Hi Platt and Squad I've snipped a few bits here and there in order to abbreviate the post a little but hopefully kept the core text. On 18 Dec 99, at 15:53, Platt Holden wrote: > Hi Horse: > > Glad to see you jump in on the morality discussions. As usual, your post is > provocative, and as usual, I have a number of comments and questions, > mostly questions. I couldn't stay out of this forever, especially after Roger accusing me of being honest and a philosopher in one sentence (6 Dec 99). That's just too much of a jibe to ignore :) I'll try to answer as best as I can. I may sometimes disagree with Pirsig on some points - especially where it comes to absolutes :) - but not in the overall context of the veracity of the MoQ. Anyway ..... > PLATT: > Your last sentence, �Moral action RELATIVE to circumstances ...� admits > that Contextualism as a moral stance is relative, Not 'Contextualism' (see below) but context. One of the frequent problems with philosophy is that for so many innocent words there is am 'ism' added - which often changes the meaning of the originally intended word or phrase. Context and relationship are often tightly bound to each other. Moral judgement of an action has to be made in relation to the circumstances in which the action takes place. This is completely different to Moral Relativism which is the theory that there are no universally valid moral principles, but that moral principles are relative to culture or individual choice. Moral relativists propose that there are no universally valid moral principles applying everywhere and at all times. The MoQ has something to say about this. PLATT: > even though relative to a > different variant than cultural relativity. Relativism and Contextualism may be > different fish, but both swim in the same kettle because both answer > questions about the propriety of an action by saying, �Well, that depends.� I don't think this is necessarily the case with Moral Relativism and Contextualism given their philosophical definitions. I'm not advocating the formal theory of Contextualism which is "the view that inferential justification always takes place against a background of beliefs that are themselves in no way evidentially supported". Contextualism is generally epistemic in nature and not necessarily specifically applicable to moral judgement. Although..... What I'm taking about here is providing a rational moral judgement, given the concepts supplied by the MoQ, looking at that judgement in the context of the circumstances in which it occurs. Saying, �Well, that depends� is quite valid when making moral judgements. If you were to state that taking drugs is immoral I could quite reasonably say �Well, that depends� and make a perfectly acceptable case to show that taking drugs is not immoral. PLATT: > In contrast, a universal morality answers moral questions, �That�s right (or > wrong) under any and all circumstances.� That to me sounds like Strong Moral Objectivism (a.k.a. Moral Absolutism) which holds that there is only one TRUE moral system with specific moral rules which must be adhered to under all circumstances, a position with which I disagree based on the principles of the MoQ. To quote Pirsig: "What the evolutionary structure of the Metaphysics of Quality shows is that there is not just one moral system. There are many. In the Metaphysics of Quality there's the morality called the "laws of nature" by which inorganic patterns (of value) triumph over chaos; there is a morality called the "law of the jungle" where biology triumphs over the inorganic forces of starvation and death; there's a morality where social patterns triumph over biology, "the law"; and there is an intellectual morality, which is still struggling with its attempts to control society." >From the above it is reasonable to say that whilst a moral system may be universal >there is no need to conclude that some action is right or wrong under any and all circumstances. PLATT: > When Pirsig says its right for doctors to kills germs, he states a universal > moral truth. In Chap. 13 he writes,� This is not just an arbitrary social > convention that should apply to some doctors but not to all doctors, or to > some cultures but not all cultures. It's true for all people at all times, now and > forever, a moral pattern of reality as real as H20. We're at last dealing with > morals on the basis of reason. We can now deduce codes based on > evolution that analyze moral arguments with greater precision than before.� To take the above example I would say that Pirsig is right on the money, assuming that there is a straight choice between a germ and a human AND THAT THE HUMAN WISHES TO LIVE. Given a context where the patient has expressed a wish that he/she no longer wishes to live AND that the patient is 'mentally competent' etc. then it would be immoral for the doctor to choose the human over the germ. Some forms of euthanasia would come into this catagory. Other examples can easily be constructed which support the same conclusion. PLATT: > To say, �all people at all times, now and forever� sounds universal to me. > (Maybe you�ll accept the term �universal� in lieu of �absolute� which I know > you can�t abide.) Question: Do you think there are any �universal� moral > truths, i.e., truths that are not contextual? Nothing springs immediately to mind,but it's getting late. Can you supply me with an example. Hmmm! Maybe I'm being picky, but doesn't the MoQ state that Truth is a sub- species of Good and support the principle of many truths. Although as Jonathan stated and with which I concur: On 13 Dec 99, at 12:01, Jonathan Marder wrote: > Many truths to me does *not* mean that anything goes, but that the truth of any > statement is dependent on the context. Something I would like to add to this is that although there are many truths there are also infinitely more non-truths.The many truths idea is often invoked inappropriately to support bigotry, stupidity, poor and inadequate reasoning and plain BS. Also many truths does not mean that there are no truths. Perhaps some discussion of the many truths idea would be appropriate. Where the MoQ provides moral principles I accept that these may be universally applicable, but cannot say that they are absolutes or that they support a position of a 'universal truth' which is immutable and unchanging. This would surely negate an important part of the MoQ - Dynamic Quality. > HORSE: <SNIP> > To be an Altruist in a > predominantly selfish environment is dangerous and makes for a short and > unhappy life. Similarly, to be selfish in a predominantly altruistic > environment, even though you may thrive for a time, will get you labeled as a > sponging git and removed from the environment. The solution you need may > be extracted once you have defined the problem properly. > > PLATT: > Speaking of definitions, how do you define �environment.� That term can > cover a lot of territory. Surely it covers the culture one inhabits. What�s the > difference between �environment,� �context� and �circumstances?� I�m > confused. Hmmm! I doubt that - you're far too intelligent, but anyway.... All three of the above are connected to each other and may contain some overlap. Environment is where something takes place, ranging from the Universe as a whole to the confines of an atom. More usually though it would be the planetary environment, national environment (society/culture), immediate family and friends, workplace environment, sports club, political union etc. How you use the term depends on the issue(s) you are considering. Context and circumstances could include other issues, information, actions etc. which need to be considered when making a moral judgement. Maybe an example would be best so let's take that quote of Pirsig's above that you supplied: "...given a value-centered Metaphysics of Quality, it is absolutely, scientifically moral for a doctor to prefer the patient. This is not just an arbitrary social convention that should apply to some doctors but not to all doctors, or to some cultures but not all cultures. It's true for all people at all times, now and forever, a moral pattern of reality as real as H2O. We're at last dealing with morals on the basis of reason." Pirsig is, I presume, making some reference to the Hippocratic oath. At first the Hippocratic oath may seem to be an Intellectual pattern of value and in the CONTEXT that Pirsig uses it (to support the MoQ) this is quite correct.The circumstances under which this statement is valid are, as I've said, where there is a choice between the germ and the patient and the patient wishes to live. There is no immediately apparent moral dilemma here and context and circumstances are plain to see. However, the environment in which the Hippocratic oath was first formulated was (apparently, I'm not an expert in this) in fifth century BC Athens - or some other city state - where the intellect was still subservient to the state. The circumstances would have involved a need for the maximum number of available citizens (slaves didn't count and probably were excluded from the oath) to be available to fight for the state in one of the many wars that abounded at the time or perform some other function of the state. There is still no moral dilemma but, environment, context and circumstances are obvious and different. Coming back to the present, if we now include the right to life and the right of the patient to choose to die (the latter is certainly intellectual value) then there is a dilemma. The environment may not have changed (culture, religious group, hospital etc.take your pick) but the context has. The patient wishes to die or has expressed a wish to die in circumstances where mental ability is severely impaired (E.g. Alzheimers). Is it now ethical for the doctor to ignore the wishes of the patient or the relatives? I won't go any further as I'm sure you see my point by now (if you didn't already :) ) and will understand what I mean by Environment, Context and Circumstances. > HORSE: > General Stuff: > The two main problems that seem obvious looking over the recent posts are: > > The problems being discussed are ill-defined and/or too broad. > Solution - Narrow down the problem and define it in an appropriate context. > > PLATT: > I thought Roger�s moral dilemmas were reasonably narrow and defined. What > would you add? Would Truman�s decision to use the atom bomb be morally > different today than it was at the time it was made, given the same > circumstances? Or is it always (universally) wrong to kill so many people in > one fell swoop? Unfortunately I didn't have the time to comment on Roger's moral dilemma's due to personal circumstances (sorry Rog) - I'll try to do so in the near future. As to the morality of Trumans's decision I cannot understand how it is possible to advocate the use of such a destructive force in the way it was used where a possible alternative existed. I believe such alternatives existed at the time but were considered too risky in view of the potential outcome if success was not immediate. But what you seem to be asking here is for me to advocate Moral Truth and going with the MoQ I cannot do that. Somewhere in the Hiroshima debate I came across the oxymoron 'Revisionist History' which made me chuckle a lot. History is nothing but revisionist. Do you remember the footer I used to put on my posts to the group: "Making history, it turned out, was quite easy. It was what got written down. It was as simple as that!" Sir Sam Vimes. As true now as it's always been. History is not truth. > HORSE: > Basic moral principles are similarly ill-defined. > Solution - Define and clarify basic MoQ principles relating to moral action. > > PLATT: > I thought we�d been there, done that. We�ve had many posts on MoQ > principles. What have we missed? We may have had many posts on MoQ principles but (IMO) without sufficient agreement to formulate basic principles beyond those supplied in Lila. I'm not trying to tease out some sort of Moral Laws which are immutable and everlasting (far too static) but to expand on those in Lila and maybe add some workable variants which can also remain sufficiently fluid. Tricky but not impossible. > HORSE: > > None of the problems I�ve seen discussed recently are going anywhere. They > vary between Emotivism (I believe X, do so too) and pasting the MoQ onto > already held beliefs. > > PLATT: > Agreed. I can see how Emotivism can be cured by giving reasons for one�s > moral decisions based on some overall moral structure such as one finds in > the MoQ. But the �pasting� problem has me stumped. Once somebody > asked, �What moral views that you held previously has the MoQ changed?� > or words to that effect. The response was telling by its absence. I really > wonder if, once a moral outlook is established in someone�s mind and heart, > usually in childhood, any change is possible through rational persuasion. It > seems name-calling is the primary means by which one person or group > tries to change another�s moral outlook. Did the MoQ change any of your > prior moral views? Reading Lila and taking the MoQ did change some of my moral views. Those on abortion and euthanasia for a start (there are others). But what it did more than anything else was provide a rational basis from which to start examining prevalent moral systems. This (I think) is what Walter means by a bottom up approach and is the reverse of many current attempts to superimpose prejudice and desires onto the MoQ. If you remember from my bio the MoQ revalation hit me right in the middle of a formal ethics course. I was having a great deal of trouble with much of the content of that course because of the underlying belief that moral values could be easily relegated to a subjective state and that the prevalent environment was one of detached objectivity. I could have kissed Pirsig! > PLATT: > I think everyone participating in these discussions operates under the > assumption that we have free will and can make moral decisions. Otherwise, > there�s no point in discussing morals at all. Those who say we don�t have > free will have a lot of explaining to do, like, �What, after all, is the likelihood > that an atom possesses within its own structure enough information to build > the city of New York?� (Lila, Chap. 12.) Therein lies much of the problem. We are operating under an assumption and not discussing other possibilities. This is allowing the Social value of convention to dominate the intellectual value of rational discourse. Immoral in MoQ terms. At one time there was the assumption of a flat Earth and today many people still believe in God because that is what they are taught to believe and fail to even question this assumption. I'm not saying that we don't have free will but I would prefer that this belief can be shown to be supported by the MoQ and if not what is the alternative. Can we show this to be the case due to our experience? Is there something in a value-based hierarchy such as the MoQ that provides at least a reasonable basis for belief in free will? If we are just working on unsupported assumptions then we're straight back to arguing different positions of how we would like the world to be or how we've been told it is and continuing pointless emotivist arguments. Another point about the free will debate is to try and say what it is we are trying to support and the context in which we are discussing it. > HORSE: > It's easy to be selfish, just follow your biological nature. But altruism is a lot > more difficult and requires some thought. > > PLATT: > E.O. Wilson and other sociobiologists would disagree. They say altruistic > behavior comes about naturally (without thought) because it once served the > interests of our ancestor�s genes. See �The Moral Animal� by Robert Wright. And I'm sure that in some circumstances this is correct (I haven't read much Wilson but I'm reasonably familiar with the sociobiologist and evolutionary psychology positions) but neither sociobiology or evolutionary psychology gives much weight to intellectual value in terms of altruism. And just because it served my ancestors genes in a particular way doesn't mean it must serve my genes in the same way now. Biology is more static than Society or Intellect and the environment in which many of my genes developed is different to todays environment. Again we come up against environment, context and circumstances with a bit of Intellectual value thrown in for good measure. Altruism and free will seem to be co- dependent. > Like I said, Horse, lots of questions. Hope to hear back and wish we�d hear > from you more often. I seem to have more time available now than I did a while back and am hoping to get back into the discussions, so your wish may come true. :( I'm sure there are points I've raised above that still need some clarification and I'll be happy to continue with this. BCNU Horse MOQ Online Homepage - http://www.moq.org Mail Archive - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/ Unsubscribe - http://www.moq.org/md/index.html MD Queries - [EMAIL PROTECTED]
