DMB, I had (have) actually no idea how the conversation began or how it progressed. I just happened to see David's subject line and thought I might take a look. And I hope you didn't take me to be construing you as saying that, since "the possible" has no material existence, it is therefore unreal. That would be, as you say, something reminicent of a positivist standpoint, but I think SOM's provinence extends beyond debates about materialism. As I said before, I don't think you neccessarily are regressing or looking at things like a SOMist.
What I was attempting to suggest, by cutting in at a different angle, was that the two of you, though using (possibly wildly) different vocabularies, are really not at odds on this point, on the reality of the possible. David may have his particular way of putting the point, which sounds like nonsense to you, but a lot of poetry and physics sounds like nonsense to a lot of people, though some readers may be able to suggest different terms in which the poetry and physics can be seen to be expressing something good sensical. Having not read most of the nonsense David's been throwing up at you, I can't be sure whether some if it isn't, in fact, nonsense. I don't know. What I read from the two of you, though, suggested to me that the two of you were cutting each other at cross purposes. I was hoping to suggest a way to mend that. So, essentially what I'm saying is that when you say that "the possible" is not real, but that imagination is, I think you are right and that that is all David is (or very well should be) saying. His angle, however, sounds the way it does to combat certain pernicious tendencies in SOMist philosophical formulation, for instance Enlightenment philosophical exaltations of the God known as "Reason," at the expense of the imagination, which is why the Romantics reacted the way they did by exalting the Imagination. I see David's suggestions as an offshoot of Romanticism. David doesn't (or shouldn't) want to describe "the possible" as being outside of experience. His intention, so far as I can see, is to redescribe experience in such a way as to include something he calls "experience of the possible." Personally, I find talk about possibilities scurrying about, living and dying, cute and harmless. However, at the same time, I can't imagine many situations in which I'd find it useful to pick up David's redescription and use it. But I don't think they are running afoul of any of my own scruples. Now--as far as defending his redescription with phenomenology (not a good idea, for one person's demon is another person's hallucination) or physics (very bad idea, I've never been able to imagine how scientific studies are supposed to support (as opposed to change) philosophy--which is why David says I have a blindspot or lack of respect for science) or--God help us--an inner/outer distinction--clearly these demand some sort of explanation and, as need be, cuffs around the ears. I don't have much sympathy with such things, but then that's why David I and still have our own outstanding disagreements. If I had one practical suggestion for you, it would be to stop suggesting that David is saying that "the possible" exists outside of experience (after all, he explicitly denies it). If I had one practical suggestion for David, it would be to stop suggesting that you are denying that possibility exists (after all, you explicitly handle it). I consider the existence of both accusations to be a prime indication of cross purposes. When we encounter a formulation that seems to deny something obvious (some thing or some distinction we think we need), we should definitely ask for clarification on the score. Most redescriptions should be able to handle such events. If the resulting clarification still denies something needed, we should reject it (and, ya' know, criticize it). If it seems to handle it fairly enough, though we still don't find the redescription useful, we should probably consider it harmless. For instance, if Pirsig had asked for clarification about SOM's denial of the existence of values (from, say, a logical positivist like Ayer), the clarification would have been that they don't deny they exist, they just think they are cognitively meaningless. Since this still seems ugly and disputable, we should refine our criticisms accordingly and pursue our hunch that there's something wrong with it. What we shouldn't do, though, is continue with our pre-clarification accusations if they've been clarified away because that's what gives the appearance of the creation of a strawman (which is what Struan and Glenn used to say about Pirsig, and why you and David are spinning around in circles, with David suggesting that you need to get rid of your preconceptions--David's saying this like a good phenomenologist, but a Pirsigian, in my opinion, should have no truck with such a thing because without these "preconceptions," which are the static patterns being debated, there would be nothing to debate about; indeed, David's suggestion amounts to: "Just drop the way you think about it and think about it my way!"--that's not debate, that's replacement). Which is to say: both of you need to refine your terms of criticism so it doesn't look to people like me that the two of you are talking past each other. There may yet be something wrong with either one of your views on "the possible." I just can't see what it is because the water is still too muddy. My hunch is that there isn't, but that's just my guess. I'd be right if the two of you agreed with my intervention, but things like this usually aren't that easy. I only hope that it helps in some way. Matt _________________________________________________________________ Get a FREE Web site, company branded e-mail and more from Microsoft Office Live! http://clk.atdmt.com/MRT/go/mcrssaub0050001411mrt/direct/01/ moq_discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
