On Sep 24, 2006, at 4:33 PM, Mark Kent wrote:
Remember, we're not talking about RFC1918 space,
where there is a BCP that says we should filter it at the edge.
We're talking about public IP space, that just doesn't happen to be
announced outside of a particular AS.
If the intent is to prevent folks from reaching out and touching
random network infrastructure devices directly whilst still allowing
traceroute to work, iACLs and/or using IS-IS as one's IGP and null-
routing the infrastructure blocks at one's various edges achieves the
same effect with less potential for breakage:
http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0405/mcdowell.html
Note that a good infrastructure addressing plan is a prerequisite for
both of these methods.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Roland Dobbins <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> // 408.527.6376 voice
Any information security mechanism, process, or procedure which can
be consistently defeated by the successful application of a single
class of attacks must be considered fatally flawed.
-- The Lucy Van Pelt Principle of Secure Systems Design
