Hullo MFers,
The last question in this new topic seems the easiest to respond to. We would
recognise any
fifth level that emerged because of its quality, directly experienced, and because its
moral
imperatives clashed at some fundamental level with the imperatives of the intellectual
level.
This is assuming that Pirsig's structure is sound, of course.
So what can we say of the intellectual imperatives implied in the MOQ? Despite last
month's
discussion, it seems to me that the intellect values what is 'true' over what is
'good', in broad
terms. (Or perhaps this could be phrased differently as stating that the highest level
of the
good is true.) What Pirsig has done that transforms this, though, is make the
intellectual truth
subservient to the experience of the good, from which through a convoluted process our
concepts of the good have actually emerged, with a lot of input from the mythos. So
there is a
moderating effect on the truth as explored by the intellect: it can always be negated
by the
experience of dynamic quality. This pattern is essentially the same as the philosophy
of
science - something of a paradox given Pirsig's dislike of mainstream science. In
science the
negation of theory is achieved by experiment, while in the MOQ the intellect is
empowered
only as it conforms to dynamic experience.
While Pirsig has set up SOM as the enemy of quality, it is not clear to me that the
corrosion
of human values that marks this century is only about the loss of values. It is also
about the
loss of truth. The later structuralists, and especially the deconstructionists, have
argued that
philosophy is about the pursuit of power, rather than truth. (Susan Blackmore's view of
memes involved in a struggle for survival epitomises this view.) By conflating the term
'language' with formal systems, they have managed to convince themselves, and in so
doing
to substantially influence the mythos, in asserting that what is real is what belongs
to the
'ontology' of whatever 'language' we are using. Knowledge is no longer a matter of
justified
true belief, it becomes a matter of correct, or warranted, assertibility. It is a
system of
propositions or statements or sentences (the terms become interchangeable), and the
ideal
of knowledge is to be found in the scientific community, beause in some sense
scientific
knowledge is taken to be empirically sound. Philosphy, and metaphysics, is much
reduced in
this world-view, because it ends up describing the propositions of an accepted body of
knowledge, rather than prescribing them. Philosophy has no empirical function. More
fundamentally, subjectivity is eliminated as irrelevant. In terms of subject/object
metaphysics,
the whole movement has been to eliminate the subject. Creativity has been replaced by
productivity. Since everything is wrapped up in words, it is useles to try to get
behind the
words to some deeper reality; all that happens is that one enters an infinite regress.
So
outside of language there is only the ineffable. 'Reality' is no longer real, except
as a word in
a particular language.
What is required to counter this absolute destruction of human values is "a restorative
access to reality" (Edward Pols, Radical Realism, p41) Pols goes only part way, but in
stressing that we have access to 'direct knowing' of a primary kind, he points to what
Pirsig
has more amply described in the MOQ.
This detour into the philosophy that has tended to dominate the last quarter of this
century is
intended to point in two directions. On the one hand, it has further destroyed human
values,
and made the very idea of independant experience unthinkable. In that sense it is a
subtle
progression of the SOM type of thinking that Pirsig attacks. But at another level, it
is an
attack on the ability of the intellect to be anything other than a production of the
mythos
interacting with the mythos, generally for its own purposes, that is, to gain power.
It is thus
profoundly cynical. It seems to me that Pirsig's MOQ is rather vulnerable to this
insidious
doctrine, especially as Pirsig himself denigrates the 'me' as "just completely
ridiculous" (Lila
Ch 15) and replaces people with 'patterns of patterns'. While he accepts that we need
real
live people for these patterns to operate, they are simply the carriers of the memes,
whose
quality is unclear at the time, needing perhaps a hundred years for the quality
assessment to
become clear. Of course the people involved are by then 'ex-world'. People are useful
fictions, in a sense. Their value is simply derived from the quality of the patterns
they
exemplify, and that value will not become clear until after their deaths.
In terms of why it matters, Pirsg's metaphysics seems rather a flop. And putting the
intellect
at the top of the heap is disastrous. "This has been a century of fantastic
intellectual growth
and fantastic social destruction. The only question is how long this process can go
on." (Lila
Ch 13) If Pirsig's MOQ was only the static levels, it would be soulless. It is rescued
by his
profound assertion that we have access to the reality of quality as encountered in
dynamic
experience. And this quality is value laden. Value is right there at the most basic
level of
experience. Or is it?
Where Pirsig's thinking fails us is in his failure to grasp the complexity of quality.
Rather than
accept that quality resides in and has value at all levels of the static hierarchy, he
posits a
replacement of each level of values by the emerging level. Of course he is partly
correct.
Often the levels are in conflict, and when this occurs the 'higher' level must
overcome the
'lower' one to prevail. But there is a residue of value from each level that is
essential to our
human functioning. The intellect that totally ignores the body ends up in trouble, as
Phaedrus
found. Balance is required. Wisdom is not the same as intellect. We are holistic
organisms,
and while Pirsig has incisively demonstrated the value clashes between levels, he
fails to
adequately address the need for a fluid balance, changeable over time, that is perhaps
best
summarised in the phrase "the wisdom of the organism".
The second failure of Pirsig's thought is in his failure to adequately address the
complex
issue of what is really 'real'. Any worthwhile metaphysics should be able to shed some
light
on fantasy. For it is clear to me that most people, most of the time, live not in the
'real' world,
whatever that might mean, but in fantasy worlds constucted by their intellects. The
power of
fantasy is immense. Try this experiment. Attempt to hold your arms straight up over
your
head for the next hour or two. After ten minutes you are likely to be physically
exhausted, and
happy to tell me the exercise is physically impossible. Really? Visit your nearest
hypnotist,
and you will find that in a hypnotic 'trance' what was impossible becomes simple.
(Thanks to
Julian Jaynes for this example.) Intellect has produced huge benefits for mankind, and
as
Pirsig points out, has caused fantastic social destruction. It has also impinged on our
physical beings in destructive ways, and the damage to our psyches has been immense
too.
The loneliness that is the underlying motif of Pirsigs books is clearly one of these
impacts.
So, to return to the most difficult part of our question, I will venture that a fifth
level is needed
(Pirsig suggested a level of art, though it was unclear whether he was referring to
dynamic
quality, in general, or the specific quality of artistic creation which in my humble
view is not
the same as intellectual quality.) I will suggest that any emerging level will need to
do the
following things:
a) provide for an appropriate balancing of the varying forms of quality,
b) discriminate between dynamic quality and fantasies that mimic quality, and
c) restore contact between people.
I don't have a one word answer for this, but I would suggest that the emergent level
will be
focussed on contact and awareness.
John B
MOQ.org - http://www.moq.org
