Why "It's better here" is a response to DQ, and why this evolutionary force is active on all of the MOQ's levels.
Premise: Atoms, cats and people all respond to DQ, but their responses are limited to the repertoire of the levels from which the response originates. An animal, a biological pattern of value, responds to DQ from the confines of the biological level. A human responds to DQ not only with possibilities derived from the biological level, but with possibilities derived from her/his social and intellectual construction as well. Claims: This position derives from two points. (1) Evolution has not stopped on "lower" levels. (2) Animals respond to DQ, biologically, with the same repertoire of possibility that they have always had. Opposing: Opposition derives from the two opposing points. (1) Evolution has stopped on "lower" levels. (2) Animals at one time responded with a greater repertoire of possibility than they currently have. Point One: Has evolution stopped, or does it continue to occur, on the MOQ's lower levels? Point Two: Did animals behave differently in the past, with a greater repertoire of possibility, when they were able to respond to DQ? Or do they maintain the repertoire of possibility afforded them via the biological level "then" as "now"? Both of these claims are concerned with the emergence of new levels in the MOQ hierarchy. In one claim (mine), DQ continues to operate on each level, even after new levels emerge, with the difference being that the repertoire of responses to DQ is greatly increased for patterns on the new level. In the other (Platt's), DQ ceases to operate on previous levels, indicating that some "ability" is "lost" for those patterns. When social patterns emerged from the biological level, "biological patterns", such as animals, "lost" their ability to respond to DQ. Regarding the first claim (mine), the evidence should indicate that animals today act with the same repertoire of possibility that they have always had. An animal 10 million years ago, or 100 million years ago, responded to its environment, or acted, with the same biologically-enabled repertoire of possibility as any animal alive today. I can think of no evidence from the historical record to dispute this. I see no evidence that animals in the past had "DQ repsonses" that transcend the ability of modern animals. Regarding the second claim (Platt's), there should be evidence to indicate that animals in the past, 10 million or 100 million years ago, had the ability to respond to their environment, or act, with a greater repertoire of possibility than animals today. What evidence do we have of this? What possible examples of this could we speculate on? What were animals of the past able to do, in response to DQ, that animals of the present are unable to do? To date, Platt has offered two possible "responses" an animal in the past could have been able to do, that animals in the present are no longer able to do. (1) Die. (2) Stare at their tails in wonder. The first has never been revisited, so we can assume Platt realizes how absurd it is. The second was offered in a different context, but was offered as something that would constitute "evidence" that animals today "could" respond to DQ. We can extend this then to the supposition that when animals were responsive to DQ, they had a certain "wonderment" or level of consciousness that they no longer have. What is evident here is the absurdity of projecting a "human" response (a response enabled by social and intellectual patterns constituting "man") as evidence "in toto" of what a response to DQ would look like. For this, it is apparent, goes in one of two directions. Either (1) an animal "used to" be able respond to DQ similar to the way "man" does today, or (2) nothing could respond to DQ before "man". If "wonderment" is evidence of DQ-repsonsiveness, that means that (1) cats could respond with "wonderment" before "man" came along, or (2) nothing could respond to DQ before "man" came along. "Wonderment", I should note, is a possibility-towards-response enabled by social and intellectual patterns of value. These same positions extend to the "inorganic level", for we can read from the MOQ that "Dynamic Quality" was at one time operable on in the inorganic level; that is, "inorganic patterns" used to be able to respond to DQ. The question is (1) can they still, or (2) are they no longer able? Regarding the first claim (mine), the evidence should indicate that inorganic patterns act today with the same repertoire of possibility that they have always had. An atom 10 millions years ago, or 100 billion years ago, responded to its environment, or acted, with the same inorganically-enabled repertoire of possibility as an atom today. Regarding the second claim (Platt's), there should be evidence to indicate that atoms in the past, 10 million or 100 billion years ago, had the ability to respond to their environment, or act, with a greater repertoire of possibility than atoms today. What evidence do we have of this? What possible examples of this could we speculate on? What were atoms of the past able to do, in response to DQ, that atoms of the present are unable to do? The next logical question to consider is, what features of any given pattern (at any level) enable it to respond to DQ? In one claim (mine), since all patterns continue to be responsive to DQ from the possibilities afforded by their level, there is no "feature" other than "being" that enables anything to respond to DQ. In other (Platt's), since patterns "lose" the ability to respond to DQ when upper levels form, there must be some level-particular thing that (1) enables DQ-responsiveness (2) that is then lost. In other words, if animals continue to be responsive to DQ, we would see nothing "biologically or inorganically" that would differentiate a DQ-responsive animal from a modern non-DQ-responsive animal, since both continue to respond to DQ biologically (and, of course, inorganically). However, if animals "stopped" responding to DQ, there must be some "feature" that enabled DQ-responsive animals to respond to DQ that has been "lost" in modern animals. If not, why are animals "today" unable to respond to DQ, but animals in the past "could"? If there is no biological (or inorganic) adaption that enabled this, then were did this ability come from? The same holds true of inorganic patterns. If, as I propose, atoms today continue to respond to DQ as they always have, via an inorganically structurated repertoire of possibility, there would be no "difference" between atoms of the past and atoms of the present. However, if as Platt proposes, that atoms "lost" the ability to respond to DQ, then there must have been some "feature" of atoms of the past that enabled their responsiveness? If atoms of the past and atoms of the present are identical, then what was it that allowed atoms in the past to respond to DQ? DQ in Context: My view, that response to DQ occurs at all the MOQ's levels, but within a repertoire of possibility enabled by those levels, places DQ as a background by which all things move. That is, it is not the ability to respond to DQ that distinguishes a level, but the repertoire of possibility in response afforded by each level. It is not that atoms can't respond to DQ but mice can, but that atoms respond to DQ within an inorganically-structurated range of possibilty, while mice have a much greater repertoire of possibility (greater freedom) in how they are able to respond. Carrying this forward, it is not that mice can't respond to DQ, but humans can, but that mice are considerabley more restricted in the possibilities of their response than humans, who have a social- and intellectual-level repertoire of response (the greatest potential for freedom in the MOQ as it stands today). DQ out of Context: Platt's view, I argue, considers DQ to be an external force that applies itself, almost at whim, to certain things. When new things are created, it ceases to apply itself to the old thing and instead inhabits the new thing. DQ, then, is no longer part of the fabric of "all things", but something that applies itself only to a very limited subset of the cosmos (at present, only "man"). Here we see DQ more-or-less "manipulating" atoms to create mice, and when it does it abandons the inorganic level and begins "manipulating" mice. When it happened to create "man", it saw new possibilities and stopped messing around with other animals and attached itself soley to humans. Man as biological/Self as intellectual: According to my view, all animals of the order homo sapiens are born with (more-or-less) the same biological repertoire of responding to DQ. A "desert island baby" would possess similar biological repsonsiveness to DQ as a chemistry professor. But the repertoire of responses enabled by social, and later intellectual, participation affords the chemistry professor a far greater range of possbility-to-act (freedom) as the hypothetical "desert island adult". As Pirsig states, the "self", an intellectual pattern, is made possible not by biology (simply "I am"), but by that biological pattern's participation in "culture" (social patterns). Man/Self as biological: According to Platt's view, the logical stance would be that "man", simply by virtue of of existing biologically, is granted the gift of being responsive to DQ. Thus the repertoire of possibility-to-act for a "desert island adult" and a chemistry professor is similar. Both would share the same fundamental abilities in how they respond to DQ. Logically, this grounds the ability to respond to DQ is some biological feature of "man", perhaps a special appendix or neural trait. But if this is so, then how did other things, animals or atoms, respond to DQ before "man"? Did they also have this "appendix" and then lose it? Or if this appendix is NOT necessary for DQ, then why is it that only "man" can respond to DQ? In SODV, Pirsig makes the following statement; "... a static pattern of inorganic values," which is a definition the Metaphysics of Quality gives to "substance," is the same as "a pattern of probabilities"...". This is critical because I think it demonstrates, also, the "possibility" inherent in each of the MOQ's levels. "Probability" is simply an aggregate of the actualized "possibility" emanating out of the back of the car window. Static inorganic patterns, then, are "probability waves" (a term used in SODV) generated by the aggregated responses of inorganic patterns responding to DQ within the confines of an inorganic repertoire of possibility. The same is then true of upper levels, such as "static biological patterns", which are "biological probability waves" emanating out of the aggregate of actualized "possibility" as smaller biological patterns responding to DQ within the confines of a biological repertoire of possibility. (Jos, I think this is similar to what've said, no?) Granted, of course, "possibility" becomes less and less profound as we descend from the intellectual to the inorganic level. The repertoire of options a quark has to respond dynamically to its environment are minute compared to the repertoire of options available to a human. But, the critical point is that possibility, and hence DQ, is operable on the smallest inorganic level as it is on the highest intellectual level. This final point drives back to one of the questions presented early on, "has evolution 'stopped' at the lower levels?" If, as Platt says it has, then "possibility" no longer exists on these levels. Everything is "fixed" in a stable static pattern that is without possibility to change, adapt, evolve or grow. Given that "man" (in Platt's position) is the only "thing" capable of responding to DQ, inorganic and biological evolution has "stopped". To restate the premise in conclusion. The difference between the levels is not "what can or can't respond to DQ", but what repertoire of possibility each level affords in response to DQ. 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