Hi Again.
On April 3 Struan Hellier wrote:
> BO:
> > "But don't you see how vulnerable the mind/matter interpretation of
> > MOQ makes it? (For instance: The MOQ an intellectual pattern in
> > here, compared to the corresponding patterns out there?? I had
> > almost wanted Struan to home in on it). It's very well in an closed
> > circle where nobody wants to be rude, but the Quality Metaphysics
> > has a world-shaking ability if its tenets are understood. Think of
> > it; the first time the dreaded subject-object, mind-matter,
> > inside-outside spell is broken. This is the essence of the Quality
> > idea, and it must not be compromised".
> STRUAN:
> Let us have a look at that arch-SOM'ist, logical positivist and
> falsely supposed denier of all value, A.J. Ayer. I choose logical
> positivism on the grounds that it is probably the last philosophical
> position most people here would think might draw similar conclusions
> to the MoQ. This first quotation is merely interesting, it is the
> second that is so illuminating.
> 1)
> "We are all brought up to understand a form of language in which the
> perception of physical objects is treated as the standard case. But
> this is a contingent fact: it is surely not inconceivable that there
> should be a language in which the sense-experiences were described by
> the use of purely qualitative expressions which carried no reference
> to the appearances of physical objects." (The Problem of Knowledge,
> 1956, Penguin, pg111)
I notice with interest the sentence : " ...it is surely not
inconceivable that there should be a language in which the sense
experiences were described by the use of purely
QUALITATIVE..etc ......Keep that in mind.
> 2)
> "Accordingly, it does not greatly matter whether we say that the
> objects which figure in it (Ayer's Logical Positivism) are theoretical
> constructions or whether, in line with common sense, we prefer to say
> that they are independently real. The ground for saying that they are
> not constructions is that the references to them cannot be eliminated
> in favour of references to sense-data. The grounds for saying that
> they are constructions is that it is only through their relationship
> to our sense-experiences that a meaning is given to what we say about
> them." (Ibid pg132).
I'll say nothing critical at this stage, but notice the reference to
sense DATA in the first example and sense EXPERIENCE in the
last. The former is supposed to be objective and the latter is
subjective. But then Ayer suddenly speaks of MEANING, and
could have made a new meaning metaphysics had he seen the
meaning. A MoM would have been an exact equivalent to the MoQ.
To do that he would have had to declare that there's nothing but
Meaning: Dynamic M and Static M ...etc, but no, the "meaning" bit
falls within the subjective half in the no 1) quotation above.
> You see, Bo, the, "dreaded subject-object, mind-matter, inside-outside
> spell," has been broken precisely four million times before. It does
> not greatly matter to 20th century philosophy whether there is an,
> 'out there,' or an, 'in here.' Everybody and their grandmother knows
> that there is no either/or situation here and those same people all
> agree that reality is in the relationship between observed and
> observer.
"Reality the relationship between the observed and the
observer...." is merely the new physics effort to (try) a
reconciliation between the Quantum weirdness and the subject-
object world view that - regardless of countless exorcisms - lives
on. And really Struan: Don't you see the hitch: what is the
observed that interacts with the observer? The sense data?
The SOM reality is disproved by quantum mech, by relativity a by
anyone who cares to see many million times, but it does not help
as long as they are blind to any SO-METAPHYSICS. To the said
academics there is no such only the god-given S/O reality that
they go to great lengths to circumvent while still dominating their
maps. The moment the S/O is identified as one particular way to
regard existence - not as reality itself - its spell is broken.
> Perhaps at one time this was, 'world-shaking,' but now it is little
> more than mildly interesting.
> Again, Ayer, that recipient of so much misunderstanding on this forum,
> had this to say - and please bear in mind quotation 1), lest the
> language should appear to detract from the point;
>"If, for example,
> this carpet looks blue to me it is because light of a certain
> wavelength is being transmitted from it to my eyes, from which
> impulses pass along the appropriate nerve fibres to my brain. In a
> different light . . . it might appear to me a different colour . . .
> But to infer from this that we do not perceive things as they really
> are, that, for example, the physical object which I refer to as 'this
> carpet' is not really blue, is to make the assumption that if a
> thing's appearing to have a certain property is caused, in part, by
> outside factors, then it does not really have it. Stated generally
> this assumption is obviously false. Thus, part of the cause of the
> carpet's now appearing blue to me may be that it has been dyed: but no
> one would regard this causal dependence upon a dying machine as a
> reason for concluding that the carpet was not really blue." (Ibid
> pg93-94).
I will try my best not let anything detract from my understanding of
Ayer. He obviously knows the empiricists argument i.e: that there
are no "qualities" out there: Colours, smells, sounds or taste or
tangibility are physical quantities like light frequencies, molecular
configurations etc. In other words: our perception is a subjective
(re)construction of the world. This weird, but watertight argument
caused an uproar back in the early eighteenth century culminating
with Kant who tried to save objectivity by introducing the...(what's
the English expression?) among them time, space and causation
which exist apriori - before experience - (in our minds). But this did
only make it more ineffable.
Well, Ayer makes an effort to prove that even if the sight sense
may be deceived in another light or by dying there are ....what he in
the former quotation calls sense DATA which in interaction with
his sense IMPRESSIONS create the carpet reality. But are the
sense data Ayer different from the sense impressions Ayer?
After Kant who was considered as the last word there was the
idealist and materialist camps who fired at each other across the
S/O chasm and such the situation remained until positivists
(logical they certainly regarded themselves) who rejected any
speculations and propound to present "reality as it is". But you can
as little rid yourself from a basic world view as you can chew off
your own teeth
> We can see from this that Ayer is happy to define the reality of what
> the carpet is by the relationship he holds with it. Thus the carpet IS
> blue, and, by extension, is a carpet, because, and only because, of a
> RELATIONSHIP between two DEPENDENT entities (for want of a better
> word)
I think Ayer says that the relationship between his sense
impressions' and his sense data defines reality. Can you give a hint
of the nature of the sense data SOURCE? Is it something outside
and different from the impression Ayer? I don't see the difference
from the honest SOM notion of either the solipsist "my reality" or
"the material world is the only reality and if interpreted differently
one is deluded".
I say this because if you think that the Ayer approach is faintly
similar to the MOQ solution you don't understand. The fact that you
haven't "homed in" on the said subject-object interpretation of the
MOQ should have told me that you were most happy withy it. It
relieves me considerably though.
> When I read:
> PLATT:
> > Whatever it�s nature, most seem to agree with Justin Binktmons > who
> > wrote that there is �� a distinction between Reality and the >
> > mind�s perception of reality.� As to the question of whether
> > >patterns also exist �out there,� there�s some disagreement.
> <snip>
> > Peter Lennox says, �� the patterns we perceive are subjective
> > impressions of some other, objective reality.�
> I have to say that I hope most don't agree with these sentiments. This
> is a naive realism which will find no support anywhere within the
> philosophical field. Yes, I concede, it may be a, 'man in the street,'
> common sense view, but it is one of which any reader of Pirsig, or any
> modern philosophy, should be disabused. When I read:
I can't for the life of me see how this is different from an "observer"
and the "observed" position.
> PLATT:
> >"Roger says, �� reality or experience
> > exists, but it (is) by no means is independent of us.�
And how this is different from Platt and Peter?
> > Horse says, �We are created by reality as much as we create it.�
> I have to agree completely. But for goodness sake, nobody in academia
> is going to be impressed by such (to them) self-evident, almost
> platitudinous observations. To describe Pirsig's reiteration of the
> ending of the subject/object dichotomy as, 'world-shaking,' is,
> frankly, risible and these continued attempts to re-invent Western
> philosophy as resting on some naive, simplistic, either/or
> metaphysical position will gain no credence whatsoever.
I am not sure that you have the right to call upon Horse as your
witness, because when he says "We are created by reality ....etc"
he does it from a MOQ p.o.v. where "Reality is Quality" and that
makes all the difference. It is as if Ayer had said: "Reality is
Meaning and Meaning has created static meaning patterns ....etc.
But he did not do that, his impressions and data are the SOM
variants.
I could have gone on, but this is too much already.
Bo
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