Rick and all focusers: Valence said: ............................This is not to suggest that the narrator's pragmatism and Phaedrus's metaphysics can be reconciled, rather, it's to suggest that both carry on, in tension with each other, within the reawakened Phaedrus. This may be evidenced by the fact that the same tension carries on, as Matt has continuously pointed out, within the pages of his next book. No longer half-pragmatist zombie and half-metaphysician ghost, he's reintegrated, having regained possession of all of his faculties and thoughts... even the thoughts that conflict with other thoughts. Reading it this way, we may view the MoQ as the reawakened Phaedrus trying to design a metaphysics that can comfortably accommodate his pragmatic instincts as well (whether this attempt was a success is, I suppose, up to each of us to decide for ourselves). This tension might also explain (at least partially) the variation in the treatment of Socrates; the metaphysician in Phaedrus wants to lionize Socrates for dying for the truth, but the pragmatist in Phaedrus wants to remind us that truth is what is good in the way of our own beliefs.
dmb says: Yes, he is re-integrated. I think that's right. But I think its a case of over-interpreting things to contrue this as an integration of pragmatism and metaphysics. I mean, it strikes me as an imported element that too narrowly describes what Pirsig is doing and in terms Pirsig that does not employ. "Plato is the essential Buddha-seeker who appears again and again in each generation, moving onward and upward toward the 'one'. Aristotle is the eternal motorcycle mechanic who prefers the 'many'. I myself am pretty much Aristotelian in this sense, prefering to find the Buddha in the quality of the facts around me, but Phaedrus was clearly a Platonist by temperment and when the classes shifted to Plato he was greatly relieved. His Quality and Plato's Good were so similar that if it hadn't been for some notes..." ZAMM 331-2 dmb continues: Here we can see a tension between two kinds of Buddha-seekers, between the Platonic Phaedrus and the Aristotelian narrator. And these two are integrated in LILA by the MOQ inclusion of both DQ and sq, both the "one" and the "many". To construe this as a tension between pragmatism and metaphysics is to leave out the mystical, the Buddha-seeking and reduces Pirsig's distinction to a smaller battle, one he's not even fighting. I think this is a mis-interpretation that leaves DQ out of the picture and thereby misses the point. Rick also said: The answer I'm getting at is that is that there is no answer. I suggest we read LILA as a portrait of a philosophically conflicted free-thinker trying to get his beliefs to hang together. Those of us that want the individual worth themes of ZMM to carry over will (as Matt might say) cheer on Phaedrus when talks like a pragmatist and just stare at the ground innocently whistling when he starts cozying up to Socrates, and we'll just correct the MoQ accordingly (like your own Eudiamonic project, or Matt's Pragmatic MoQ). dmb says: Stare at the ground when he doesn't talk like a Pragmatist? Why would you wanna do that? And correct the MOQ accordingly? I just don't get that. I mean, anyone is free to reject philosophical mysticism in favor of a certain brand of Pragmatism, but what I don't get is the urge to remove the mysticism from the MOQ and otherwise pretend that pragmatism can't reside within the MOQ's philosophical mysticism. I think that when Philosophical mysticism is properly understood and pragmatism is NOT taken to extremes, the insights of post-modernism fit quite nicely and there is no tension between them within the MOQ. Like I said, I think the battle between metaphysics and pragmatism has been imported into these debates and Pirig simply isn't playing that game. Rick said to Sam: Pirsig talks about the relationship of arete with the MoQ starting on page 433 in my edition of LILA (he carries it back to the Sanskrit Rta - 'the cosmic order of things'). However, even after rereading the material, I'm not sure I have anything to add to the discussion of individual worth. See what you think. dmb says: Right. I spoke to this issue in yesterday's post. Harmony with the cosmic order. It seems worth pointing out what Pirsig said, that the idea of a cosmic order is not new. Its the oldest idea known to man. Once upon a time, it was best expressed in social level static forms and now we have notions like E=mc2. Once this order was controlled by the gods, but now it is expressed in intellectual terms, which are more true so much as more Dynamic. And its not even the particular forms which are important so much as the harmony behind them, the Quality that produced them. So it seems to me that individual human excellence consists not in one's ability to conform with any particular set of static patterns, any particular tradition, because they all more or less express that underlying Quality, but rather in one's ability to see through the forms, to see the point and purpose behind them. And then to "ride" them. I often return to the motorcycle analogy when confronted with the critics who would like to alter or delete parts of the MOQ. (Or, in Matt's case, most of the parts.) Let me be clear about this. I'm not saying that the MOQ is perfect, complete and beyond criticism. I'm not trying to protect any dogmas or doctrines from heresy. I'm just saying that taking the mysticism out of philosophical mysticism is like taking the motor out of a cycle. Its fine you you prefer peddle power, but why wreck a perfectly good machine just because you don't look good in leather? Its ok if Buddhism and mysticism just ain't you thing, but why try to remove it from the MOQ? Why stick around only to reject every major plank? Isn't it true that a pragmatist of this sort is simply at the wrong party? It seems to me that this urge to alter the MOQ so profoundly is based either based upon a misinterpretation or its deliberately intended to be offensive, like a black heckler at a KKK meeting. Either the guy doesn't get what's going on or he's actively looking for big trouble. Either way, I think its unwise. But of course the difference is not as stark as that analogy would suggest. The MOQ accepts the postmodern view that we utterly depend on language for the ability to think, that truth is provisional, that our beliefs are context dependent. But it does not go to the extremes. It doesn't limit us to language, a social level form. It doesn't deny the existence of intellectual truth or suggests that its merely a matter of arbitrary convention, it only recognizes the impermanence of truth as a series of evolutionary steps. And it does NOT insist that usefulness is the measure of all things. You see, one of the things that prevents the MOQ from asserting that our linguistic patterns are just a matter of utility and convienience is the idea of a cosmic order. This puts an entirely different spin on the nature of these inherited patterns. Rather than being arbitrary and conventional, these patterns are seen as a reflection of that order. This idea is especially vivid when we look at mythology because it is so conspicuously NOT an intellectual invention. In myths we can see how rich and profound the social level is, the level that has so very much to do with how and what we think. Myths are like dreams. We don't create them so much as they create us. And there we find the oldest idea known to man. Pirsig is expressing it intellectually in his MOQ, but this is really only a recognition of what we've (humanity)always believed. So when I see nihilistic postmodern pragmatist trying to remove the parts of the MOQ that speak to this I just wanna pull my hair out. And that makes me less than an excellent individual. Sigh. Thanks, dmb MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org Mail Archive - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_focus/ MF Queries - [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from moq_focus follow the instructions at: http://www.moq.org/mf/subscribe.html
