On 15 May 2005 06:56:10 GMT, Peter Gutmann <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Ram A Moskovitz <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > > >On 11 May 2005 14:32:53 GMT, Peter Gutmann <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > >> Ian G <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > >> It's already happened, Verisign were pretty much wiped out last year when > >> one > >> of their certs expired, resulting in a massive DDoS on crl.verisign.com. > >Are you sure that's what happened? > > It was pretty widely publicised at the time. > > >> Now > >> imagine what would happen if revocation checking were properly done in all > >> clients, where you'd get a DDoS that makes last year's one look trivial and > >> that continues 24/7. > > >I diagree. I think OCSP scales well enough that with reasonable client > >implemetaions it can be used for things like SSL server certificate > >validation and software publisher validation. > > OCSP doesn't scale at all, which is why recent "high-performance" OCSP > proposals break the protocol's security to allow replay attacks (Verisign for > example broke their implementation last year some time in order to get it to, > uhh, "scale", other vendors have done the same). The result is that you're > not getting a real certificate status any more, just a replay of an old out- > of-date status that may or may not be coming from an attacker. Nice warm > fuzzies, but little else.
Are you familiar with the high-performance proposal? _______________________________________________ mozilla-crypto mailing list [email protected] http://mail.mozilla.org/listinfo/mozilla-crypto
