OCSP doesn't scale at all, which is why recent "high-performance" OCSP proposals break the protocol's security to allow replay attacks (Verisign for example broke their implementation last year some time in order to get it to, uhh, "scale", other vendors have done the same). The result is that you're not getting a real certificate status any more, just a replay of an old out- of-date status that may or may not be coming from an attacker. Nice warm fuzzies, but little else.
If the status has a timestamp and a validity duration embedded in it, how can a replay attack be effective? An attacker could send an old response up until it expired, but that's no different from the browser getting that response itself at the time the attacker got it. The attacker is just acting as a cache.
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