Hi Simon:
This is in response to your post of Feb. 8. Sorry for the delay. I�ve gotten
behind by trying to engage in three conversations at once. You wrote:
SIMON:
Subjective absolutes can be absolute. Absolute faith, absolute trust,
absolute belief. Objective absolute can't. Absolute truth, and so on. But
then again, that's just my absolute belief. Given that statements are
statements of my belief, they may be absolute. I make a statement that
appears absolute, it can only be absolute according to me. That's not
to say that my belief isn't the absolute truth, but I can never be
absolutely sure about it.
On a pedantic note, certain implies an absoluteness, it's like the
phrase general consensus, a consensus is by its very nature general.
Likewise, a certainty is absolute. Except when it isn't. Consider the
following sentence: "It is an absolute certainty that the sun will rise
tomorrow." - attempt at objective absolute truth - justify this certainty, I
challenge you. All this sentence actually says is: "I am absolutely
certain that the sun will rise tomorrow." - subjective absolute and totally
valid. Take this sentence apart and it says: "It is my absolute belief that
the sun will rise tomorrow."
So when I say that the world is not round, it is an absolute statement of
my belief, my absolute belief being that we can never know that we
have arrived at an absolute objective truth. My denial of the world's
shape is not an absolute and objective denial, but neither is it a
provisional denial, it is a subjective absolute denial. And as the terms
absolute and denial together carry with them an air of objectivity I have
always found it easier to just call it a denial. Did the world exist 3million
years ago? I have an absolute belief that it did, but there can be no
absolute certainty about it in the objective sense.
' "This I'm absolutely sure of"... [subjectively speaking] ... the [subjective]
certainty that you can never be sure [objectively] of anything.'
So what I'm reacting against is your use of objective
absolutes/certainties, which by the very nature of absolutes can never
exist. If I've misrepresented your position then let me know, but what I
was absolutely certain of from your postings was a certainty in external
absolutes.
If I understand you correctly, it is your belief that absolutes exist only
subjectively as personal beliefs, never objectively. But here�s the thing.
A statement of your personal beliefs is an object to me and others. Like
other objects, I see or hear your statement and interpret it. It�s put �out
there� for me to consider and thus objective to me. In fact, your own
thoughts and beliefs are objects to you, existing as identifiable entities
against a background of your inner, mental space/time.
So I see an inescapable contradiction in your analysis. Thoughts and
beliefs are simultaneously subjective and objective, absolute and not
absolute.
Pirsig solves such subject/object conundrums by saying that objects,
both mental and material, intangible and tangible, are patterns of
values. In doing this, he co-joins the mental and the physical, mind and
matter, subject and object, just as many quantum scientists have. Both
he and they have concluded that it�s all basically the same stuff albeit
in different forms. To be intelligible the form we call thought must
adhere to the absolute patterns of logic, i.e. the principles of reasoning.
To be intelligible, the form of physical matter must adhere to the
absolute patterns of identity, i.e., our imposition of boundaries upon the
aesthetic continuum of experience. From those two absolutes, all
others spring.
Perhaps the key to this whole question of absolutes is �intelligibility.�
To think rationally and thus to survive, it�s necessary for absolutes to
exist. Or, to put it in Pirsigian terms, if it�s worth thinking about, it�s
worth thinking about logically.
Platt
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