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There is serious and growing controversy nationwide regarding the lack of reliability and verifiability of new electronic voting machines currently being implemented in various jurisdictions across the country. The basic conclusion of recent studies is that the machines put at serious risk our democracy, as each individual vote is not guaranteed. The software can be hacked and votes changed. The issue has now gained national attention with the reporting by Bev Harris and her book Black Box Voting (see this and other links below). In short, my limited understanding of the issue is this: The machines in dispute are referred to as direct recording electronic (DRE) machines. They are touch screen machines WITHOUT a paper trail, which is the only way to verify votes in the case of a recount. Several recent elections are suspected of being tampered with due to the unreliability of these machines and the fear is of what's to come. The machines are manufactured mainly by Diebold and Elections Software Systems (ES&S), both of which are known to be strong Republican Party supporters/financiers. While this does not automatically indict the companies of the intent to commit fraud, it means that the public is not guaranteed of the company's neutrality with respect to voting outcomes. This is concerning given that the machine's software has been considered by several courts to be proprietary. All states are required to upgrade their voting machines by 2006 to comply with the Help America Vote Act (HAVA), following the disputed 2000 presidential elections. One of the purported reasons for the required upgrades is to allow voting by the visually impaired. But what is reportedly occurring is that the new DRE machines are being pushed by the manufactures and the federal government despite serious concerns regarding their reliability, verifiability (lack of a paper trail for purposes of a recount), and proprietary (i.e., nonpublic) nature of the software. There's much to read, with the following websites providing a good start. www.commondreams.org/headlines03/1013-01.htm www.blackboxvoting.com/ www.co.hennepin.mn.us/pa/factsheets/FSelections.htmwww. informationclearinghouse.info/article4031.htmwww. informationclearinghouse.info/article1900.htmwww.sos.state.mn.us/HAVA/HAVA.html I'm very concerned about this issue and so I read up on the voting machines in Hennepin County (the jurisdiction responsible for Minneapolis' voting system) and called Hennepin County's Election Information Department (see Hennepin County link above). I talked with David Maeda, Hennepin County Elections Specialist, who gave me permission to use his name as a source of information. This is what I learned:
According to David Maeda, Hennepin County is trying to stay ahead of the curve with respect to the mandate to move to the new touch screen machines by 2006. He shared that there is movement at the state level toward an the use of all DRE machines. The County has concerns regarding reliability and verifiability of these machines if they do not produce a paper trail. It is currently looking at ES&S's newest DRE machines that may produce a paper trail and an alternative technology that would also comply with the federal law to accommodate the visually impaired and include a paper trail mechanism. There is a prototype now underway by a company named Vogue Elections, based in Chicago. (I don't know anything more about this other than what David Maeda shared with me, so some additional research on this would be worthy). My understanding is that state law currently requires voting machines that produce a paper trail. The law may change of course, but, according to David Maeda, there would be a concern among Hennepin and other counties. Interestingly, according to David, the State has approved the use of some paperless DRE machines on an experimental basis in this November's city and school district elections. Voters will vote with the existing machines and cast an unofficial ballot on a new DRE machine. While the RFP for the machines included a requirement to produce an audit trail, none of the competing vendors (including Diebold and ES&S) met the requirement. Nonetheless, the machines were certified for experimental use in the upcoming election. This raises a serious red flag of what might be coming in the future. While we in Hennepin County are not at significant risk of voting machine fraud at this time, we should remain watchful and keep asking questions as any new technology is implemented in our county or state. I will be doing some more inquiring to verify what I am hearing from the County and to assess the direction the State is taking regarding voting technology. According to the Secretary of State's website, the State of Minnesota has developed a State Plan for the implementation of HAVA, a requirement to receive federal HAVA funds. The Plan was developed by a HAVA Advisory Committee, consisting of state and county election officials, legislators, and representatives of interest and advocacy groups. It's not yet available on line, but you can call 651-284-4173 to receive a copy. Lastly, a side, but important issue, is the Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) readiness of the Hennepin County machines, should IRV ever become law in Minneapolis or other jurisdiction. The current machines are not IRV ready but, according to David Maeda, ES&S started to make changes to its software to allow for this type of voting in San Fransisco. David does not know the current status of these changes. If anyone knows more about the voting machine issue, I hope you share it and keep the conversation about this issue moving forward. Jeanne Massey Kingfield |
