Greetings,
BO:
>I notice with interest the sentence : " ...it is surely not
>inconceivable that there should be a language in which the sense
>experiences were described by the use of purely
>QUALITATIVE..etc ......Keep that in mind.
Absolutely right. It was a deliberate choice.
BO:
>I'll say nothing critical at this stage, but notice the reference to
>sense DATA in the first example and sense EXPERIENCE in the
>last. The former is supposed to be objective and the latter is
>subjective. But then Ayer suddenly speaks of MEANING, and
>could have made a new meaning metaphysics had he seen the
>meaning. A MoM would have been an exact equivalent to the MoQ.
>To do that he would have had to declare that there's nothing but
>Meaning: Dynamic M and Static M ...etc, but no, the "meaning" bit
>falls within the subjective half in the no 1) quotation above.
Precisely. Ayer has looked at the subject/object dichotomy in terms of a traditional
either/or point
of view and decided that it doesn't greatly matter and, additionally, that both are
right - note
that Pirsig also spends some time pointing out that seemingly contrary positions
(including logical
positivism) are both correct!! You are accurate in pointing out that the 'meaning' he
writes of
falls into the subjective part of the quotation, but note that Ayer is here talking
about the
meaning which is 'given to WHAT WE SAY ABOUT THEM.' Of course words which issue forth
from our
mouths are subjective. That is what the word, in its most basic sense, means. For now,
it is
important only to note that Ayer does not recognise a subject/object dichotomy as
having much
bearing upon his philosophy despite the fact that he is fully aware of it.
BO:
>"Reality the relationship between the observed and the
>observer...." is merely the new physics effort to (try) a
>reconciliation between the Quantum weirdness and the subject-
>object world view that - regardless of countless exorcisms - lives
>on. And really Struan: Don't you see the hitch: what is the
>observed that interacts with the observer? The sense data?
The hitch is not valid. The observed that interacts with the observer is IN THAT
INTERACTION. Before
the interaction the yet-to-be-observed (conceptually unknown) has no MEANING and no
QUALITIES (very
un-moq, so back to this in a minute). What you are trying to do here is to force a
false premise
onto this position by asking an irrelevant question framed in what you would call SOM
terms and
therefore requiring an answer in what you would equally call SOM terms.
BO:
>I will try my best not let anything detract from my understanding of
>Ayer. He obviously knows the empiricists argument i.e: that there
>are no "qualities" out there: Colours, smells, sounds or taste or
>tangibility are physical quantities like light frequencies, molecular
>configurations etc. In other words: our perception is a subjective
>(re)construction of the world. This weird, but watertight argument
>caused an uproar back in the early eighteenth century culminating
>with Kant who tried to save objectivity by introducing the...(what's
>the English expression?) among them time, space and causation
>which exist apriori - before experience - (in our minds). But this did
>only make it more ineffable.
No. This is precisely the point of the carpet example. Our perception is not a
subjective
(re)construction of the world . . . .
BO:
>Well, Ayer makes an effort to prove that even if the sight sense
>may be deceived in another light or by dying there are ....what he in
>the former quotation calls sense DATA which in interaction with
>his sense IMPRESSIONS create the carpet reality. But are the
>sense data Ayer different from the sense impressions Ayer?
No, no and thrice no!!! Are you telling me that Ayer has suggested that his carpet is
not really
blue but only appears that way because it has been dyed and that there is some other
'out there'
'really real' carpet beyond the senses which may not be blue? The whole point of this
example is to
show this not to be the case AND TO PIN DOWN PRECISELY WHAT AYER MEANS BY AN OBJECT
HAVING A CERTAIN
PROPERTY. Ayer would endorse Pirsig entirely when the latter wrote that the qualities,
in this case
of the carpet, 'cannot be independently derived from either mind or matter. But (they)
can be
derived from the relationship of mind and matter with each other.' (Pirsig, SODV paper
- my
bracketed change to pluralise). To your question and I shall have to decline to answer
on behalf of
Ayer (he would be relieved) because the whole concept of sense-data is outdated. The
later
perceptual theories of 'stimuli' serve only to emphasise the inter-dependant
relationship Ayer talks
about in my second quotation, by further blurring the distinction between sense-data
and
sense-impressions. Ayer would have been pleased.
BO:
>I think Ayer says that the relationship between his sense
>impressions' and his sense data defines reality. Can you give a hint
>of the nature of the sense data SOURCE? Is it something outside
>and different from the impression Ayer? I don't see the difference
>from the honest SOM notion of either the solipsist "my reality" or
>"the material world is the only reality and if interpreted differently
>one is deluded".
I will come to this.
BO:
>I say this because if you think that the Ayer approach is faintly
>similar to the MOQ solution you don't understand. The fact that you
>haven't "homed in" on the said subject-object interpretation of the
>MOQ should have told me that you were most happy withy it. It
>relieves me considerably though.
Any similarity of solution is restricted to the role of subjects and objects. I did
not mean to
imply that Logical Positivism and the moq share the same metaphysics. Equally, I am
not happy with
any interpretation of the moq. Why it relieves you that I don't want to home in on a
flawed
interpretation of the moq is beyond me. Why should I care if people misunderstand it.
Caring about
it is your job! <grin>
To the quotations from other squad members. I am surprised that you see no difference
between them
collectively and when compared to the observer/observed position, (whatever that is).
Are you happy
with �� the patterns we perceive are subjective impressions of some other, objective
reality�? Or
are you saying that Platt, Peter, and Roger, like (in your, to my mind false, opinion)
Ayer, have
got it wrong? If you are happy with them, then do you appreciate that Peter's position
involves a
far starker separation of subject and object than Ayer would ever postulate?
Last point, before getting on to what I consider to be the root of the problem, is
that I didn't
call Horse as a witness. At no point did I suggest he would accept one word of my last
posting and I
rather suspect he does not. I merely agreed with him that, �We are created by reality
as much as we
create it.� Nothing more, nothing less.
The root of your objection is that Ayer still places primary emphasis on subjects and
objects
revealed by the fact that he doesn't actually say that reality is meaning and meaning
has created
static meaning patterns . . . . etc. You want a sense-data (I shall stick with the
term as it makes
little difference in this context) source and are unhappy about my previous
explanation which says
that the conceptually unknown has no meaning or qualities. (correct me if I am wrong).
In order to
address this problem I want to look at something Pirsig wrote:
PIRSIG:
"In the Metaphysics of Quality the world is composed of three things: mind, matter and
Quality.
Because something is not located in the object does not mean that it has to be located
in your mind.
Quality cannot be independently derived form either mind or matter. But it can be
derived from the
relationship of mind and matter with each other. Quality occurs at the point at which
subject and
object meet. Quality is not a thing. It is an event. It is the event at which the
subject becomes
aware of the object. And because without objects there can be no subject, quality is
the event at
which awareness of both subjects and objects is made possible. Quality is not just the
result of a
collision between subject and object. The very existence of subject and object
themselves is deduced
from the Quality event. The Quality event is the cause of the subjects and objects,
which are then
mistakenly presumed to be the cause of the Quality!"
1)"In the Metaphysics of Quality the world is composed of three things: mind, matter
and Quality."
OK A presupposition, but we know that. I'm not happy with 'Quality' and nobody thinks
that subjects
and objects are all there is, but that comes later.
2) "Because something is not located in the object does not mean that it has to be
located in your
mind."
Agreed. The carpet is really blue but my mind is a 'factor' in that reality. NOTE: A
'factor.' Not,
'the only factor', or even, 'the decisive factor.' The 'blueness' is a property of the
object (UNDER
AYER'S DEFINITION) but it is also contingent upon the mind therefore:
3) "But it can be derived from the relationship of mind and matter with each other."
Precisely the point.
4) "Quality occurs at the point at which subject and object meet"
Absolutely. Note that mind has become subject and matter, object. Can we use these
interchangeably?
Quality occurs at the point at which mind and matter meet. Fine with me.
5) "Quality is not a thing. It is an event"
Of course
6) "It is the event at which the subject becomes aware of the object"
Again. It is the event at which mind becomes aware of matter. Ok
7) "And because without objects there can be no subject, quality is the event at which
awareness of
both subjects and objects is made possible."
Aha! That is why the subtle shift from mind and matter to subject and object has been
made. I agree
that an object pre-supposes a subject, but what about this? "And because without
matter there can be
no mind, quality is the event at which awareness of both mind and matter is made
possible." There is
no logical contradiction in postulating mind without matter. The strong 'a priori'
argument that
objects rely upon subjects has vanished completely. Notice that this is not a question
of whether
mind is contingent upon matter in the sense that it could not have come into being
without it, it is
a question of whether the mind can function without perception of matter. Notice also
that this does
not need to be empirically validated (although I suspect it can), the fact that it is
logically
possible is enough. The argument collapses at this point.
8) "Quality is not just the result of a collision between subject and object"
Hmm . . . . tell me more
9) "The very existence of subject and object themselves is deduced from the Quality
event."
'Deduced.' It is that 'awareness' thing again. Notice that deduction is not empirical.
cf. point 7.
Can I say, "The very existence of mind and matter themselves is deduced from the
Quality event?" Is
deduced by what? The subject? Pirsig has made the huge jump from, Quality being
'derived from the
relationship of mind and matter,' and occurring, 'AT THE POINT AT WHICH SUBJECT AND
OBJECT MEET,'
to:
10) "The Quality event is the cause of the subjects and objects, which are then
mistakenly presumed
to be the cause of the Quality!"
So how does he make this jump from quality 'being DERIVED from the relationship
between mind and
matter' (my emphasis) to it being the CAUSE of mind and matter? The answer is that he
does it with
that short sentence in point 7. He does it by sneakily replacing mind and matter
(which is what he
is really talking about) with subjects and objects in order to give his reasoning
veracity.
Now, to the Logical Positivist (and almost everybody else) these problems do not
arise, because most
people do not agree with assumption that subjects and objects (and Quality if we must)
are all there
is. Time is a good example (and I too saw Professor Barbour's lectures) of something
most people
would say exists and is real, yet it is not reducible to a subject or an object. Space
is another.
Radio waves another, and so on. The problem is Bo, that you think, along with Pirsig,
that subjects,
objects and Quality are all there is. If someone disagrees with your formulation of
Quality, then
you automatically assume that for them only subjects and objects are left. This is not
the case and
people like Ayer can quite happily talk about the relationship between subjects and
objects, can
quite happily explain subjects and objects in terms of relationships, can quite
happily talk of
values as being derived from the way subjects and objects relate to each other and yet
still not
have a Subject Object Metaphysics.
That being said, I am quite happy to agree with you that Logical Positivism does not
agree with the
statement that everything derives from the good. That can be left to Aristotle, Plato,
Aquinas and
dozens of others throughout history. My posting was about 'Independent reality' in
refutation of
your misguided, "subject-object, mind-matter, inside-outside spell," and I am not
about to defend
the logical positivist view of values.
Ah, but I still haven't answered the question of what constitutes the sense data have
I? My answer
remains, 'X,' and I refer you back to the lengthy discussions on this forum a couple
of months ago
if you want more details.
Quality as term for the conceptually unknown has no meaning for me! Perhaps it does
for you, but
that merely demonstrates that meaning is (in this sense) subjective.
Struan
------------------------------------------
Struan Hellier
< mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
"All our best activities involve desires which are disciplined and
purified in the process."
(Iris Murdoch)
MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
Mail Archive - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
MD Queries - [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html
