One further anonymous comment.
Struan still neglects to support his fact-value gap. This obligation
unfullfilled, he nevertheless sets out to aquire further unfullfilled
obligations to explain himself.
Struan wrote:
3) If you want to derive what we *ought* to do from the *fact* of
complexity, you need to give a good reason why you are doing so. 'Starting'
from a Quality position is not sufficient if you want to establish Quality
as the primary empirical reality. Pirsig clearly realised that he had to try
and prove it if anyone half reasonable were to take him seriously. As I
don't consider the concept of everything being Quality is a coherent one,
let alone the actuality, you will see that this is another reason why I
reject the framework.
Anon wrote:
that if like Struan you want to separate *ought* from *fact*, then you need
to give a good reason why you are doing so. 'Starting' from an anti-quality
position is not sufficient of you want to establish anti-quality as the
primary empirical reality. Struan clearly realised that he had to try to
prove it if anyone half reasonable were to take him seriously. As I don't
consider the concept of some things being 'facts' and others being 'oughts' a
coherent one, let alone an actuality, you will see that this is another
reason why I reject Struan's framework.
Struan wrote:
But, Anon, I certainly, most definitely and absolutely am NOT trying to
establish 'anti-quality as the primary empirical reality'. I clearly stated
that I take an entirely pragmatic approach to ethical matters. Given that
this is my only framework and observing that you reject it, you seem to be
saying that you reject any account of ethics which works. A rather extreme
negative position would you not think?
Anon wrote:
About this reply, I think that it isn't a reply. It doesn't begin to justify
the fact-value gap, which is the essence of the science-morality gulf that
Struan finds so hard to bridge. Instead it appears to attempt a broad brush
charaterisation of Struan's position for which I have seen no detailed
practical exposition or explanation. What do you mean, for instance, in
saying that you take 'an entirely pragmatic approach to ethical matters'?
This could mean any number of things, given that it apparently doesn't mean
what it ought to mean, i.e. the entirely pragmatic approach adopted by the
american school of Pragmatism, of which Pirsig is an exponent, and for which
the fact-value gap is the classic philosophical mistake.
Struan wrote:
In terms of ethics, Pragmatism (in most forms) subscribes to the following.
Firstly it rejects certainty as a legitimate intellectual goal and thereby
avoids a dogmatic approach to morality. (Pirsig is nothing if not dogmatic
about his ethical system of levels, although in other respects he is
pragmatic).
Anon:
That is factually incorrect. Philosophical Pragmatism does not reject
certainty as a legitimate intellectual goal. Pragmatists are quite certain
about their pragmatism, and indeed in the thought of Dewey the pattern of i
nquiry is described in such a way as to make certainty the only legitimate
intellectual goal. Doubt is not the end of enquiry it is the motivation to
enquiry. Pragmatism is a way of understanding our pursuit of that necessary
goal of certainty, not a way of rejecting that goal. Furthermore their are
quite certain ontological implications to the Pragmatic thought that all
knowledge is fundamentally evaluative, and Prisig's idea of Quality as the
primary empirical reality is the ontological manifestation of the
epistemological primacy of value.
Struan wrote:
Secondly it [pragmatism] is teleological to the core and so rejects the many
and varied deontological statements Pirsig makes about ethics, such as:
'That choice which is more dynamic . . . is more moral'.
'It's true for all people at all time'.
'It's scientifically immoral for everyone' (referring to eating meat and
with minor qualifications).
'The principle of human equality is an even higher form than the nation'.
etc . . . etc . . . !
Anon:
The exclamation mark does not constitute an argument. The kinds of statments
you quote could have a variety of metaethical backgrounds, deontological,
teleological or neither of the above. It is an unfinished argument between
consequentialists and deontologists as to which of the two metaethics best
describes what is going on in moral statements like those you outline. But
you provide no kind of argument to support your own veiw of the matter.
Struan wrote:
As Pirsig is clearly a deontologist...
Anon:
'Clearly'? In the appropriate terminology: 'Come Again?'. There are
excellent reasons for thinking that Pirsig is no Deontologist (someone who
thinks oughts are derived from the existence ['onto'] of fundamental moral
rules or instructions ['de']). We might point to his Buddhism for a start,
and numerous members of this disscussion group have, at lesser and great
length, over and over again, and, I noted, largely in discussion with you.
On you side of the argument we find that you can point to... nothing at all.
Your list of normative moral statements is no evidence one way or other on
the question of what methethical foundation underlies that normativity. That
you consider that list to be in the least bit relevant reflects poorly on
your grasp of basic moral theory. There is normative ethics (what you ought
to do), and there is metaethics (where those oughts come from). Our
discussion about the moral views of R.M.Pirsig is, as soon as you mention
works like 'deontological' and 'teleological', of the metaethical variety.
Struan wrote:
...my initial point that, if you want to derive what we *ought* to
do from the *fact* of complexity, you need to give a good reason why you are
doing so, still stands in a way that it doesn't stand for those of us who
take an entirely pragmatic view of things.
Anon:
Am I entirely alone in finding this more than a little obscure? Please, what
are you talking about?
Finally, I should say that I resent the attempts to question my anonymity,
which I value as a proper protection against a storm of ad hominiem arguments
that I have observed from lurklandia.
Who I am can only matter to you if you fail to address what I say.
while crocodile
Anon
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