Anon has received a reply.
Struan wrote:
3) If you want to derive what we *ought* to do from the *fact* of
complexity, you need to give a good reason why you are doing so. 'Starting'
from a Quality position is not sufficient if you want to establish Quality
as the primary empirical reality. Pirsig clearly realised that he had to try
and prove it if anyone half reasonable were to take him seriously. As I
don't consider the concept of everything being Quality is a coherent one,
let alone the actuality, you will see that this is another reason why I
reject the framework.
Anon wrote:
that if like Struan you want to separate *ought* from *fact*, then you need
to give a good reason why you are doing so. 'Starting' from an anti-quality
position is not sufficient of you want to establish anti-quality as the
primary empirical reality. Struan clearly realised that he had to try to
prove it if anyone half reasonable were to take him seriously. As I don't
consider the concept of some things being 'facts' and others being 'oughts' a
coherent one, let alone an actuality, you will see that this is another
reason why I reject Struan's framework.
Struan replied:
But, Anon, I certainly, most definitely and absolutely am NOT trying to
establish 'anti-quality as the primary empirical reality'. I clearly stated
that I take an entirely pragmatic approach to ethical matters. Given that
this is my only framework and observing that you reject it, you seem to be
saying that you reject any account of ethics which works. A rather extreme
negative position would you not think?
Anon thinks about this reply:
About this reply, I think that it isn't a reply. It doesn't begin to justify
the fact-value gap, which is the essence of the science-morality gulf that
Struan finds so hard to bridge. Instead it appears to attempt a broad brush
charaterisation of Struan's position for which I have seen no detailed
practical exposition or explanation. What do you mean, for instance, in
saying that you take 'an entirely pragmatic approach to ethical matters'?
This could mean any number of things, given that it apparently doesn't mean
what it ought to mean, i.e. the entirely pragmatic approach adopted by the
american school of Pragmatism, of which Pirsig is an exponent, and for which
the fact-value gap is the classic philosophical mistake.
Struan's reply being a reply that isn't a reply and an answer that isn't an
answer, I have nothing to add at this point.
Anon
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