Hi Ron
Ron:
>> Perhaps I do not understand the genesis of this argument. You called
>> for thoughts about The origin of intellect. You poo-pooed the large
>> majority of the responses on basis of "Mystic rubbish". Pirsig divides
>> reality into 4 levels inorganic, biological, social and intellectual.
>> All of which work on the concept of "value". You seem to be making the
>> argument that Intellect came before social and that social is a result
>> of intellect that it was reasoned That gathering in societies was
>> valued more than individual survival.
Bo:
> Are you sure I am the target here, it looks distinctly like Magnus'
> about an intellectual level before the social level. It would have
> been useful with a quote of the points in question, at least I am
> strongly opposed to any shuffling around of the level sequence.
Even if Bo has left for a while, I must stress that I've never said anything
about the intellectual level appearing *before* the social! The level
dependency
is of the outmost importance to the MoQ and to me and I have on the contrary
defined the social level much broader than most for exactly this reason.
>> The question being Then is: are
>> human beings social creatures by instinct or by intellect? When
>> pavlovs dog Begins to salivate at the sound of a bell is the dog
>> intellectualizing on the biological level? Is adaptation, biological
>> intellect?
>
> Of course, this reaction isn't intellectual, it need not be dogs,
> humans may salivate too from sights and sounds too, it's our
> biology kicking in.
>
>> Hell, Pirsig eludes to intellect when he makes the
>> statement That molecules "prefer" the patterns they assume suggesting
>> that intellect of some sort even at The inorganic level. One
>> may even go as far as equating value with intellect in this regard. So
>> what is your take on this Bo, at the risk of you handing my head back
>> to me on a platter.
>
> No risk for heads on platters, as said I think Magnus is the guilty
> one here.
No, it's just Bo's misunderstanding again. And I have no idea why he suddenly
starts blaming *me* for Pirsig's statements?
Pirsig's use of verbs like "prefer" and "values" does not imply intellect. But
it *is* pretty central to the MoQ nonetheless. Such words are better at
describing reality since words like "cause" are too definite. Even if physical
events seem to be very deterministic, we know that they aren't. So it's only
possible to determine a probability for the outcome of an event, never
certainty.
I have a certain feeling you're also reading some kind of mind into those
words,
and then you make the SOM assumption that mind implies intellect. But in the
MoQ, I rather think that some sort of "mind" can be attributed to both subject
and object in all quality event, even inorganic ones. This kind of mind is of
course not intellectual in any way, and perhaps we shouldn't call it mind at
all
to avoid lots of other associations, but let's do it for a while here anyway.
Anyway, instead of having those words imply intellect (via mind), we should
only
let them imply this MoQ kind of mind and then I hope they make more sense.
BTW, after some further contemplation about this, I'd say that DQ has very much
to do with this MoQ kind of mind.
Magnus
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