Greetings,
DAVID asked:
Here's a question..... if the universe is a moral order, IS IT
POSSIBLE FOR US TO ACT IMMORALLY? Not, "are there better/worse
choices/actions", but can we truly act IMMORALLY?
Given your premise I would suggest the answer is yes, although it depends upon whether
your moral
order is hierarchical (as Pirsig's is) or otherwise. If you actively work against the
hierarchy by,
for example, killing and eating a human being rather than a bag of peanuts (when the
choice is
restricted to one or the other and ((here it comes Horse) - all other things being
equal) then you
are being immoral (i.e. not conforming to the moral order) What you cannot do, given
the premise, is
be amoral.
---------------------------------------
RICH PRETTI quoted me:
Let us get this clear. I am not denying
>that there are subjects and objects and I am not denying that, for most
>practical purposes, we all
>see ourselves as distinct from everything else."
Then wrote:
"That is the problem. That is SOM (as existing present-individually rather
than social-historically). The "natural" sense of "I", as ultimately other
than and often opposed to "that", or "thou"."
But there is no, 'ultimately opposed to,' or, 'ultimately other than,' in my sense of,
'I,' only a
realisation that the various 'materials' of which I am composed at this time are
arranged in a
format which gives me a sense of selfhood. I wrote, 'for all practical purposes,'
deliberately and
in preference to, 'ultimately,' because it is not a metaphysical position. If, 'The
"natural" sense
of "I", as ultimately other than and often opposed to "that", or "thou,"' is what is
meant by SOM
then that does nothing but confirm my conviction that SO is not an M and is certainly
not a position
held by modern science. At a metaphysical level there is no opposition to the rest of
the universe.
My 'self', as Hume said, is 'nothing but a bundle of perceptions,' and will eventually
dissolve into
the singular universe from whence it came. I have a subject object relationship with
the universe at
a superficial level, but deep down, at a metaphysical level, I know this to be an
illusion. No
solution is needed because the problem does not exist.
To the book you recommend. I'm afraid that Buddhism loses me at the first noble truth,
that all is
suffering. It clearly isn't for me, but if I ever get miserable enough and think it
is, then I will
certainly give the book a try. The fact is that I am not remotely interested in
letting go of
worldly things and so have little need for that kind of enlightenment. Buddhism sees
enlightenment
as an escape from an otherwise endless cycle of death and rebirth. I don't believe in
reincarnation
so am quite happy to know that I will attain Nirvana immediately once this lifetime is
over.
Ironically, while your average Buddhist still has a few thousand lifetimes packed with
suffering yet
to endure, (poor chaps). The levels are intellectual constructions and therefore
beyond any sort of,
'proof,' other than the extent to which they explain things better. Looking at it from
that angle, I
find them far too discrete and hierarchical for my liking and they explain nothing
better to me than
I can to myself. But I am intrigued enough to check the book out, if it ever gets
published here in
England. Thanks for the tip.
--------------------------------------------------
JC wrote:
I can either choose to believe I have free will or I can choose to believe
I don't have free will. Choice seems so simple and obvious that I have
never really thought about debating the issue. How can you fail to see the
paradox in choosing non-choice? Thus, we HAVE to have choice. We've got
no choice in the matter. :-)
Methinks you misunderstand. You can choose whether to BELIEVE in free will or not, but
that makes
not one jot of difference to whether you ACTUALLY have it. You cannot choose whether
you actually
have it. You either do have it or you do not.
Consider a man in a room with a locked door. He does not know that the door is locked.
The man
believes that he can choose whether to leave the room or not and decides not to leave,
believing
that he has, of his own free will, made the decision. But the reality of the situation
is that the
decision was never his. He is staying in the room and that is that. Your paradox is
therefore a
false one because you conflate belief and reality.
Free will = consciousness is another misconception. If I nail your hands and feet to
the floor you
cannot choose to get up and yet you are still conscious, therefore they cannot be
synonymous.
JONATHAN wrote:
"The
free-will argument is a red herring because humans clearly DO make
decisions and can be held responsible for the outcomes."
Computers clearly DO make decisions and CAN be held responsible for the outcomes, but
does this mean
that they are responsible in a moral sense? I agree that the free will argument is a
red herring,
but having free will in the sense you ascribe does not necessarily mean that we can
properly be held
morally responsible for our choices. Yes a murderer is responsible for the death of
his victim
because he wielded the knife which killed his victim, but this is different to saying
that, at a
fundamental level, he was free to act otherwise, and not affected by the correct claim
that he made
the choice to do what he did. My example to JC also makes this point.
----------------------------------------------------
CLARK writes:
"Everybody is making the same mistake of trying to apply the terms Morality, Value,
and Good to
the concerns of humanity (sentience).
This is not what Pirsig said Morality, Value, and Good was."
To be fair Ken, Pirsig spent a lot of his book applying the terms mentioned to the
concerns of
humanity. This is surely not a 'mistake,' but I suspect that your overstating of the
case comes from
frustration at the almost complete sidelining of anything other than human ethics in
recent
discussions and I think you are right to remind everybody that this is but one small
part of a
greater whole.
------------------------------------------------------
Jonathan, the vital point in the Q v X argument is brought out here, as the 'agreement
argument' is
easily explicable using traditional science and the old razor precludes a new
metaphysics based on
that:
JONATHAN:
", X is meaningless until
AFTER it has been defined, while Pirsig presented Q as a metaphysical
entity that precedes definition."
Yes, this is how he presented it, but there is a fatal contradiction. Q has already
been defined
simply by the use of the word, 'quality,' as the word (being a proper word) at least
partly defines
what it is applied to. The 'metaphysical entity' does not precede definition because
it is called
quality. If you want something that precedes definition then, on a priori grounds, the
name one
ascribes to it has to be a meaningless one. Only after it has succumbed to (at least
partial)
definition can one give it a name like quality because definition is built into the
term.
JONATHAN:
"The point is, Struan, you can't define things without meaning - the mere
act of defining them is recognition of their meaning/quality."
Precisely, which is why I am not defining it and you draw out the reason very well in
the next
paragraph:
JONATHAN:
"Next let's consider morality="X".
This is an inevitable outcome of Pirsig's treatment of the Q idea in his
second novel. He broke his own rule by putting Q subservient to
Aristotelian definition. The whole 4 layer MoQ presented in Lila is just
that. The only way one can accept any of Lila is by not taking it too
literally. A literal reading of Lila just opens up endless
contradictions - as Struan will surely agree."
Absolutely, or indeed any reading this side of the way we read fairy stories. Pirsig
sees quality as
synonymous with morality. But as you point out, if the corollary is that morality=X,
then Q=X. This
is my point. Under Pirsig's system he might as well have used X instead of Q because
if Q does not
equate to morality then what is the point of using a value laden word to describe
something for
which he cannot substantiate values without undermining his own position that quality
precedes
definition? (and if anyone is worried about my use of value in that last sentence - I
can see the
argument coming - I refer them back to my original reply to Roger and in particular
the very bit
that Jonathan snipped out)
Meaning eh? Well, it is a lot better than quality, but it doesn't help much in the
search for a
rational ethic. Does killing a germ instead of a man have meaning? Well yes, but is it
good? No
answer! Of course X is no better in this regard, but at least it makes no claim to
being an ethical
proposition. If your 'meaning' makes no claims to be such either then I feel no need
to argue
against it.
Struan
------------------------------------------
Struan Hellier
< mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
"All our best activities involve desires which are disciplined and
purified in the process."
(Iris Murdoch)
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