C. D. Rok wrote: > Nelson B wrote: > > > In a recent post, someone here attempted to defend the practice of > > using insecure email as the sole means of confirming the legitimacy > > of a request for an SSL server certificate. I'm here to challenge > > that. I think it's SO BAD a practice, in fact, that I think mozilla > > should specifically say, in the policy, that that's not good enough > > for a CA that is admitted to mozilla's trusted root list. I am not > > targetting any particular CA here. I think this is a matter of policy > > for all CAs. > > There are two paradigms: > > a) An identity exists as a meta-category, and someone or something has > to ensure that the certificate is issued with a name that without any > possibility of doubt or error maps to that meta-identity. > > b) A certificate has a unique identifier (a "name") and all that the > certificate ensures is that the combination of certificate issuer > identification and the name associated with the certificate is > unique. > > Paradigm (a) is naive and will never work in practice. > > Paradigm (b) is what we must accept and learn to work with. > > CD Rok
I don't think that the two you list are the only two options. To me they read as the two sides of the binary assertions "we can depend on perfection from this part of the system." If I used the two suggested models as my only options in the pedestrian world I would never use a credit card in a store as I could not be assured a means of insurance or protection from fraud; instead the credit card system relies on the interaction of sub-perfect. When you soften (a) to require a high probability of accuracy rather than perfection you end up with a component you can build on. _______________________________________________ mozilla-crypto mailing list [email protected] http://mail.mozilla.org/listinfo/mozilla-crypto
