Hello everyone Long time no write! I came across John Beasley's "Creating an Organismic Metaphysics of Quality" yesterday while browsing moq_discuss and read it over several times before coming back today and re reading. Having some free time now, I have several comments I'd like to share; first, great job John! Very well written and engaging in style. I might not necessarily agree with your conclusions, as you will see, but this in no way detracts from value in your paper. While I have many comments, I will start here as this seems foundational to disagreements I have. John wrote: When Pirsig says "a thing that has no value does not exist", he is overstating his case. At a fundamental level all language can be seen as carrying static value. Most words only form from experiences of value. According to his logic, if there was no value for me in a word, it would not become part of my vocabulary. However some words seem clearly functional without value - the word the will do as an example. The fills a grammatical role in language, but as a word it is empty of content and equally empty of value. You might argue it has a grammatical or syntactical value, but this is to apply a different standard. The value Pirsig implies is the primary value arising out of dynamic experience. To now move in the reverse direction, is it not at least possible that there may be some 'things' which we do experience as existing, but function like the word 'the' as a component of our ordering of experience, without value? If so, it seems a fundamental statement of Pirsig's metaphysics is flawed. To me it seems the word "the" is itself sufficient refutation. It may well be that a whole class of mathematical and logical terms, for example, are of this type. Or can you explain for me how I might distinguish the values of seventeen and eighteen respectively? (from essay - Creating an Organismic Metaphysics of Quality) Dan: Hi John Pirsig's MOQ principle "a thing that has no value does not exist" seems related to Niels Bohr's framework of complementarity which itself contains very deep complexities pertaining to why it is we must neglect "hidden variables" or "quantum of action" in order for (unambiguous) value to arise from observation. To say Pirsig overstates his case here is to ignore this vital link to forming agreements with MOQ and complementarity. If anything, I would say Pirsig doesn't state his principle emphatically enough. Your statement of "the" as being without value seems to indicate this. "The" refers implicitly to object as existing separately from subject. Value in "the" resides not in words but in conceptual agreements we as users of (english) language have formed with our reality. "The" implicitly contains value pertaining to external reality existing as something "real" and "out there" and aids in formulating unambiguous agreements of objectivity. Yet "the" is not necessary to english language and is grossly overused by most everyone. While this seemingly contradicts "the" as having value, I like to view this as indicative of implicate value easily overlooked. On value, if something costs $18 and you only have $17 in your pocket, distinguishing value is not difficult. However, delving deeper, implicate subject/object value contained in words like "the", "good", "bad", "positive", "negative", all referring to subjectively objectified situations, all seem to lose meaning (value) in Pirsig's MOQ. One of my favorite authors, R. Buckminster Fuller writes: "Science's discovery of fundamental complementarity has frequently occasioned individual scientist's realization that the word 'negative' used as the opposite of 'positive' is at best carelessly and misinformedly employed. Since complementarity is essential to the success of eternally regenerative Universe, the phenomenon identified as the opposite of 'positive' cannot be 'negative', nor can it be 'bad', since the interopposed phenomena known heretofore as 'good' and 'bad' are essential to 100% eternally regenerative Universe. They are both 'good' for Universe." (Critical Path, foreword) By comparing Pirsig's MOQ and Bohr's framework of complementarity as complete and unitary descriptions of experience/observation I believe further understanding can be reached as to just what Pirsig's value-centered universe means. However this also entails fundamentally shifting our perspective by learning whole new intellectual patterns of value, requiring much effort and time. I also agree with Avid that higher value is acheived in disagreements rather than in agreements and I look forward to your comments on them, John. Struan writes: For what it is worth . . . . . . . John, that is a profoundly impressive piece of work and I am seriously looking forward to the debate which must arise from it. Your meta-ethical critique especially is beautifully put, and when I read, "The problem here is how to understand the terms morality and value," my face lit up as I have banging on about this for months and getting mainly blank looks. I hope that everyone will take a couple of hours (at least) over this in order that we might dig deep into the foundations of a metaphysics which claims value at the core. Unless we understand what we mean when we say that, we are in big trouble. Your statement "C. "Most organisms encounter the world through experiences of positive and negative value, and what does not have value for them is not experienced, hence is not encountered," is an interesting, coherent and adept resolution but it does, as you say, limit the scope of the metaphysics. I wonder if anyone can remove that limitation and broaden it back out again. These meta-ethical issues have been swept under the carpet for too long and I thank you for bringing them back out. Dan: Hi Struan By using foundational value-situations, Pirsig effectively eliminates any reference to 'good' or 'bad', 'positive' or 'negative' situations and instead seems to institute scales of value, from low to high. Instead of saying "sitting on a hot stove is bad" Pirsig states it to be low-value, which does not necessarily equate with 'bad' or 'negative' unless taken as subjective. John's statement: "C. Most organisms encounter the world through experiences of positive and negative value, and what does not have value for them is not experienced, hence is not encountered." Dan: Firstly, I feel this imposes antropocentric viewpoints upon that which cannot be experienced, namely, another consciousness. Our universe is encountered through experience, this is undeniable. Secondly, Pirsig's MOQ states experience is Quality. Whether said experiences are 'good' or 'bad' is completely irrelevant, for as Bucky Fuller says, "they are both 'good' for Universe." Thirdly, I feel distinct airs of subjectivity blowing through your words here as in "for them." For instance, one negative experience might be thought of as sticking needles in my eye. Yet eye surgery may require just such action for it would seem to contain higher value than going blind. By using such words as 'positive' and 'negative' we are sinking into relativism and not advancing Pirsig's more expansive MOQ. Well, it's Good to be back! Any comments are appreciated. Best wishes Dan (glove) "Learn as if you were following someone whom you could not catch up to, as though it were someone you were frightened of losing." (Anonymous) MOQ Online Homepage - http://www.moq.org Mail Archive - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/ Unsubscribe - http://www.moq.org/md/index.html MD Queries - [EMAIL PROTECTED]
