But to answer Ron Leurquin's question: The idea is that the "receipt" is printed out in such a way that the voter can check it, then it is deposited in to a safe collection box. I think that the usual system recommended for this is one in which the receipt is only visually, not physically accessible to the voter in order to ensure that it is deposited, and there is a mechanism for corrections and complaints if the voter spots a problem.
Such a system easily ensures relatively good accountability since it will be immediately obvious to a voter if the machine is changing the vote on the receipt. And if the machine changes the votes tallied in the machine but not on the receipt then there is a mechanism for detecting this (counting the receipts), especially if the votes in the machine tally must are attached to their physical receipts by a unique identifier. Any recount would have to be done on the receipts, not by the machines since they shouldn't count wrong anyway (though the Diebold machines have in the past, don't ask me how).
This isn't really Minneapolis specific, but I hope it does clear up some questions about how such a system would and should work if it's installed in Minneapolis.
Ethan Jewett the Wedge
Even if a DRE creates a paper trail, how can any of us be assured that the paper trail is actually what we voted.
Ron Leurquin Nokomis East
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