I read the blog and comments briefly. Maybe I missed something or maybe there is a solution that's not clicking for me but here's the problem I see.
Let's say real-password = hash (domain-name + user-entered-password). Phisherman sets up a site and does not mark the password field as form element type password. He does however put a question mark (or whatever 'in page' feedback) as well as some javascript to asterisk out the not-really password field. The user will enter their password and the un-hashed password will be caught in the net. Since the algorithm and taget domain-name are know the bad-guy has all he needs. A solution to this is to make real-password = hash (domain-name + user-entered-password + salt). This way even given the password the bad-guy can't access the site with out brute force. The problem is that each browser instance must have it's own hard to guess salt and so site passwords are no longer portable with the user. A solution to that is to derive the salt from the master password; that works if I use the same master password at home as at work, though it still kills my ability to use my password at a kiosk where if they have mozilla they may not have a master password set, won't let me set a master password, or have a master password and won't tell me so that I can't change it. What did I miss? _______________________________________________ Mozilla-security mailing list [email protected] http://mail.mozilla.org/listinfo/mozilla-security
