Hi Struan and Group:
While everyone else is involved in discussing the pros and cons of
imbibing drugs, I�ve been mulling over the following statements by
Struan in his post of 18 October:
�Anyone who denies the fact/value distinction must almost
certainly consider that the �primary empirical reality of the world� is
value. Clearly if one sees no ontological difference between facts
and values, and if one further thinks that we are capable of sensing,
then one must concede, in the absence of other candidates for
primacy, that one senses values as the primary empirical reality.
The list of philosophers who fall into this category is very long
indeed.�
Struan, I�ve struggled to understand your meaning. Since Iris
Murdoch is one of your favorite philosophers, I went to the Internet
in hopes of learning more about her views and perhaps find a clue
or two to help alleviate my confusion.
The only thing I could find on the Internet of any use was an article
on Murdoch�s philosophy by Alan Jacobs entitled, �Go(o)d in Iris
Murdoch.� As I suspected, Murdoch concentrates on what one
might call �ethical morality,� that is, what human beings �should� or
�ought� to do to be �good.� I made the point previously that most
philosophers treat morality in the limited context of human
behavior, and Murdoch seems to be no exception. Contrast this to
Pirsig who, to my knowledge, is the first philosopher to treat
morality in the context of total reality�from particles and natural
forces to metaphysics and drug-induced revelations.
In Jacob�s article I came across the following quote that perhaps is
a clue to your statements. Murdoch is quoted as writing:
�Coherence is not necessarily good, and one must question its
cost. Better sometimes to remain confused.�
So when you wrote, �Anyone who denies the fact/value distinction
must almost certainly consider that the �primary empirical reality of
the world� is value,� it�s probably better for me not to point out that if
there is no distinction between fact/value, then the �anyone� in
question could just as well consider that the �primary empirical
reality of the world� is fact. If one has a choice between fact or
value to explain reality, is it not the tendency of all of us to side
with facts? Not many I wager would look at a tree and say, �Now
there�s a interesting pattern of values.� Nor would many
philosophers, including Putnam, Hegel, Heidegger, or Murdoch. (I
couldn�t find anything on the Internet about Shelling.)
You might well argue that those who deny the fact/value distinction
fall into the camp of the Idealists who claim reality is mind (mine,
yours and/or God�s). Since mind has value, and since reality is
mind, reality has value. Does that syllogism come close to the
heart of your point? If so, I understand why you say many
philosophers (many of whom are Idealists to one degree or another)
look upon value and reality as inseparable..
Still, I stand by my assertion that Pirsig is the only philosopher to
write a metaphysics based on the initial assumption that the world
consists solely of patterns of moral values plus a creative force
called Dynamic Quality, and that from that initial assumption he
has given us a view of reality unlike any other ever presented. Sure
he has been influenced by other philosophers. But so was Picasso
influenced by other painters. Yet no one would argue that Picasso
doesn�t stand alone in the pantheon of artists. I predict that long
after Putnam is forgotten, Pirsig will still be read and revered by
generations to come. Like Picasso, he has broken new ground and
opened up new vistas.
Platt
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