can you have knowledge of (the world of)
experience prior to experience? Hume says no, Kant says yes, Hegel
gives a
strenuous no and Pirsig says yes. [112] RMP: Pirsig says no."
Then what kind of an experience is the experience of making a logical
deduction?
Dan:
That has nothing to do with the annotation.
Tuukka:
Logical deduction supposedly allows us to infer relevant predictions of
experience. If logical deduction itself is experience, the MOQ explains why
mathematical formalisms sometimes lead to hypotheses of empirical science
that turn out true. If logical deduction isn't experience, the MOQ doesn't
explain that. This is why I asked what kind of an experience is logical
deduction.
At this point in LC there's a Pirsig quote in which he compares critics
to
sharks smelling blood. I think some people here see me as a similar
shark.
But what is despicable about such a shark are the lack of effort and the
profuse amount of rhetoric. I'm a MOQ scholastic, not a shark.
Dan:
Prove it.
Tuukka:
According to Antti Kukkonen (MA, M.Soc.Sci) my research and development of
the MOQ, published in my work "Zen and the Art of Insanity" (2013), is an
important contribution to process philosophy.
"Bodvar: (...) how can SOM avoid being trashed if it competes with the
Quality of being reality?
[135] RMP: As far as I know the MOQ does not trash the SOM. It contains
the
SOM within a larger system. The only thing it trashes is the SOM
assertion
that values are unreal."
I agree.
"Magnus: Truth comes with a context, the context in which it is true.
Mostly
for Struan: the MOQ does not provide absolute answers to ethical
dilemmas.
It /does/ however provide a framework with which to contextualize
dilemmas.
[143]
RMP: This is how I have always seen it. Just as two opposing sides can
cite
the Constitution as support for their case in the Supreme Court, so can
two
opposing sides cite the MOQ. 'The Devil can quote scripture to his own
choosing,' but there is no reason to throw out the Bible, the U.S.
Constitution or the MOQ as long as they can provide a larger context for
understanding."
Yeah, but the mind-matter problem isn't solved before it is explained
how to
correctly select idealism or materialism as the context in a given
situation.
Dan:
Not sure what you are objecting to here.
Tuukka:
Idealism states that "mind precedes matter" but materialism states that
"matter precedes mind". Pirsig's MOQ states both are true. But they
contradict each other. So, how do we know when should we believe in
materialism and when should we believe in idealism? The only answer that
can be logically inferred from Pirsig's writings is that when we believe in
bad ideas that are true we may believe in idealism, and when we believe in
good ideas we may believe in materialism. I think that's a weird answer.
"Why the ambiguity on four or more levels? [151]
RMP: The answer is that Pirsig doesn't like being unnecessarily
arbitrary.
If someone likes fire levels, he can have them. It's still the MOQ, even
though he personally prefers four levels."
What does it mean it's "still the MOQ"? Can it be discussed on MD?
Dan:
Yes.
Tuukka:
Great! Then perhaps there's something else to discuss than the Heinous
Quadrilemma.
That Pirsig doesn't like being unnecessarily arbitrary increases the
potency
of the Heinous Quadrilemma.
Dan:
How so? If your Heinous Quadrilemma is faulty, then your argument falls
apart.
Tuukka:
Same is true for Pirsig's MOQ.
"Q&A [4]
Yes, it's clear I've been of two minds on whether subjects and objects
should be included in the MOQ. My earlier view, when I was concentrating
on
the confusion of subject-object thinking, was to get rid of them
entirely to
help clarify things. Later I began to see it's not necessary to get rid
of
them because MOQ can encase them neatly within its structure--the upper
two
levels being subjective, and the lower two, objective. Still later I saw
that the subject-object distinction is very useful for sharply
distinguishing between biological and social levels.
If I had been more careful in my editing, I would have eliminated or
modified the earlier statements to bring them into agreement with the
latter
ones. However I missed these and it's valuable that the Lila Squad has
caught them. The main danger to the MOQ from subject-object thinking at
present seems to be when it tries in a conversational way to encase
values
and declare them to be either objects or thoughts. That was the attempt
of
the professors in Bozeman in ZMM that started this whole MOQ.
At present, I don't see that the terms 'subject' and 'object' need to be
dropped, as long as we remember they are just levels of value, not
expressions of independent scientific reality."
Horse said I'm incapable of backtracking but dmb obviously isn't, since
he
reverted to Pirsig's earlier stance when I demolished Pirsig's MOQ
logically. But I don't think we need to revert if we make some other
kind of
changes. A logically demolished MOQ wouldn't be very attractive anyway.
Dan:
Come on, dude. You did not demolish the MOQ. This is silly.
Tuukka:
Indeed I didn't, as Pirsig doesn't claim the final word on what is the
MOQ. Instead, he writes things like: "If I understand the MOQ correctly... "
"Q&A [4]
RMP: Yes, the relationship of the MOQ to philosophic idealism is an
important one that is not adequately spelled out in LILA. In a
materialist
system mind has no reality because it is not material. In an idealist
system
matter has no reality because it is just an idea. The acceptance of one
meant the rejection of the other. In the MOQ, both mind and matter are
levels of value. Materialist explanations and idealist explanations can
coexist because they are descriptions of coexisting levels of a larger
reality.
The MOQ does not deny the traditional scientific view of reality as
composed
of material substance and independent of us. It says it is an extremely
high
quality idea. We should follow it whenever it is practical to do so. But
the
MOQ, like philosophic idealism, says this scientific view of reality is
still an idea. If it were not an idea, then that 'independent scientific
material reality' would not be able to change as new scientific
discoveries
come in."
Even if the MOQ attempt to contain idealism wouldn't cause the Heinous
Quadrilemma there would be a problem with this. This is just a taxonomic
declaration. There is no idealistic system. There's just a conceptual box
that's labeled "idealism". The box is nearly empty. It does contain the
MOQ
but the MOQ is also contained in the box labeled "materialism". So, why
put
the MOQ alone into this other box, too?
Dan:
No idea what you are saying here.
Tuukka:
LILA actually contains an elaborate variant of emergent materialism:
Pirsig's theory of static value patterns. When one compares that to what
Pirsig writes of idealism it's like comparing a mountain to a grain of sand.
On 08-Nov-16 0:26, Adrie Kintziger wrote:
Maybe this can be of help to further avoid the munchausen trilemma.
I arrived at my in a dynamical way(smiley)
https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/imagine/201003/einstein
-creative-thinking-music-and-the-intuitive-art-scientific-imagination
Tuukka:
The Münchhausen trilemma is a pretty fundamental objection towards the
possibility of any kind of knowledge. I don't find it particular to the MOQ
or the Heinous Quadrilemma.
On 08-Nov-16 11:36, Adrie Kintziger wrote:
Sorry for the intrusion,but only a fast respons...
what kept my eye,earlier this week when i was reading russel's paradox
on the web,was the striking similarity between the paradox and what tuuk
is
saying here
snip
"Even if the MOQ attempt to contain idealism wouldn't cause the Heinous
Quadrilemma there would be a problem with this. This is just a taxonomic
declaration. There is no idealistic system. There's just a conceptual
box
that's labeled "idealism". The box is nearly empty. It does contain the
MOQ
but the MOQ is also contained in the box labeled "materialism". So, why
put
the MOQ alone into this other box, too?
Dan:
No idea what you are saying here"
---------------------------------------------------
The russel paradox is on the web.but its is math,and mixing math with
words
ends up in woods. Always.
Tuukka:
Rusell's paradox points out an inconsistency in naive set theory: there
can't be a set of all sets. But Russell's paradox doesn't apply to the MOQ
because the MOQ contains itself at a stage that precedes logic. The MOQ
does also contain itself as an intellectual idea, but this is more of a
projection of the MOQ into Pirsig's theory of static value patterns than
the real MOQ.
Furthermore, there are potentially consistent variants of set theory that
permit the set of all sets. The most notable of them is probably New
Foundations by Quine. I'd like to understand more about them. They might
render Russell's paradox even more inapplicable to the MOQ. In order to
employ them one would apparently have to denote Quality by a variable, but
this could be possible in some many-valued logic. However, that would be a
lot of work and it wouldn't seem to defuse the Heinous Quadrilemma. I am
also somehow opposed to the idea of denoting Quality by a variable although
I'm not sure why.
In any case, this consistency issue highlights a curious fact. In LILA
Pirsig writes:
"The tests of truth are logical consistency, agreement with experience,
and economy of explanation. The Metaphysics of Quality satisfies these."
It's funny that due to Gödel's incompleteness theorems, normal arithmetic
isn't known to be consistent. Only weak systems of arithmetic such as
Presburger arithmetic are provably consistent. But Presburger arithmetic
doesn't allow multiplication by variables. This basically excludes
Newtonian mechanics and quantum physics and a great deal of science. Does
Pirsig intend to restrict truth to weak systems such as Presburger
arithmetic? Probably not. What he means with "logical consistency" is
probably something like: "hasn't been proven inconsistent" (for systems)
and: "proven as a theorem of a system that hasn't been proven inconsistent"
(for theorems).
As for your opinion that mixing math with words always ends up in woods -
not for Einstein. I cite the article you linked in your previous post:
"Einstein only employed words or other symbols (presumably mathematical)
-- in what he explicitly called a secondary translation step -- after he
was able to solve his problems through the formal manipulation of
internally imagined images, feelings, and architectures. 'I very rarely
think in words at all. A thought comes, and I may try to express it in
words afterwards,' he wrote (Wertheimer, 1959, 213; Pais, 1982)."
On 07-Nov-16 10:02, David Harding wrote:
Tuk wrote:
Pay attention! My starting points are what Pirsig wrote. See the first
post titled "The Heinous Quadrilemma". Also see the cited earlier
message at the end of that post.
djh responds:
Yes I am listening. You've concluded that the MOQ is low quality due to
the
Quadrilemma. The Quadrilema in your mind is a foregone conclusion and so
you've already moved on from it. So you're starting for a point that the
MOQ is low quality. If that is your starting point then why should we
bother to discuss the MOQ with you?
Tuukka:
Because someone could write an academic article about the Quadrilemma and
send it to a philosophical journal. If the article were to pass peer-review
it would be published. I thought you'd have a motive to be prepared for
this. I could help you.
Regards,
Tuk
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